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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigated the effects of performance deficits on the 
development of cognitive competence in children with Down's 
Syndrome (DS). Fifty-one DS subjects ranging in age between 3 months 
and 16 years participated in 5 cross-sectional and 2 longitudinal studies. 
Performance was studied both in a standardised assessment situation and 
in response to a set of discrimination learning tasks. 
Each of the 4 assessment studies revealed a substantial differential 
between levels of performance and true competence in this group of DS 
subjects. Although overall levels of 'IQ' found were similar to those 
reported in previous studies of cognitive ability in DS children, item-item 
analyses and analyses of test behaviour revealed a strong tendency to 
underperform. Task avoidance was frequent, resulting in very poor 
levels of test-retest reliability. A pattern emerged from the longitudinal 
data suggesting that there may be a causal relationship between this test-
retest unreliability and the apparent loss of skills at later age levels. It was 
found that children often withheld demonstration of optimal levels of 
performance on tasks with which they had encountered difficulty at 
younger age levels. 
The implications of the results from the assessment studies are 
three-fold: firstly, the repeated evidence of unreliable performance and of 
developmental instability suggests that psychometric methods of 
cognitive assessment should be used with great caution with this 
population of mentally handicapped children; secondly, and relatedly, it 
suggests that theories of development in DS based on outcome measures 
obtained from such tests may be inaccurate; thirdly, the frequency with 
which children were seen to 'lose' skills suggests that teaching effort 
should be focussed not only on encouraging the development of new 
skills but also on ensuring the consolidation of these skills once acquired. 
Three discrimination learning studies investigated whether an 
errorless learning procedure might enhance motivation to perform to 
full competence and increase performance reliability. Results from the 
first two studies were highly encouraging: with this technique DS 
subjects quickly learned the target discrimination and this skill was 
reliably demonstrated over 4 testing sessions. Results from a third study 
indicated, however, that the technique was of little value in teaching 
learning skills per se: learning did not transfer to a second, very similar 
discrimination task. It was concluded that while errorless learning 
procedures have a useful role to play in teaching DS children that they 
can learn, they may be most effective when used in conjunction with 
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This thesis will present a study of early cognitive development in 
children with Down's Syndrome (DS), placing particular emphasis on the 
relationship between performance and competence in the development 
of learning difficulties in this population. Although the focus will be on 
Down's Syndrome, it is hoped that findings may be of relevance to the 
field of mental handicap in general. 
The study of development in handicap: practical considerations 
It is encouraging to note that the study of development in handicap 
would at last appear to be receiving the research attention it deserves. At 
the recent European Conference on Developmental Psychology (August 
1990) a substantial number of presentations concerned a variety of 
handicapping conditions. Given the sheer size of the population of 
individuals with handicaps this recent increase in attention could hardly 
be seen to be unwarranted. Warnock (1978) concluded that "up to one in 
five children at some time in their school career will require some form 
of special educational provision". Wynn and Wynn (1979) reported that 
about 1% of the U.K. population are so severely handicapped that they 
will require help throughout their lives with many or all basic skills. A 
further 10% are so severely handicapped that it is unlikely that they will 
find more than the humblest sort of employment. Wynn and Wynn 
estimated that in Britain 130,000 children under the age of 15 are very 
severely handicapped, and that a further 30,000 handicapped children are 
being born every year. In the U.S.A., Babson and Benson (1971) estimate 
that 50,000 babies a year are born with severe malformations, and an 
additional 300,000 have some degree of learning difficulty, ranging from 
mild to severe. 
Clearly, not only do the handicapped represent one of the most 
disadvantaged sections of the population, they also represent a significant 
proportion of that population. In their own right they have a clear case 
for claiming a proportionate amount of the resources available for 
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research. It could be further argued, that given the severity of their 
disadvantage there is indeed a case for claiming a greater than 
proportionate amount of these resources. 
Today, because of the nature of recent reforms in government policy 
towards handicapped groups, the claim to these resources could be seen to 
be even more pressing than ev:er before. One such series of reforms 
relates to the new impetus to care for the mentally handicapped in the 
community. Following the launch of the DHSS 'Care in the Community' 
initiative (1983) there has been a shift in policy towards the more rapid 
closure of hospitals for the mentally handicapped and an associated 
switch of resources from health boards to local authorities. In conjunction 
with these changes, as a result of the publication of the Warnock Report 
(1978), there has also been a move towards integrating mentally 
handicapped children into mainstream s~hools. 
To ensure the successful implementation of the above reforms it 
would seem vital that we continue to increase our knowledge of the 
specific needs of individuals with mentally handicapping conditions. In 
particular, there can be little doubt that educational integration can only 
be effective if those who work within the mainstream education system 
are adequately informed about the development of children with mental 
handicap. 
Practical problems in working with handicapped populations 
Although there is a pressing need for more knowledge of the 
development of children with mental handicap, it is important to 
acknowledge, at this point, that there are a number of practical problems 
in carrying out research with this population. Before discussing these, it is 
perhaps worth noting that there are problems inherent in all 
developmental and other social science research dependent on the 
availability and cooperation of subjects. Epidemiologists have long been 
concerned with the effects of subject loss and unresponsiveness on the 
outcome of both experimental and non-experimental investigations (e.g., 
Cox, Rutter, Yule & Quinton, 1977; McMahon & Pugh,1970). Several 
studies have drawn attention to the importance of this problem in infant 
research. It has been estimated that up to 30% of infants who participate 
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in experiments within the first half year of life are discarded as subjects 
because they fail to provide valid data (Lewis and Johnson 1971). 
Investigation of those infants excluded from data analysis on the grounds 
of uncooperativeness or unresponsiveness suggest that there are in fact 
differences between those infants who complete tests and those who do 
not (Lewis and Johnson 1971; DeLoache, Rissman and Cohen 1978). The 
results of a recent study by Wachs and Smitherman (1985) lend further 
support to the suggestion that incomplete data or subject loss are not 
randomly determined and may bias findings. 
In the field of mental handicap research a number of additional 
problems compound those outlined above. Until the 1960s, a major 
confounding factor in the study of handicapped populations was the 
institution in which the children were living. As a consequence of a 
number of studies demonstrating the deleterious effects of 
institutionalisation on development (Tizard 1960, Stedman and Eichorn 
1964, Bayley et al 1966), studies comparing handicapped institutionalised 
children with non-handicapped children living in their parental home 
were heavily criticised on the grounds that it was impossible to determine 
whether results reflected genuine differences in potential between the 
two populations or simply the effects of institutionalisation. With the 
move towards integrating handicapped sections of the population into 
society, this has become less of a problem for researchers; handicapped 
children are now being brought up in an environment similar to that of 
their non-handicapped peers. 
However there are still a number of difficulties in ensuring that 
mentally handicapped children available for participation in research 
studies are representative. Many forms of handicap are associated with 
additional health difficulties. For example, in a study of 480 children with 
disabilities of varying aetiologies, it was found that over half of the 
sample had been admitted to hospital at least once in the previous year 
(Baldwin 1985). The implications of these findings are twofold: firstly, 
only the healthiest children may be available for inclusion in research 
samples and secondly, there may be a considerable amount of subject loss 
due to illness among those who do .participate. The effects of long periods 
of illness and/ or hospitalisation on development must also be taken into 
account. 
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The availability of subjects for psychological research is also 
dependent on parents volunteering their child, or at the very least giving 
parental consent to their being included in a particular research study. 
The 'costs' of having a handicapped child, in terms both of time and 
economics, may to some extent affect these decisions. Sample bias may 
arise also from differences betw:een individual parents' inclinations to 
allow their children to take part in investigations. Implici~ in the decision 
to volunteer a child for handicap research is an acceptance - which cannot 
always be assumed - of that child's handicap. 
The study of development in handicap: its relevance to mainstream 
developmental psychology 
Despite these considerable practical difficulties, it still remains 
crucial that we continue to increase our knowledge of development in 
handicapped children. In a~dition to the obvious value to the 
handicapped themselves, findings from handicap research have a large 
contribution to make to developmental psychology as a whole. It is 
essential that any attempt to explain the processes which contribute to 
successful, adaptive behaviour should also be able to explain how and 
why it is that these processes are interrupted in abnormal development 
(Cichetti and Sroufe 1978; Cichetti and Pogge-Hesse 1982; Cichetti and 
Shneider-Rosen 1983). This approach is not new; historically, scientists in 
a number of disciplines have pointed to the need for looking at the 
relationship between normal and abnormal patterns of development. 
Comparisons of atypical and normal populations increase our 
understanding of how specific abnormalities can affect development. 
They can also help identify factors influencing development which are 
less obviously manifested in the development of non-handicapped 
children. Studies have shown that children with visual, hearing and 
motor handicaps can achieve developmental skills very similar to those 
acquired by non-handicapped children. This would seem to indicate that 
sight, hearing and mobility are not prerequisites for the development of 
specific abilities. These disabilities may, however, influence the way in 
which specific skills are acquired. the development of reaching in blind 
children, for example, has been observed to follow a different 'route' 
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from that seen in sighted children, highlighting the role vision plays in 
making the association between the tactual and auditory properties of an 
object in sighted children. Blind children do come to make this 
· associ.ation, but very much later, indicating that it is possible to integrate 
information in different ways to reach similar levels of understanding 
(Fraiberg 1977). 
Results from studies of the development of children with mental 
handicap can similarly increase our understanding of the relationship 
between chronological age and mental age in the development of certain 
abilities. Because chronological and mental age are very closely linked in 
the normal population, it is difficult to tease the two apart in studies 
using only non-handicapped children. Consequently it is frequently only 
possible to speculate on developmental links between domains such as 
cognition and emotion. By investigating mentally handicapped children, 
an atypical population in which mental and chronological ages are not so 
closely interrelated, less speculative conclusions can be drawn. 
Why study Down's Syndrome rather than other forms of mental 
handicap? 
There are a number of advantages to focussing on DS in any research 
on early development in children with a mental handicap. DS is a 
chromosomal abnormality which can be identified at birth and affects a 
large number of children - approximately 1 in every 660 children born. 
Whereas other forms of mental handicap may take as long as two or even 
five years in some cases to diagnose, the availability at such an early stage 
in development of such a large number of children, guaranteed by their 
condition to demonstrate some degree of mental handicap, presents a 
vast resource for studying early development in the mentally 
handicapped child. 
The fact that the syndrome contains within it three differing types -
trisomy 21, translocation and mosaicism - is an added advantage. 
Mosaicism, for example, is believed by some to have a more favourable 
developmental prognosis than the other two forms of DS. Although 
there is still considerable disagreement as to whether mosaic DS children, 
having only a proportion of trisomic cells, are or are not generally less 
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retarded than those with full trisomy 21, what is known is that some of 
the least retarded cases of DS are mosaic (Hamerton, Gianelli and Polani 
1963, Fishier 1975). In general, however, there is substantial variation in 
intellectual ability among individuals with DS (see Gibson 1978), a 
prerequisite for any research into development and developmental 
proces~es. 
The size of the population of individuals with DS would in itself 
seem to warrant more research than has been done to date. DS accounts 
for one third of the population of the severely mentally retarded. This 
incidence rate - which is universal - seems to have remained relatively 
constant over time. Prevalence, however, has increased greatly, both 
through the reduction of mortality rates and the extension of life 
expectancy. 
Presently-available screening methods appear to have had 
disappointingly little impact on overall incidence rates. Despite recent 
developments based on a composite risk factor derived from serum 
concentrations of alpha fetoprotein, unconjugated oestriol, human 
chorionic gonadotrophin and maternal age (Wald et al 1988), problems 
inherent in this strategy make it unlikely that it will be widely adopted in 
the near future. Although it is claimed that this screening procedure 
could identify as many as 60% of all affected pregnancies, as Donnai and 
Andrews (1988) point out, it would introduce the problem of having to 
discriminate between those women with low composite risks and those 
who would normally have been offered amniocentesis on the basis of age 
alone. Current practice uses age as the basis for screening but this means 
that only about 30% of all DS pregnancies are potentially detectable; two 
thirds of DS babies are born to mothers under 35, the usual cut-off point 
for screening. In fact fewer than half of those women entitled to screening 
on age grounds actually present for amniocentesis with the result that the 
detection figure stands at about 15% (Wald et al 1988). Although screening 
has reduced the number of DS births born to older women, a reported 
drop in fertility in mothers over 35 (i.e. in the 'at risk' category) in 
conjunction with stable incidence rates may imply that there is an 
increase in the number of younger mothers giving birth to DS children 
(Mikkelsen 1977; Evans et al 1978). 
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As yet, there is no means of identifying which parents are most 
likely to be at risk of having a child with DS. There are some cases in 
which the rarer forms of the syndrome - translocation and mosaicism -
can be inherited but as these forms of DS only account respectively for 5-
6% and 1-2% of the total population with the syndrome, this would have 
little iinpact on the overall i~cidence figures. Down's Syndrome is 
therefore a condition likely to continue to be with us, certainly in the 
foreseeable future and as such it is important to maintain our efforts to 
investigate its effects on development. 
Problems specific to DS 
At this point it is worth discussing more specifically the problems 
encountered in carrying out research on development in this particular 
population. It is important to note, however, that the majority of these 
problems are health-related and are therefore to a large degree becoming 
surmountable. Over the past 20 years dramatic improvements in both life 
expectancy and the quality of life have been recorded for DS children. 
Whereas in 1958, 70% failed to survive the first ten years with 63% dying 
in the first year and 30% before four weeks of age (Carter 1958), these 
mortality rates have now been reduced by 50-60% (Thase 1982). 
The most common cause of infant mortality in DS is still respiratory 
infection, but treatment with antibiotics and better general medical care 
has dramatically reduced the number of deaths from pneumonia. The 
second major cause of death in DS is heart disease; approximately one in 
two DS children are born with a congenital heart defect (Greenwood and 
Nadas 1976, Rowe and Uchida (1960). This contrasts with a reported 
incidence of 0.7% to 1% in the population as a whole (Richards et al 1955; 
Mitchell et al 1971; Keith et al 1978). Medical advances in treatment, in 
surgery, and in advice available for parents on day to day management of 
a child with heart disease have led to vast improvements in the survival 
rate and quality of life of the DS child born with a cardiac defect. Although 
there is still a high mortality rate in DS infants and children who need to 
undergo cardiac surgery (approximately 38%), Katlick et al (1977) found no 
obvious differences between these figures and the figures from 
comparable cardiac surgery on non-DS children. This runs contrary to the 
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previous supposition that DS added to the mortality and morbidity of 
cardiac surgery. 
These medical advances have not only led to an increase in the 
numbers of DS children potentially available for research, but also offer a 
greater opportunity to study their development proceeding more 
'normally', without the intrusion . of additional health difficulties. 
Another practical problem which is being both recognised and 
overcome is that there is a high rate of visual and hearing problems 
associated with the syndrome. Visual defects have been reported to affect 
approximately 67% of individuals with DS (Gardner 1967). Refractive 
errors, short and long sightedness, and astigmatism are common 
(Gardner 1967, Fanning 1971) but can all be corrected with spectacles. 
Hearing loss is also frequently reported in children with DS. 
Rigrodsky et al (1961) reported 60% of those in their study to have hearing 
deficits, mainly in the moderate to slight range; in a study of 24 infants 
Cunningham and McArthur (1981) reported that 80-85% had moderate to 
severe hearing losses; in a group of 51 Down's adults Keiser et al (1981) 
found that 74% had some degree of hearing impairment; Nolan et al 
(1980) reported an incidence of 69%. The majority of problems arise from 
otitis media, a dysfunction of the middle ear. Although the immediate 
results of surgery for this condition (including the insertion of grommets) 
are often positive, the long term results are so poor that this means of 
treatment has largely been abandoned (Davies 1985). However hearing 
aids are becoming increasingly widely used with generally favourable 
results. 
Previously the developmental effects of auditory and visual defects 
were mistakenly identified as the result of mental deficiency. It has 
however been shown that diagnosis and treatment of such conditions can 
lead to significant improvement in many aspects of development (see e.g. 
Davies 1985). 
Clearly, the improvements outlined above in relation to the health 
of children with OS have to a large degree removed what was previously 
a major obstacle to research with this population of children. It is 
important to recognise, however, that several additional factors associated 
8 
with this condition still present problems in ensuring the 
representativeness of DS children in relation to the wider population of 
children with mental handicap. Over and above the prevalence of 
respiratory, cardiac, visual and hearing problems, DS children almost 
without exception are hypotonic at birth, i.e. have poor muscle tone; this 
may h~ve effects on their early motor development not present in other 
mentally handicapped groups (Cowie 1970). In addition, the consistent 
finding that DS females demonstrate higher levels of ability than males 
(Brousseau and Brainerd 1928; Sternlicht and Wanderer 1962; Clements et 
al 1976; La Veck and La Veck 1977) reduces their representativeness of the 
handicapped population in general in which there appears to be little 
difference in ability between the sexes. 
Theoretical considerations in studying development in DS children 
Despite the alleviation of many of the practical difficulties discussed 
above, there are still a number of theoretical considerations which 
potentially provide obstacles to researchers studying development in DS 
children. Until the 1970s it was generally believed that, because DS 
children demonstrate identifiable physiological, biochemical and/ or 
anatomical deficits contributing to their handicapping conditions the 
developmental process in DS should be conceptualised as being 
qualitatively different from that of MA-matched handicapped children 
showing no obvious organic impairment. Edward Zigler, a major 
proponent of this viewpoint, suggested that organically handicapped 
groups may follow a quite different set of developmental pathways to 
non-handicapped persons and may manifest a kind of cognitive 
functioning that differs qualitatively rather than quantitatively from 
normal developmental processes. A fuller discussion of this 
difference/ delay debate can be found in Chapter 3. 
More recently a group of researchers in the USA have advocated the 
application of a more 'liberal' developmental perspective to individuals 
with DS and to other groups of organically handicapped persons. With 
this shift in perspective a considerable amount of research attention is 
being paid to highlighting the similarities in the developmental processes 
in organically handicapped and normally developing children. 
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The application of this perspective has given rise to two major 
hypotheses on development in organically handicapped groups such as 
DS. The first- the similar sequence hypothesis - is based upon the classical 
developmental principle of directed change. The basic tenet of this 
principle is that there are regular and invariant sequences of 
development all leading towards a clear endpoint. Piaget, a major 
proponent of this position, hypothesised that the child traverses cognitive 
stages in invariant order, beginning with sensorimotor modes of 
thinking and ending with the acquisition of formal operational thought. 
Application of this principle in research in handicap has resulted in the 
search for evidence of similar sequences of development in populations 
such as DS. 
Piaget also held that the child's progression through these stages of 
development was characterised by both qualitative and quantitative 
changes. Language acquisition, for example, involves not only such 
quantitative achievements as the increasing size of the child's vocabulary 
but also a qualitative restructuring of internal mental schemes. Whereas 
the sensorimotor (prelinguistic) infant has only action schemes, the 
preoperational child can represent events in language and other symbol 
systems. 
The second and complementary similar structure hypothesis on 
development in mental handicap draws upon the principle of qualitative 
change. This hypothesis predicts that across all areas of cognitive 
functioning handicapped children should perform equally well from task 
to task - in the same way that normally developing children do. 
Both hypotheses encompass the orthogenetic principle (Werner 
1948, 1957) which states that development proceeds from a state of 
relative globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing 
differentiation, articulation and hierarchic integration. 
The work of Piaget and Werner largely focussed on children's 
achievements in the cognitive and linguistic domains. Although the 
basic principles outlined by both researchers still form the backbone of 
more contemporary expansions of developmental theory, more emphasis 
is now placed on non-cognitive domains such as social, emotional, 
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motivational and personality development. In short, it is now generally 
held that children are more than thinking organisms and that a complete 
understanding of the child cannot be achieved through examination of 
the development of cognitive and linguistic capacities alone. This 
'expanded' theory of development has also been applied to the study of 
development in mentally handicapped populations. 
It is also now widely accepted in mainstream developmental 
ps'ychology that the process of development is most profitably studied as 
an integrated whole rather than as a sum of distinct and separate 
domains. It is accepted, for example, that failure to take into account the 
influence of emotional factors on the development of cognition can only 
result in an incomplete and inadequate picture of the complexity of the 
developmental process. Current developmental theory as a result has 
shifted emphasis away from the study of isolated fragments of social, 
emotional and cognitive behavioral systems, and now focusses on the 
interrelationships between these different systems. The following section 
provides a brief outline of some of the research on development in DS 
which has adopted this perspective. 
Applying the 'expanded' developmental perspective to children with 
DS 
Affect and temperament: A number of studies of the emergence of 
affective responses in DS infants have suggested that development in this 
domain is closely related to cognitive development. Strong correlations 
have been found to exist between level of cognitive development and the 
level of complexity of stimuli which make DS infants laugh, for example 
(Cicchetti and Sroufe 1976). In a later study Cicchetti and Serafica (1981) 
found that levels of positive affect were also related to the intensity of 
negative reactions to the visual cliff situation. Although infants with OS 
show later onset of both crying and laughter than non-handicapped 
infants of similar ages, studies of their responses to items designed to 
elicit smiling and laughter or fear and distress reactions have found that 
the development of positive and negative affect proceeds through a 
similar series of stages to that seen in their non-handicapped peers. 
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Such findings, it is claimed, point to the similarity of structure and 
of sequence in the development of affect in DS and non-handicapped 
children. Differences have been found between the two populations, 
however, in terms of the intensity of affect expressions. Although, 
overall, studies with both infants and toddlers have produced equivocal 
results; several have found children with DS to demonstrate less positive 
and negative affect than normally developing children of the same 
chronological age (Rothbart and Hanson 1983) and developmental level 
(Gunn et al 1981; Marcovitch et al 1986). Parent report measures have also 
suggested differences between DS and non-handicapped children along 
the dimensions of threshold attention and threshold level. The 
persistence of such differences across age groups (i.e infants and toddlers), 
it has been proposed, may reflect temperament differences between these 
two populations of children (Cicchetti and Ganiban 1990). 
Similar findings have. also emerged from comparisons of DS and 
non-handicapped infants with regard to the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of attachment and stranger fear responses. The majority of 
children with DS form secure attachment relationships with their 
caregivers (Thompson et al 1985), and although they develop at a slower 
pace, it has been suggested that the attachment, affiliation and 
fear /wariness systems of infants with DS are similarly organised to those 
in normal infants (Cicchetti and Serafica 1981). Again, however, infants 
with DS have been shown to demonstrate less intense separation distress, 
longer response latencies, briefer recoveries and a smaller range of affect 
lability in their responses in comparison to normally developing infants 
'of the same MA orCA (Thompson et al 1985). 
A number of biological studies have produced findings which may 
in part explain these differences found between DS and normally 
developing children in relation to temperament. Studies of 
neurotransmitters have pointed toward decreased functioning of both the 
parasympathetic and sympathetic branches of the peripheral nervous 
system, and decreases in serotonergic activity thought to affect 
consciousness (Weinshilbaum et al 1971; Keele et al 1969; Casanova et al 
1985; Yates et al 1980; Scott et al 1983). These difference may predispose 
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infants with DS to be more passive or less reactive than other children of 
similar ages . . 
In addition, neuroanatomical studies have found that DS affects the 
maturation of the brain (Becker et al 1986; Purpura 1975; Takashima et al 
1981). Investigations of the growth of neuronal networks in the brains of 
infants· and children with DS have suggested that after a short period of 
growth within the first few months of life, the maturation of the brain 
seems to decrease relative to that of the normally developing brain. It has 
been speculated that these restrictions may place restraints on the rate of 
development and the onset of transition and changes in temperament 
characteristics. Delayed neurological development, it has been suggested, 
might also affect the development of forebrain inhibitory tracts which are 
important for self-regulation of both arousal and attention. 
Loveland (1987) has speculated that poorly developed inhibitory 
mechanisms may also explain the differences in attention level and 
information-processing abilities which have been found to exist between 
DS and non-handicapped children. Studies comparing the two 
populations have noted that youngsters with DS generally have long 
attention spans and appear to be less distractible than their normally 
developing peers (Miranda and Fantz 1973,1974; Gibson 1978; Cohen 1981; 
Loveland 1987). DS children have also been noted to be more visually 
attentive in their interactions than normally developing infants 
(MacTurk et al 1985; Vietze et al 1983). If such inhibitory mechanisms are 
impaired, the DS child's ability to disengage from a task or to redirect 
attention may suffer simply because the physical ability to self-regulate is 
impaired. 
Studies that have used selective attention as a measure of 
information processing have shown delays in development when tasks 
have required higher level processing. In both visual and auditory 
domains, investigations of this capacity have concluded that although 
individuals with DS possess the basic ability to perceive information 
accurately, they appear to be delayed in their ability to utilise and interpret 
their experiences to the same extent as normally developing infants 
(Fantz, Fagan and Miranda 1975; Glenn, Cunningham and Joyce 1981). 
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Play and communication: Slower information processing capacities 
may explain the delayed pace of play development also found in children 
with DS. As in the domains of affect and attachment, DS development in 
this area follows a similar sequence to that seen in normally developing 
infants. Pre-symbolic play is characterised by a progression from 
predominantly visual-tactual obj~ct exploration and manipulation to the 
manipulation of objects in relational and combinatorial ways. The 
symbolic play of children with DS, although emerging at a delayed pace, 
progresses through the same developmental sequences of decentration, 
decontextualisation and integration in object and social play that 
characterise the play development of non-handicapped children in early 
childhood (Beeghly and Cicchetti 1987; Hill and McCune-Nicolich 1981; 
Motti et al 1983). Levels of sophistication of play have also been found to 
correlate with levels of overall cognitive development (Beeghly et al 
1989). The same researchers have also noted, however, that one 
important distinguishing characteristic of the play of children with DS is 
that although it does become increasingly more abstract, it is still more 
concrete than that of their normally developing peers. 
Beeghly et al also found dimensions of social play to correlate 
significantly with levels of play maturity and cognitive development. 
Differences were found between DS and MA-matched non-handicapped 
children, however, in the extent to which they would engage in social 
play. DS children spent significantly less time engaging with their peers 
and were rated as being less responsive and initiating than their 
cognitively matched controls during social interaction. 
In spite of this difference, DS children have been found to be more 
advanced in the pragmatic (social/ communicative) aspects of language 
acquisition than in the more structural aspects of linguistic competence 
(i.e vocabulary and syntax). Indeed the major deficit most often found in 
the DS population is in language functioning. Despite similarities in 
structure and sequence for most aspects of language, results of many 
studies document that individuals with DS show an increasing linguistic 
deficit in relation to their non-verbal cognitive abilities with increasing 
chronological age (Miller, 1991 in press). However, Beeghly and Cicchetti 
(1987) found children with DS to perform significantly better than 
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linguistically matched non-handicapped controls (but not MA-matched 
controls) when measures of communication and pragmatic development 
were considered, with longer sequences of on-topic turns and 
conversationally relevant turns, a greater diversity of speech acts, and 
more mature turn-taking skills. 
Cicchetti and Ganiban (1990) have proposed that this asynchrony 
between the pragmatic and structural aspects of language may reflect the 
impact of interactions between children with DS and their caregivers 
rather than significant differences in the organisation of behavioral 
systems. Cardoso-Martins and Mervis (1985) found that mothers of 
prelinguistic children with DS provide lesser amounts of labelling and 
deictic information than do mothers of non-handicapped children. It was 
suggested that this may result from reduced maternal expectations 
concerning their children's ability to learn language. More recently 
Mervis (1991, in press) has considered the issue of directiveness as 
another possible contributory factor to the linguistic deficits of children 
with DS. Here it is suggested that because these children respond to their 
environment with dampened reactivity, caretakers may be more directive 
in their exchanges with their children. The low degree of contingency in 
such exchanges may mean, that children with DS do not learn as many 
words as children who experience a large amount of contingent 
exchanges with their parents. 
In summary, the application of an expanded developmental perspective 
to the study of DS has resulted in a number of findings which support the 
'similar sequence' hypothesis of development in this population of 
handicapped children. In the domains of affect, attachment, play and 
language, for example, children with DS have been shown to progress 
through similar series of stages to those traversed by their non-
handicapped peers. However, a number of differences in developmental 
structure have also been noted to exist between the two populations. In 
general these differences are believed to result from differences in 
temperament, attention and information processing capacities which can 
be explained with reference to biological and neuroanatomical deficits. In 
addition, in relation to language, it has been suggested that the structural 
asynchronies found may result from an interaction between such 
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biologically determined deficits and the linguistic environment provided 
for children with DS. 
It remains uncertain, however, whether any explanation relating 
deficits inherent in the condition of DS to the wider experience of the 
child resulting from such deficits can also be applied to explain the delays 
and deficits in cognitive ability which have been so widely documented. 
Researchers have sought explanations in the wider experience of the 
child for the developmental processes found in language - where findings 
do not fit with attempts to impose a 'normal' structure, nor with 
biological findings which might indicate lack of structure. Intent on 
applying a developmental perspective which focusses only on sequences 
and structures, these researchers may not in fact be addressing the whole 
child to any significantly greater extent than did their predecessors - the 
classical developmental theorists who sought to describe 'stages' in 
sensory-motor or cognitive development. 
Indeed it could be argued ·that, despite claims that the new approach 
focuses on the whole child, many of the non-cognitive areas which have 
been studied from this perspective have simply been studied for the 
purpose of investigating whether or not these areas of development are 
interrelated in the same way as they appear to be interrelated in normal 
development. There appear to have been few attempts to study the nature 
of such interactions. Although we now know that there are correlations 
between levels of cognitive development in individual children with DS 
and the stages of development reached by those same individuals in 
affect, attachment and play, we still remain uninformed with regard to 
the way in which factors related to these and other areas of function may 
influence the DS child's experience of learning situations. Similarly, 
while it has been shown that low levels of arousal and deficits in 
attention and information processing may affect both cognitive and non-
cognitive capacities, we do not know whether the extent of their 
contribution is similar across all domains of development. Can it be 
assumed that because cognitive development has been found to correlate 
neatly with developments in areas such as affect, attachment etc, these 
deficits in non-cognitive domains are in themselves sufficient to explain 
the cognitive deficits in DS ? 
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The very methods by which this group of researchers have 
attempted to demonstrate interrelationships between cognitive and non-
cognitive domains seem to fail to acknowledge that performance in 
cognitive contexts is heavily influenced by non-cognitive factors. A 
number of researchers in mainstream developmental psychology have 
pointed to the difficulties inherent in cognitive testing because of the 
extent to which motivational factors can affect a child's performance 
(McCall 1981; Scarr-Salpatek 1976; Scarr 1981; Hrncir et al 1985). Despite 
this, the application of the developmental perspective to the study of DS 
has largely resulted in assessment of the cognitive abilities of children 
with psychometric instruments such as the Bayley Scales and the 
Piagetian-based Uzigiris and Hunt Scales. Tests of this nature can give no 
indication of the extent to which children's performance in assessment 
situations actually reflects their true lev~ls of functioning. It will be the 
contention of this thesis that any perspective which neglects the role of 
motivational factors in development cannot attempt to represent 
accurately the true nature of development in DS. 
Mental handicap and motivation 
In a recent review of the role of motivational factors in the 
functioning of mentally handicapped individuals, Zigler and his 
colleagues pointed to the need to translate research findings from this 
area of study into assessment techniques (Merighi, Edison and Zigler 
1990). A constant dimension characterising descriptions of DS is that of a 
lack of belief in personal efficacy. Strongly inclined to expect failure, the 
retarded child is more responsive to success feedback and less responsive 
to failure. This results in a style of problem solving that causes the 
retarded individual to become a 'failure avoider' (Cromwell 1967). They 
are more motivated to avoid failure than to achieve success and their 
inferior performance reflects not so much a cognitive inadequacy as weak 
motivation (Gardner 1957; Zigler 1966 ; Zeaman and House 1963; Zigler 
and Harter 1969). 
It can be predicted that lowered expectancy of success is also likely to 
influence the approach of mentally handicapped children to assessment 
situations.Indeed, motivational factors might affect the performance of 
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this group of children to an even greater degree than has been implied in 
relation to non-handicapped children. 
H it is accepted that there is a need to review current methods of 
assessing the cognitive abilities of handicapped children in the light of 
tendencies such as failure avoidance, there is an even more pressing need 
to investigate the potential effec~s of these same motivational factors on 
the children's cognitive development. The study of the developmental role 
of motivation - the so-called 'motor' of development in ·normal children 
-has been neglected in mental handicap research. Despite the recognition 
that motivational variables do affect the demonstration of competence in 
mentally handicapped adults (Cromwell 1967, Zeaman and House 1963) 
and children (Balla et al 1971, Balla 1980), there have been few attempts to 
study the developmental origins of these effects. It is not commonly 
recognised that the development of cognitive deficits in the handicapped 
child might result as much from motivational problems as from intrinsic 
functional anomalies. 
It is easy to see how repeated failure as a result of intrinsic deficits in 
functioning could influence general expectancy of success (or failure) and 
thus adversely affect motivation to succeed. Seligman's (1975) 'learned 
helplessness' model encapsulates the essence of this problem. According 
to this model, a state of learned helplessness is reached when an 
individual perceives that s/he lacks control in obtaining a desired 
outcome. The major consequence of this is a lowering of expectations and 
a reluctance to believe in control when it is restored. Seligman's original 
model was based on research with animals. The reformulated learned 
helplessness model of Abramson et al (1978) is however equally 
applicable to the human learning process: the mentally retarded person is 
viewed as essentially defeated by chronic failure to cope effectively. 
In mainstream developmental psychology the learned helplessness 
model has recently received increasing attention (e.g. Dweck and 
Repucchi 1973; Dweck and Bush 1976; Andrews and Debus 1978; Diener 
and Dweck 1980; Craske 1988, Chapman 1988). It is accepted that certain 
groups of children do suffer from motivational problems that may lead to 
cumulative skill deficits, and that through appropriate intervention 
methods, it is possible to alleviate these problems and thus help the child 
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to reach his or her full potential. In the field of developmental testing, it 
is also becoming accepted that motivation and competence "cannot be 
teased apart" (Hrncir et al 1985) - that the measurement of 'competence' 
with a standardised measure inherently also includes a measurement of 
motivation (see also McCall 1981; Scarr 1981; Scarr-Salpatek 1986). 
It is now widely recognis~d that there is a continuous interplay 
between cognitive and motivational factors in the development of 
competence in the non-handicapped child. If a child is seen to be 
underperforming, this is attributed to a maladaptive motivational 
pattern, or to a poor academic self concept. The major learning problem 
manifested by this child is a motivational one. Although the mentally 
handicapped child may by definition experience difficulties which can be 
attributed to functional anomalies there is no reason to assume that 
motivation plays only a secondary role in these difficulties. The learning 
process in mental handicap may be as much impeded by motivational 
deficits as it is by the cognitiye deficit. Clearly, there is a need for an 
approach to the study of cognitive development in mental handicap 
which focusses as much on the relationship between performance and 
competence as on the sequential and structural similarities in the 
development of handicapped and normally developing children. 
It could indeed be argued that the expanded developmental 
perspective now applied in mainstream psychology would benefit from 
the study of non-cognitive factors in development in children with 
mental handicap. It may be that that a full understanding of the interplay 
between cognition and motivation in development could best be 
achieved through the detailed study of a population in which an 
imbalance between the two may be expected. The high level of 
motivation characteristic of normal development is presumably 
sustained by experience of success and failure in satisfactory proportions. 
In contrast, by nature of his or her handicap, a child with mental 
handicap must have an increased experience of failure. This in turn 
might be expected to adversely affect the child's motivation to learn or 
even to demonstrate what has already been learned. Careful observation 
of handicapped children of different ages in both learning and assessment 
situations might therefore provide some insight into whether any deficit 
in motivation is manifested in identifiable patterns of behaviour, 
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whether its effects on development are cumulative, and whether 
intervention. might to any extent prevent this deficit from adversely 
affecting the developmental process. 
While this thesis focusses on development in children with Down's 
Syndrome, it is hoped that findings may be of relevance to the field of 
mental" handicap in general. It is important to state, however, that it 
cannot be assumed that all findings from research into DS can be 
generalised to mental handicap in all its forms. The fact that there are 
additional complications associated with the syndrome immediately sets 
it apart from other forms of mental handicap in which no such additional 
problems interfere with development. Nonetheless, at the very least, 
conclusions from studies of DS may be of value in directing the focus of 
research with other mentally handicapped - and indeed, non-
handicapped - populations. 
In an attempt to achieve a more integrated picture of the cognitive 
development of the DS child this thesis will present a detailed 
investigation of the relationship between competence and performance, 
with particular attention being paid to the non-cognitive aspects of 
performance in contexts of ostensibly cognitive tasks. The performance of 
DS and non-handicapped children on a number of differing cognitive 
tasks will be compared at a number of different ages with the aim of 
exploring the extent to which motivational factors may be impeding the 
development of cognition in the child with DS. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INCREASING TASK MOTIVATION IN DS CHILDREN: A 
COMPARISON OF TRIAL-AND-ERROR AND ERRORLESS 
TEACHING PROCEDURES 
Motivation and learning 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that a fuller picture of the 
cognitive development of the handicapped child might be achieved by 
broadening the scope of investigations to include the non-cognitive 
characteristics of performance in cognitive contexts, and by examining the 
way in which these may interfere with the development of cognitive 
ability. it was further suggested that the cognitive deficits seen in the DS 
child may to some extent result from motivational problems: that 
frequent early experience of failure may erode motivation to learn, 
thereby contributing directly to subsequent deficits in functioning. 
The work of Dweck and h.er colleagues with non-handicapped 
children has underlined the importance of taking motivational factors 
into account in investigations of learrung difficulties. Dweck and Repucci 
(1973) demonstrated that one group of children in their studies was more 
likely to give up in the face of failure than to persevere. They observed 
that these 'helpless' children tended to place less emphasis on the 
relationship between effort and success and when unsuccessful, to 
attribute the outcome of their behaviour more often to lack of ability 
rather than to lack of effort. The implication of this is that 'helpless' 
children see themselves as less instrumental in determining outcomes 
and are therefore less likely to respond to failure with increased effort or 
perseverance. These different attitudes were seen to emerge in spite of the 
fact that the 'helpless' and 'non-helpless' children were of similar levels 
of cognitive ability. Intervention techniques were therefore devised on 
the basis of altering the helpless children's perceptions of the reasons for 
their failure. 
In the study to be presented here, the effectiveness of two strategies 
for teaching discrimination to DS and non-handicapped children were 
18 
' 
compared - trial-and-error and 'errorless' learning. As in the Dweck 
studies the aim of this experiment was to investigate a possibl~ means of 
increasing the child's motivation to perform to full competence. Dweck's 
approach involved changing childrens' perceptions of the reasons for 
failure. This approach may not however be appropriate with mentally 
handicapped children. In comparison to non-handicapped children, the 
imbalance in the handicapped child's experience of failure does result 
from a lower level of ability. It is nevertheless still important that such a 
child does learn to recognise and to maximise the potential s/he does 
have. This is particularly crucial if an attitude of learned helplessness is to 
be prevented from reducing effort and perseverance in all learning 
situations, easy or difficult. It is equally important that handicapped 
children also do learn to attribute success to effort, instead of consistently 
opting out of challenging situations because they perceive their lack of 
ability to be an insurmountable obstacle to the achievement of success. 
Moreover it is crucial that handicapped children remain motivated to 
sustain the level of effort required for the achievement of this success. 
The role of errors in learning 
Many learning theorists - in particular Piaget (1936,1937,1950) -
would argue that erring is an essential element in the learning process 
and that the experience of erring has as much to contribute to the process 
of cognitive development as does success. From observations of non-
handicapped children in learning situations has come the acceptance that, 
in certain types of learning situation, the advent of error can often be a 
sign of progress. Mentally handicapped· children, by comparison, have 
frequently been observed to avoid situations in which they might 
experience failure. It could be argued, therefore, that this very tendency 
may make a significant contribution to difficulties encountered in 
learning. If failures are not responded to, they cannot be incorporated into 
the accommodation/ assimilation sequence which Pia get considers to be 
the trigger for progression onto higher stages of development. John Morss 
(1979), in a study of the development of the object concept in a group of 
OS children, observed that their learning did appear to be 'incomplete' in 
this sense. Initial successes seemed to be viewed in limited terms - more 
in terms of success on a particular occasion rather than as reflecting a 
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general understanding. Morss offers this as an explanation for the 
inconsistency in performance demonstrated by many of his subjects; they 
did not seem to be responding to errors as a means of preparation for later 
successes. 
It is not difficult to see how a negative attitude towards erring could 
evolve in the mentally handicapped child. Whereas a non-handicapped 
child is occasionally rewarded during the process of trial-and-error 
learning with sufficient levels of success to counteract the effects of 
inevitable errors, for the child with a mental handicap, the balance is 
more likely to be in the direction of consistent failure. Rather than 
recognising the positive value of errors and subsequently attempting to 
use them to advantage, it may be that these children see their errors as an 
underlining of their lack of ability to cope and therefore reject them. This 
may explain the 'incompleteness' of the learning process: understanding 
of success is prevented by a lack of understanding of failure and a 'failure 
set' may be generalised to areas of comparative strength 
Errorless learning 
The errorless learning technique arose out of the claim, f~equently 
made by proponents of the cognitive approach to mental handicap, that 
central to the condition is a lessened ability to manipulate the 
environment and therefore to learn spontaneously from it. Zeaman and 
House (1963) have argued that the failure of so many mentally retarded 
people to learn can be viewed in terms of a stimulus control model. On 
the basis of this model, failure in discrimination learning, for example, is 
interpreted in terms of failure to attend to the relevant dimensions of a 
stimulus. A major implication of this is that to improve performance it is 
necessary to obtain greater control over the discriminative stimuli. 
As noted above, the Piagetian view is that over the course of trial-
and-error learning, as much is learned from mistakes as from successes. 
Terrace (1963a & b), working with pigeons, questioned this assumption 
and showed that learning is in fact possible without the subject ever 
having to respond to the negative stimulus: in short that learning was 
possible in the absence of errors. A stimulus fading procedure was used in 
which the alternative stimuli were gradually 'faded in' by increasing their 
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prominence along a particular dimension (such as intensity, duration or 
size). In his original experiments, for example, Terrace taught pigeons to 
peck in the presence of a red key and to withhold pecking in the presence 
of a green key. On initial presentation the green key was less bright and of 
shorter duration than the red key. The brightness and duration of the 
green key were progressively increased over trials until they reached the 
same levels as that of the red key. Throughout all trials responses to the 
correct stimulus were reinforced and in the event that the incorrect key 
was chosen (the probability of this being far less than under trial-and-
error learning), this response was neither positively nor negatively 
reinforced. 
Later application of similar techniques with human subjects 
demonstrated that humans also are capable of learning in the absence of 
error (Moore and Goldiamond 1964). Success with non-handicapped 
children led to the growth of interest in this technique of 'fading' as a 
training method for teaching discriminations to mentally handicapped 
people (Sidman and Stoddard 1966; Touchette 1968; Sherman and 
Webster 1974). More recently, errorless techniques have been successfully 
used to teach very practical discriminations, skills previously unlearned 
when conventional methods were used (Cullen 1976; Mcivor and 
McGinley 1983; Adams 1984). 
Effective though it may be, the underlying assumption made in 
errorless learning is a very pessimistic one. Although to some degree its 
adoption implies recognition of the possibility that motivational factors 
may influence cognitive outcome, generally its use stems from the belief 
that the experience of erring in a learning situation will always be counter 
productive in the mentally handicapped, adding to already existing 
cognitive problems. Errorless learning is typically seen as a compensatory 
method for subjects who do not appear to be able to learn specific 
discriminations by trial-and-error. 
On one hand, this approach may produce encouraging results from 
those who had previously been unable to make the target discrimination, 
particularly older children and adolescents. On the other hand, it is far 
from encouraging in terms of what it implies in relation to the ability to 
learn in mentally handicapped individuals i.e. that they are unable to 
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learn from their mistakes. Evidence of poor learning ability using trial-
and-error methods is not, however, in itself evidence that mentally 
handicapped children are unable to profit cognitively from their 
mistakes. There has been little direct evidence to support the view that 
such children cannot be taught to respond positively to error. 
It follows from this that overuse of errorless learning techniques 
could potentially incur more harm than good. Encouraging learning 
through the use of success-only techniques could prevent learning taking 
place in situations where such a level of support is not available. If, as 
mentioned above, the advent of error can be a sign of progress, 
preventing the occurrence of error may prevent progress. Over-
dependence on this sort of strategy could lead to a reluctance to advance 
beyond it. It may enhance the likelihood of correct response to one 
particular stimulus but may actually hinder development in other ways. 
Dweck, (1975) in describing errorless learning employed with a group of 
'learned helpless' non-handicapped children, pointed out that; 
"Although there is ample evidence that errors per se do 
indeed have adverse effects on the performance of these 
children and that success works to motivate them, the 
question is whether the most effective way of organising 
such reactions to failure is to eliminate it from the 
situation, or to teach the child how to deal with it" 
(Dweck 1975) 
If it is accepted that erring is an essential element in the learning 
process, it could be suggested that adoption of an exclusively, or primarily 
errorless approach may in some way pervert or undermine the normal 
course of early learning. It cannot nevertheless be denied that the 
errorless learning technique is an ingenious one that has met with a good 
degree of success. Careful use of such procedures may well be even more 
beneficial if a different emphasis were to be placed on their role in the 
learning process. In a number of experiments carried out with mentally 
handicapped subjects in the 1950s and 60s, for example, the differential 
effects on performance of prior experience of success and failure were 
examined. (Gardner 1957; Zeaman and House 1963). Results from these 
experiments generally indicated that although performance was likely to 
deteriorate following failure, after prior experience of success, 
performance was frequently enhanced. These results were achieved 
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largely in experiments which investigated performance on a variety of 
motor tasks however. Although it was claimed that initial success did 
increase subjects' motivation to improve their performance, there 
appears to have been little scope for any generalisation to other, more 
cognitively based skills as a result of enhanced motivation. 
The present study was designed to investigate whether an errorless 
technique could be used to increase motivation in a similar way, but with 
less restricted results. Rather than initially imposing a difficult trial-and-
error learning task on an apprehensive learner, the intention was to use 
an errorless learning task to change the success/ failure rate that would 
normally be first experienced on a learning task. In this way it would be 
emphasised to the child that s/he could learn and that learning could be 
easy, thereby raising motivation to put this newly realised skill to further 
use on a similar but more challenging, trial-and-error task. Two 
discrimination tasks were presented. The aim was to investigate whether 
success on the first discrimination task as a result of using the errorless 
teaching strategy might carry over into performance on the second, 
different task -which required trial-and-error learning. 
By combining errorless and trial-and error-techniques, the aim was 
to set up a learning situation which would offer the handicapped child a 
more balanced experience of success and failure - one more similar to that 
experienced by non-handicapped children. Implicit in this is the 
assumption that such a strategy should have differential effects on the 
performance of handicapped and non-handicapped children. Devised on 
the basis of theory, errorless learning is an example of a teac_hing 
technique which, by emphasising the differences between mentally 
handicapped and normal children, may not have paid sufficient attention 
to any possible similarities between the two groups: development in 
handicap may not in essence be so radically different from normal 
development, but may appear so only because of an intervening variable 
(e.g. motivation). A direct comparison both of the effectiveness of 
errorless learning and of its potential role as a 'primer' in both DS and 
non-handicapped subjects is therefore required. 
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The two main hypotheses to be tested were therefore as follows: 
1. That an errorless learning procedure would have a greater 
enhancing effect on performance than trial-and-error learning and 
that this effect would be greater in the DS group than in the group of 
non-handicapped children. 
2. That initial experience of an errorless learning procedure would 
enhance performance on a subsequently presented trial-and-error 
task and that this effect would be greater in DS children. 
STUDY 1 
METHOD 
Subjects: selection and matching 
Both handicapped and non-handicapped subjects were selected and 
matched on the basis of inability to pass a subject selection pre-test based 
on the shape discrimination tasks which were to be used in the 
experiment itself (see below). To be included in the experiment it was 
necessary that children could demonstrate some knowledge of shapes but 
were as yet unable to discriminate the shapes used as target stimuli in the 
discrimination tasks. -
In many studies comparing handicapped and non-handicapped 
children, subjects are matched on the basis of mental age. Given the 
particular nature and aims of the study to be reported here, however, it 
seemed important to avoid direct mental age (MA) matching for a 
number of reasons, both practical and theoretical. The validity of MA 
matching in handicap studies has frequently been questioned (Clarke and 
Clarke 1975; Woodward 1979; Wishart 1986), largely on the basis of its 
underlying assumption that subjects achieving similar test scores are 
equated on some fundamental intellectual dimension, regardless of the 
way in which those scores were achieved. The MA composite is arrived at 
by a simple addition of scores on a number of test items. Consequently it 
is possible for two testees to have identical MAs, but to have widely 
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differing ability profiles. Even in studies of the normal population, some 
'matches' must for some purposes be inappropriate. 
Even more open to criticism are MA matches of mentally 
handicapped children to non-handicapped children of a much younger 
age; the greater the chronological age gap the more likely it is that the 
individual children's learning histories will have differed, both generally 
and in terms of specific skills. A single test item which tests only for the 
presence or absence of a particular skill can provide very little in the way 
of information about the developmental background to the acquisition of 
that skill. It cannot take into account the possibility that a child with a 
physical or mental disability may have taken considerably longer to have 
reached a specific developmental milestone than a younger non-
handicapped child with an equivalent MA, or that in approaching that 
milestone their development may have taken different routes (see 
Chapter 1 p. 2). Nor can any account be taken of the possibility that 
throughout development the two children's experience of success and 
failure may have been very different, resulting in differing attitudes to 
learning in general and to the demonstration of what has been learned. 
Use of MA matching involves accepting that motivational factors do not 
differ'entially affect performance in the two populations and that 
performance and competence are similarly linked in handicapped and 
non-handicapped children. 
Down's Syndrome group 
Thirteen children were selected from two Edinburgh Special 
Schools. Three were excluded on the basis of the subject selection pre-test 
(see below) and a further two had to be dropped because of inability to 
concentrate for long enough to participate effectively in the experiment. 
This left eight OS children, five males and three females, who completed 
the experiment (mean age: 7 years 9 months; SO 14.6 months). 
Non-handicapped group 
Thirteen children were selected from two Edinburgh nursery 
schools. Four were already able to pass the subject selection pre-test and 
one had to be excluded later in the experiment because of attention 
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difficulties. Mean age of the remaining eight non-handicapped subjects 
was 2 years 6 months (SD:4 months). There were . four males and four 
females . 
Design 
The study was designed to investigate whether prior experience of 
learning using an errorless technique could be used to increase 
motivation to learn from a conventional trial-and-error teaching 
situation. Order of the two tasks was counterbalanced. Half of the children 
in each group (DS and non-handicapped children) were initially 
presented with the errorless learning task and then with the trial-an~­
error task, the other half with the two tasks in the opposite order (i.e trial-
and-error followed by errorless learning) thereby enabling investigation 
of performance on a trial-and-error task without prior errorless 'priming'. 
An alternative design would have been to examine trial-and-error 
performance after exposure to another, similar trial-and-error task, and 
then to compare these scores with the trial-and-error scores of those 
subjects who had initially been presented with the errorless learning task. 
This design was avoided on the grounds that the intention of this study 
was to investigate a possible method for coping with failure - not to 
accentuate its effects or simply to confirm that DS children do not learn 
well in trial-and-error situations. The design adopted enabled observation 
of any differences in effects of the order of presentation of the two 
procedures in both the DS and the non-handicapped groups while also 
incorporating a control for any practice effects. 
Procedure 
Testing of all children took place in a small room, as free from 
distraction as could be arranged within the school settings. Child and 
experimenter sat opposite each other at a table. 
A total of 4 discrimination tasks were used, 2 shape discrimination 
tasks and 2 nonsense figure discrimination tasks. Nonsense figure tasks 
were included as a control for the possibility that prior experience with 
shape learning could have interfered with performance on the shape 
discrimination tasks. As it is impossible to control for any such 
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differential experience of shapes prior to entering the study it was felt 
necessary to replicate the procedure using stimuli that no subjects could 
possibly have seen before. 
All tasks were presented using a similar format. Each stimulus was 
presented on a separate card. In each trial three cards were placed, one by 
one, on the table in front of the child. Children were required to select the 
target stimulus from each of these trial sets of three. 
Subject Selection Pre-test 
In the selection pre-test one of two target stimuli (a rectangle or oval) 
was presented together with two alternative stimuli: one 'orthodox' 
shape (circle, square, triangle, parallelogram) and one of a variety of 
'unorthodox' shapes introduced to limit the possibility that the oval or 
rectangle would be 'correctly' identified by a process of elimination of 
more familiar, known shapes (see Figure 2:1). 
Figure 2:1 
Test Cards Used in Subject Selection Pre-Test 
I I 0 
~ 
I ~ 
All shapes were of different colours and approximately 7cm along 
the longest dimension. Each shape was centred on a white post-card sized 
card. Position of the shape to be identified was randomised over trials. 
Subjects were told "I am going to show you three cards with shapes on 
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them. When I say the name of a shape, I want you to point to the card 
with that shape on it." 
A mimimum of 28 trials were given to each subject, a minimum of 
six of each target stimulus and four of each orthodox shape. Where 
subjects' performance showed a bias neither towards correct or incorrect 
responses on the rectangle and oval trials, these were repeated until it 
could be established whether correct responses were due to random 
guessing or to a true ability to discriminate the shape in question. 
Responses were not differentially reinforced on this pre-test. As already 
stated subjects were selected on the basis that they showed an ability to 
discriminate some shapes but were as yet unable to discriminate 
rectangles and ovals. 
The discrimination tasks 
For both trial-and-error and errorless shape training the procedure 
consisted of 3 parts: a pre-test, the training trials and a post-test. No pre-
test was required in the nonsense figure tasks as no subject could have 
had any prior experience of the target stimulus. 
AJ Shape discrimination tasks 
In the trial-and-error procedure an oval was used as the target 
stimulus; a rectangle was used in the errorless training strategy. 
(i) Pre- and post-tests 
Initially, 10 pre- and post-test trials were used for each shape. It was 
found, however, that this resulted in an unacceptably long procedure and 
the number of trials in each was therefore reduced to 7. The target 
stimulus (oval or rectangle) was varied in size and colour in these pre-
and post-test trials in order to represent the concept of rectangle or oval in 
its more general form. The position of presentation in the row of 3 cards 
was randomised over trials. Instructions to subjects were as in the 
selection pre-test. 
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(ii) Trial-and-error training (oval) 
Trial-and-error training consisted of 15 trials. An oval was presented 
in every trial together with a common and an unorthodox shape of the 
same colour. Colour was changed over the 15 trial sets to prevent subjects 
from using this dimension as a discriminatory target; size and position of 
the ovals as well as order of presentation of the trial sets were 
randomised. 
Subjects were told 'I am going to show you three cards 'vith shapes 
on them just as I did the last time and I want you to point to the card with 
the shape I ask for. This time I will tell you if you are right." Correct 
responses were verbally praised. Incorrect · responses were negatively 
reinforced; children were told: "No, that is not right. Try again the next 
time" 
(iii) Errorless training (rectangle) 
15 trial sets of three cards were used. The trials were presented in an 
order such that two alternative stimuli to the rectangle were gradually 
'faded in', increasing in size while varying in shape over trials (see Figure 
2:2). 
Figure 2:2 
D D 0 
D 0 
0 D D 
In trial sets 1 and 2 the target stimulus was presented with two blank 
cards. In these and all subsequent trials, position of the target stimulus 
was randomised over trials, as was colour, the latter a precaution against 
misidentification of this as a relevant attribute of the target stimulus. 
Trial sets 3 and 4 consisted of a rectangle with two similarly coloured but 
much smaller (0.5 em) alternative shapes. The dimensions of the 
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alternative stimuli were increased over each set of two trials until trials 
11, 12 and 13 where size was increased and colour changed over each 
single trial. These trials became increasingly more difficult as the sizes of 
the alternative stimuli became very similar to that of the target stimuli. 
The final two trials consisted of three red shapes each: a rectangle and two 
alternatives of equivalent dimensions. 
Verbal instructions were identical to those given in trial-and-error 
training. Verbal praise was given each time the child made a correct 
response. Errors were not commented on but, rather than proceeding 
with the next trial, the previous trial was re-presented, this procedure 
being repeated as necessary until the child had shown mastery of that 
particular step in the training sequence. 
B/ Nonsense figure discrimination tasks 
As in the shape discrimination task stimuli were presented on white 
post card sized cards. In trial-and-error training 'nims' were used as target 
stimuli; 'wugs' were used in errorless training (see Figure 2:3), 
(i) Trial-and-error training (nims) 
Subjects were shown a drawing of Mr Plimp and told that he had 
some friends called 'nims' in the pa:ck of cards on the table. The aim of 
this game was to help Mr Plimp find all the 'nims'. Subjects were then 
told "I am going to show you three cards with little men on them. I want 
you to point to the card which you think has Mr Nim on it. Correct 
responses were verbally praised on bel}.alf of Mr Plimp. When an 
incorrect response was made subjects were told to try again next time. 
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Figure 2:3 
Examples of Trial and Error Learning Test Cards 
(Nonsense Figure Discrimination- Nims) 
~ 
. ~ 
(ii) Errorless training (wugs) 
15 trial sets of three cards were used. Alternative stimuli to the 'wug' 
were faded in over trials in exactly the same way as in the errorless 
rectangle training. 
(iii) Post tests 
Post-test trials consisted of seven test card sets, each with either a 
'nim' or a 'wug' and two other similarly sized nonsense figures. Subject 
instructions were as in the selection pre-test. 
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RESULTS 
All responses in the pre-tests, training and post-tests were used in 
the analysis. Scores in the pre- and post-tests were expressed in terms of 
the number of correct responses made. Since the number of trials 
presented in the errorless procedure was subject-determined, scores in the 
errorless and trial-and-error training periods were expressed as 
percentages (correct responses/total responses).l 
A/ Shape disc-rimination 
Pre-test trials. 
Pre-test scores on both shape tasks were compared in the DS and 
non-handicapped groups. No significant differences were found, thereby 
validating the procedure adopted for sample selection and matching (oval 
(trial-and-error): t = 1.078, df(14), NS; rectangle (errorless); t = 1.56, df (14), 
NS). There. were also no ·differences within groups on the two 
discrimination tasks (DS: t = 0.74, df (7), NS; non-handicapped: t = 0.42, 
df (7), NS) 
Training trials. 
Table 2:1 shows the percentage of correct responses during trial-and-
error and errorless shape training trials for both the OS and non-
handicapped groups. In the combined groups performance in the two 
training conditions differed significantly (t = 3.7, df (15), p < 0.005). The 
same comparison in the two groups taken separately yielded a similar 
pattern in both groups (OS t = 11.4, df (7), p < 0.0005); non handicapped 
t = 4.8, df (7), p < 0.005). As was predicted, errorless training scores 
' 
exceeded trial-and-error training scores in all cases, the effect being 
slightly more pronounced for OS than for non-handicapped subjects. 
1These results have already been reported in the British Journal of Educational 
Psychology; L. Duffy and J.G. Wishart (1987). A comparison of two procedures for teaching 
discrimination skills to Down's syndrome and non-handicapped children, 57, 265-278. 
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T -tests comparing the trial-and-error training scores of children 
·initially trained with errorless learning and th?se with no prior training 
revealed a significant difference in favour of those who had had prior 
errorless training (t = 2.15, df (14), p < 0.025). Again the same effect was 
present in the scores of the two groups taken separately, although in both 
cases it was slightly weakened. (DS: t = 1.47, df (6), p < 0.10; non-
handicapped: t = 1.63, df (6), p < 0.10) 
Table 2:1 










































No overall effect of order of presentation of training conditions on 
errorless scores was found. In the DS group, however, an unexpected 
trend emerged: children who had initially been presented with the trial-
and-error training task attained poorer errorless training scores than 
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children who had had no prior trial-and-error training experience 
(t = 1.70, df (6), p < 0.10). 
Table 2:2 
Shape Discrimination- Effects of Errorless and Trial-and-Error 
Training on subsequent Performance: 
Pre/Post-Test Score Difference 
Errorless Training Trial-and-Error 
Scores (rectangle) Training Scores (oval) 
Pre- Post- Diff. Pre- Post- Diff 
Initial Training DS Subjects 
Errorless 1) 0 5 5 2 5 3 
2) 0 7 7 5 7 2 
3) 4 7 3 2 7 5 
4) 2 4 2 1 6 5 
Trial-and-Error 5) 1 2 1 1 2 1 
6) 0 5 5 · 2 5 3 
7) 1 5 4 2 1 -1 
8) 3 6 3 1 4 3 
Non-handicapped subjects 
Errorless 1) 1 5 4 4 7 3 
2) 3 6 3 2 6 4 
3) 2 6 4 2 3 1 
4) 6 7 1 7 7 0 
Trial-and-error 5) 4 7 3 2 7 5 
6) 2 6 4 1 5 4 
7) 2 7 5 2 2 0 
8) 1 6 5 3 6 3 
Post-test trials. 
Improvement in performance was calculated by comparing pre- and 
post-test scores. Table 2:2 shows the differential effects of the two training 
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conditions on post-test improvement. Overall a significant difference was 
found in favour of errorless training with performance improving more 
following training with this procedure than with trial-and-error training 
(t = 1.78, df (15), p < 0.05). This difference did not reach significance in 
either group however, although unexpectedly, it came closest to doing so 
in the non-handicapped group (t = 1.76, df (7), p < 0.10). 
No overall effect of order of presentation of training conditions on 
post-test improvement was found. Only the trial-and-error scores in the 
DS group varied significantly with order of presentation, children with 
prior errorless experience producing better trial-and-error scores than 
those with no prior training (t= 1.96, df (6), p < 0.05). 
In the two non-handicapped sub-groups performance was roughly 
equivalent in both training conditions, irrespective of their order of 
presentation. 
B/ Nonsense figure discrimination 
Training trials. 
Table 2:3 shows errorless and trial-and-error scores. As in the shape 
task, errorless training scores reliably exceeded trial-and-error training 
scores. Again this difference in scores was less pronounced in the non-
handicapped than in the handicapped group (overall t = 6.15, df (15), 
p < 0.0005; DS t = 5.96, df (7), p < 0.0005; non-handicapped t = 3.31, df (7), 
p < 0.01). 
Comparison of trial-and-error training scores of children initially 
given the errorless task and children with no prior training showed no 
significant differences, either for the combined groups or for the groups 
taken separately. However there did appear to be a trend in favour of DS 
children with prior errorless training. This trend was not present in the 
trial-and-error training scores of non-handicapped children assigned to 
the same condition. 
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Table 2:3 
Percentage of Correct Responses During Nonsense 










































There was no overall effect of training order on errorless training 
scores although, as in the shape task, there was a trend in favour of the 
OS sub-group given this training condition first i.e. with no prior trial-
and-error experience, (t = 1.48, df (6), p < 0.10). 
Post-test trials. 
Since there were no pre-test scores, the differential effect of the two 
training strategies on nonsense figure discrimination was evaluated by 
comparison of post-test scores in the two training groups (see Table 2:4). 
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Table 2:4 
Difference Between Nonsense Figure Post-Test Scores 
after Errorless and Trial-and Error Training 
Errorless Trial-and Error 
training training Diff. 
Initial training DS subjects 
Trial-and -error 1) 5 3 2 
2) 7 0 7 
3) 7 5 2 
4) 6 3 3 
Errorless 5) 7 0 7 
6) 6 0 6 
7) 7 7 0 
8) 7 7 0 
Non-handicapped Subjects 
Trial-and -error 1) 7 7 0 
2) 7 7 0 
3) 6 3 3 
4) 7 7 0 
Errorless 5) 6 3 3 
6) 6 5 1 
7) 6 4 2 
8) 7 7 0 
Errorless learning proved superior in all comparisons with the effect 
again more pronounced in the DS group than in the non-handicapped 
group (overall results: t = 3.6, df (15), p < 0.005; DS group: t = 3.2, df (7), 
p < 0.01; non-handicapped group: t = 2.18, df (7), p < 0.05). 
Although a trend in favour of initial errorless learning was evident 
in post-test scores of both non-handicapped and DS groups, these 




This study aimed to investigate and compare the efficiency of 
errorless and trial-and-error methods in teaching discrimination skills to 
non-handicapped and DS children. As predicted, in both shape and 
nonsense figure tasks, errorless learning training scores reliably exceeded 
those produced under trial-and-error training. This overall pattern is 
consistent with previous findings from studies using errorless learning 
techniques. As a strategy for teaching specific within-task discriminations, 
the technique is clearly more effective than trial-and-error methods. In 
addition, the prediction that this difference would be more pronounced 
in the DS children's scores was supported. This is hardly surprising. The 
procedure in the trial-and-error task after all most closely approximates 
the conditions encountered in everyday natural learning situations and 
the handicapped children by definition show inferior learning skills in 
such situations. In comparison, performance of non-handicapped 
children would not be expected to differ to such an extent in the two types 
of training trials. 
More surprising, however was that the relatively superior response 
of DS children to errorless training in the shape task did not carry over 
into post-test improvement. Unexpectedly, the errorless procedure seems 
to have benefited the non-handicapped group's post-test performance 
more than that of the handicapped group. This may be explained by an 
interesting pattern which emerged from an investigation of the effects of 
order of presentation of the two tasks. In trial-and-error training, all 
subjects (both DS and non-handicapped) who had received prior errorless 
training produced better scores than those who had had no initial 
training. By contrast, the only difference in errorless training results was 
found between the two DS sub-groups, with those subjects who had 
previously been presented with the trial-and-error task producing worse 
scores; non-handicapped subject groups showed no such order effect. This 
same pattern was repeated, albeit to a lesser extent, in the nonsense figure 
task. 
Comparison of the mean errorless shape training scores achieved by 
non-handicapped subjects with and without prior trial-and-error training 
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in fact indicates a trend in favour of those who had previously been 
presented with the trial-and-error task. Overall, scores achieved by the 
non-handicapped group on both tasks - errorless and trial-and-error -
were higher where presentation of the task had followed another task -
possibly indicating the operation of a practice effect. 
The reverse of a practice effect seems to have taken place in OS 
errorless training performance on the shape task. Prior trial-and-error 
experience seems to have had an adverse effect on thei:~; performance on 
the errorless task. Poorer training performance may therefore have been 
responsible for reducing post-test scores and the consequent narrowing of 
the overall difference between the amount of improvement made under 
the two training conditions. An interpretation of this pattern could be 
that initial errorless training produced the same enhancing effect on trial-
and-error training scores in the two groups but for different reasons. Non-
handicapped children had simply become better practised in 
discrimination tasks, whereas the success-only support given by the 
errorless training had led to improved OS performance in the subsequent 
trial-and-error task. 
These findings lend support to the hypothesis that motivational 
factors differentially affect the expression of performance and competence 
in the two groups. It is significant that for the OS group, even in a 
structured learning situatio~ such as that provided by the errorless 
strategy, prior trial-and-error training does seem to have had a negative 
effect on performance. Errors inevitably encountered in the trial-and-
error task may have lowered expectations of success in the subsequently 
presented task, thereby reducing motivation to perform to full potential 
on that task. 
No such apparently adverse effects of prior trial-and-error training 
were evident in the post-test performance of the non-handicapped group. 
This is not especially surprising; given the superior ability and better 
balanced history of success and failure in this group, there is no reason to 
expect that their motivation to learn would be reduced by trial-and-error 
experience. Nor indeed would it be predictably increased to any significant 
extent by errorless experience. 
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In the shape task the outcome of this overall pattern was that it 
appeared to have masked the effect that prior errorless training did have 
on the subsequent trial-and-error performance of children in the DS 
group. Whereas there was no overall carry-over effect, post-test 
improvement was markedly more evident in the DS sub-group who had 
not had previous experience of the trial-and-error task. If this result can 
be attributed to increased motivation brought about by success-only 
experience in the errorless task, it is encouraging, particularly given that 
only a single training session was required to produce such an effect. 
In contrast, the effect of errorless training on nonsense figure post-
test scores was immediately apparent. Although this effect was more 
pronounced in the DS group, both handicapped and non-handicapped 
children in fact appeared to have benefited from errorless training to a 
greater extent than from trial-and-error training. The fact that differences 
between the two groups were not as marked in this second set of tasks 
may highlight the effects of prior learning experience on performance on 
the shape tasks. Neither group could have had any prior learning 
experience of the nonsense figures; however it had been a prerequisite for 
participation in the shape study that some knowledge of shapes was 
already present. The overall age difference between the two groups, in 
conjunction with their similar pre-test abilities would appear to indicate 
that their learning histories prior to training must have differed, the DS 
group having been exposed to a higher absolute and relative rate of 
failure than the non-handicapped children. Poorer performance on the 
shape discrimination task may therefore be associated with the fact that 
DS children were being tested on a concept in which prior experience of 
failure was actually being added to, further lowering expectations of 
success- even on the easier errorless task. 
Overall, this set of results contains a consistent trend. Prior errorless 
training was found to have enhanced the subsequent trial-and-error 
performance of children in the DS group on both sets of tasks. Although 
this effect was only statistically significant on the shape task, nevertheless 
it did systematically affect performance in the same positive direction in 
both tasks. Moreover there was very little evidence of any adverse effects 
of prior trial-and-error training on performance in the non-handicapped 
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group. The presence of such effects in the OS children's scores however, 
underlines the importance of ensuring that expectations in the 
handicapped do not lie in the direction of failure. 
Although in all cases errorless performance was superior to that 
achieved under trial-and-error training, it must be borne in mind that 
this was not consistently reflected in a subsequent test of what had 
actually been 'learned' in training, i.e in post-test results. Errorless 
procedures have been previously criticised on the grounds that although 
effective at a within-task level (Schimoeller et al 1979; Etzel et al 1981; 
Gollin and Savoy 1968), there is little generalisation to other tasks. As a 
teaching technique per se, it could be maintained that errorless learning 
may have little intrinsic value, its usefulness limited to situations in 
which very specific responses are required which have failed to be learned 
by trial-and-error methods. However, the results from this study indicate-
that by virtue of the priming effect they appear to have on trial-and-error 
performance, errorless techniques may be useful as a means of increasing 
the motivation of children to make a greater effort in everyday, trial-and-
error learning situations. Dweck (1975), as noted previously, has stressed 
that children should be taught to recognise the importance of effort, not 
just ability, as a determinant of success and failure. In contrast to the 
findings from this study she found no positive effects from an errorless -
or success-only - training strategy on the performance of a group of 
'helpless' children on a subsequent test. She found that a more effective 
method of altering these children's perception~ of success and failure was 
to teach them more directly to attribute success to effort. This contrast 
may result from the nature of the two subject groups. Both the OS 
children in the present experiment and the 'helpless' children in Dweck's 
studies seemed to be affected by a similar reluctance to perform to full 
potential, but the actual levels of potential in the two groups must 
inevitably have been different. A non-handicapped child who is taught to 
realise the more favourable outcome of increased effort will come to such 
a realisation through frequent reward for that effort i.e. through increased 
success. The handicapped child -by definition- is unlikely to experience a 
sufficiently high ratio of success and failure to justify such perseverance. 
Errorless learning may therefore be a more appropriate means of 
dealing with learned helplessness in mentally handicapped individuals. 
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Rather than simply avoiding potential learning situations as non-
handicapped 'helpless' children appear to do, they are at the added 
disadvantage of being more likely to fail in situations where they do 
choose to apply themselves - thereby reinforcing their lack of belief in 
their ability to succeed. As a consequence of this they may need constant 
reminding that success is possible. 
Some anecdotal evidence from the present study can be offered in 
support of the contention that it is important to avoid the establishment 
of a 'failure set' being generalised to areas of comparative strength. 
Patterns of performance in at least two of the DS children- both 10 year 
olds - seemed to suggest that they had underperformed in the selection 
pre-test. One of these children in fact readily admitted afterwards that this 
had been the case. Two other OS 10 year olds also had to be excluded from 
the analysis because although they produced overly consistent incorrect 
responses in the selection pre-test, when offered tangible reinforcement 
for correct responses they changed to near-perfect levels of success. 
According to the school teacher, in one case at least, this behaviour was 
likely to have been a deliberate tactic, produced to avert the possibility of 
being presented with a more difficult task. 
This reluctance to perform to full potential was interestingly only 
evident in the older DS subjects. A 6 year old boy with DS who had to be 
excluded from the study on the basis of high performance on the selection 
pre-test made no attempt to hide his capabilities in this test. By 
comparison, the older children, rather than allowing themselves to be 
placed in a situation over which they might have no control, seemed to 
be imposing their own control over the situation from the start, their 
poor performance very much a case of "won't do", rather than "can't do" 
(Koegel and Mentis, 1985). 
Although the numbers of children on which these observations 
were made were small, the differences in attitude demonstrated by older 
and younger OS subjects do resemble those which would be expected 
within the learned helplessness model, with the effects of failure 
becoming more prominent as age - and therefore experience of failure -
increases. Given this it seems important to attempt to determine whether 
this progression can in any way be inhibited. As suggested previously, it 
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may be that the functional anomalies intrinsic to the condition of 
handicap are only partially responsible for the extent of the accompanying 
cognitive deficit. Persistent failure in itself may to some degree be 
responsible for the development of a negative attitude toward learning, 
compounding the already-existing disadvantage of the mentally 
handicapped child in learning situations. 
If it were possible to identify the developmental ongms of this 
tendency to avoid potential failure situations, early intervention 
programmes could be targeted towards preventing its emergence, or at 
least limiting its development. It cannot simply be assumed, however, 
that the motivational deficit does evolve simply as a result of repeated 
experience of failure . . It would, nevertheless seem important to 
investigate this possibility. Motivational problems may actually be 
intrinsic to the condition of handicap, but even if this is the case, this 
should not prevent attempts to minimise their effects. Through careful 
observation of early cognitive development, it may be possible to 
determine at what stage motivational deficits are first manifested and to 
identify the most appropriate means of trying to counteract their effects. 
The study to be presented in the following chapter therefore focuses on 
the very earliest stages in DS development, infancy. 
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CHAPTER3 
A CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY OF THE PERFORMANCE OF -
CHILDREN WITH DOWN'S SYNDROME ON THE BAYLEY 
SCALES OF INFANT DEVELOPMENT 
Findings from the experimental study reported in Chapter 2 
indicated that the performance of DS children on a discrimination task 
was affected by non-cognitive factors to a greater extent than was that of 
non-handicapped children. Not only did prior error-free experience have 
an enhancing effect on DS performance on a subsequently presente~ trial 
and error task, but initial trial and error training adversely affected 
subsequent errorless performance. Both patterns would appear to indicate 
that the DS childrens' approach to discrimination learning was to some 
degree dependent on the levels of success_ and failure experienced in the 
learning situation. Neither pattern was present to a similar extent in the 
scores of the non-handicapped group, nor was there any evidence that 
any of the non-handicapped children were underperforming in any of the 
trial sets. 
While suggestive, findings from this one study can obviously tell us 
very little about whether - and to what extent - non-cognitive factors may 
have affected learning at earlier stages in the development of these DS 
children. They can also tell us little about how motivational factors might 
have influenced acquisition of other types of cognitive skill. Clarification 
of such issues would require examination of cognitive behaviour at 
much earlier stages in DS developmen-t. In the study to be presented in 
this chapter therefore, a group of 36 children with DS aged from 3 months 
to 5 years were presented with a wide-ranging set of cognitive tasks and 
both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of their performance 
investigated. The assessment battery used was the mental scale of the 
Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID). The items contained in 
psychometric tests of infant development such as the BSID provide a 
'checklist' of the sorts of skills that are commonly seen to emerge as 
cognitive ability develops. 
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The BSID is designed to assess: 
sensory-perceptual acuities, discriminations and the ability 
to respond to these; the early acquisiton of 'object 
constancy' and memory, learning and problem- solving 
ability; vocalisations and the beginnings of verbal 
commmunication; and early evidence of the ability to 
form generalisations and classifications, which is the basis 
for abstract thinking. 
(Bayley 1969) 
It provides a single outcome measure which can be used to 
determine the ability of a child relative to that of other children and of 
groups of children with handicaps of varying aetiologies relative to the 
normal population. In the study to be presented performance on the 
Bayley will be examined at two levels. The test scores collected will 
provide a quantitative cross-sectional picture of the general cognitive 
ability of this group of children with DS. Behaviour during testing will 
also be monitored, however, for any more qualitative evidence of levels 
of performance being influenced by non-cognitive variables; parents' 
reports will ~lso be collected for this purpose. The primary aim of this 
study will be to determine whether it is possible to identify the 
developmental origins of the motivational deficit observed among older 




Thirty-five subjects were drawn from a volunteer subject pool run 
by the Department of Psychology and recruited through the local health 
authority and the Scottish Down's Syndrome Association. This subject 
pool comprises approximately 90% of all children born with DS in the 
Lothian area and previous research has shown that it is a representative 
sample in terms of variables such as social class, level of parental 
education, ability level and secondary health problems. All children aged 
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between 3 months and 5 years at the time of the study were included. 
Table 3:1 shows the number and sex of children tested in each age group. 
Age (months) N Male Female 
3 8 5 3 
6 5 1 4 
9 2 0 2 
15 1 0 1 
18 1 1 0 
21 1 0 1 
24 2 1 1 
30 2 0 2 
36 4 3 1 
42 4 1 3 
48 2 1 1 
54 2 2 0 
60 1 0 1 
Total 35 15 20 
All subjects were confirmed by karyotyping as having Down's 
Syndrome (DS); all were standard Trisomy 21. Fourteen had congenital 
heart disease of varying degrees of severity (the majority minor), 4 had 
diagnosed hearing loss, 10 had minor visual impairments and one 
suffered from arthritis. Fourteen were firstborns. Numbers of siblings at 
time of testing ranged from none to 4. 
Each child in the present study served as his or her own control. The 
BSID has already been standardised on a large group of non-handicapped 
children and since the purpose of this investigation was to observe test 
performance in DS children, no direct control group was considered 
necessary. It will be recalled that the practice of mental age matching of 
handicapped and non-handicapped groups was avoided in the study 
presented in Chapter 2 for practical and theoretical reasons. All of these 
reasons are equally applicable to the present study. It was in fact hoped 
that findings from this study would provide additional empirical 
evidence to support the viewpoint that mental age matching is of 




All testing took place in the Department of Psychology in a small 
quiet room with a minimum of distractions. Testing was scheduled for a 
time of day when the mother thought her child was most likely to be alert 
and cooperative. The mother was present throughout and the child sat on 
her knee for testing; mothers were asked to encourage their children if 
necessary but not to direct their responses in any way. They were however 
asked to comment on their child's performance - in partic1.1lar when test 
items were failed - and to indicate whether s/he had previously been 
observed to produce the behaviour required by a given test item in any 
other setting. 
The BSID was administered in accordance with the procedural 
instructions provided in the test manual (Bayley 1969). The 163 items in 
the test are arranged in order by age placement (the age at which 50% of 
the standardisation sample passed a given item). Each item has also been 
assign~d an age range value which is an estimate of the ages at which they 
were passed by 5% and . 95% respectively of the children tested (for 
example, item 88 - picks up cup: secures cube - is placed at 9 months, but 
has an age range of 6 - 14 months). Generally, a child's test performance is 
expected to extend over items having age· placements several months 
apart. Basal and ceiling levels determine the upper and lower limits of 
performance, the basal level being the item preceding the earliest failure 
and the ceiling level the item representing the most difficult item on 
which the child succeeded. To establish basal and ceiling levels a criterion 
of 6-10 successive passes or fails is recommended. 
Although cognitive development in children with DS is generally 
described as progressing at half the normal rate (see e.g. Berry et. al 1984), 
it was necessary to establish more accurately for each individual subject 
the most appropriate level at which to start. Basal levels were determined 
on the basis of observations of the child playing for a short period before 
testing and by using the Situation Codes provided in the manual. These 
Situation Codes refer to series of items in which one basic test procedure 
or stimulus situation can be used for several items of varying difficulty 
levels. One particular task, for example, which involves placing square 
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and circular blocks onto a form board (referred to in the test as the blue 
board) covers 7 different items, with age placements ranging from 13.6 to 
30+ months. A child's performance on this task provides a useful 
estimate of the age level at which to begin testing. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
BSID scores were analysed in a number of ways, outlined below. In 
addition records of the more qualitative aspects of children's behaviour 
during testing were examined for any indication that motivational factors 
were in any way influencing performance. Parents' reports were also used 
for these analyses. 
Treatment of scores 
Bayley scores can be expressed in several different ways. The 
conventional measure is the Mental Development Index (MDI). This is 
converted from the raw score (the total number of items passed) and is 
expressed as a standard score with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation 
of 16. A Developmental Age Equivalent or Mental Age (MA) in months 
can also be calculated from the norms tables by comparing raw scores with 
corresponding MDis of 100 at different age levels. A fourth measure is 
the developmental quotient (DQ) based on the ratio of developmental to 
chronological age. 
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages associated with 
each of the above measures. Because MDis are based on a normal 
distribution of scores they are easily interpretc~d as a measure of 
development. The normative tables which cover the age range from birth 
to 30 months contain Developmental Indices ranging from 50 to 150 
(approximately 3 sds below and above the standardisation mean). Use of 
MDis are therefore precluded when raw scores fall below an MDI of 50 at 
any age level. Extrapolated values for raw scores falling below this level 
have been computed (Naglieri 1981) but because these were arrived at by 
calculating regression equations from the normative sample, they can 
only be used with children of 30 months or below (the age range of the 
BSID standardisation sample). For the purposes of the present study, 
which includes children of up to 60 months of age, these scores are 
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therefore not appropriate. Naglieri's values are not in any case based on 
actual empirical data with the result that some precision is inevitably lost. 
The most precise measure of performance can be achieved by 
expressing scores simply as the total number of items passed i.e as raw 
scores. These also permit direct comparison of performance in infants 
whose scores are too low to be converted to MDis using standardisation 
sample norms. Raw scores are rarely used in the literature, however, 
probably because, unlike MDis, they are not so readily interpreted as a 
measure of development. Mental Age scores, like MDis also have the 
advantage of allowing evaluation of development in readily understood 
terms. It is not possible to obtain an MA for every raw score, however, 
which makes this the least precise of the four methods of measurement. 
DQs present similar difficulties when used alone. Despite the fact that 
Bayley herself stressed that there is no evidence to support interpretation 
of figures of this kind derived from the BSID, this is one of the most 
frequently used means of expressing Bayley scores. Use of DQs permits the 
aggregation of data from different age groups but by their inherent nature, 
such scores can increasingly penalise handicapped subjects as they grow 
older, suggesting deceleration in development even when 
developmental rate is constant (Bailey and Bricker 1985). 
In the present study each of the four different means of expressing 
scores (MDis, raw scores, MAs · and DQs) will be used in analyses 
depending on which is most appropriate for the level and type of analysis 
being carried out. 
Analyses 
Table 3:2 and Figure 3:1 present the mean raw scores achieved at 
each age level together with the mean number of items passed at these 
ages by the BSID standardisation sample. It can be seen that although in 
general, OS raw scores do increase between every adjacent pair of ages, the 
difference in mean raw scores between the two populations widens as age 
increases. This is further demonstrated in the rising number of OS scores 
which fall below MDI levels of 50 as age increases. At 3 months, all 8 OS 
subjects attained MDis of 70 or more, with 4 scoring above 80. One 6 
month score fell short of an MDI level and had to be converted into a 
mental age score, but the MDis of the 4 remaining 6 ~onth olds ranged 
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between 60 and 81. Both 9 month old s_ubjects did achieve sufficiently 
high raw scores to permit conversion into MDis but these were lower 
than almost all MDis attained by the two younger age groups. The highest 
MDI of 98 was attained by the only one 15 month old in the sample; her 
raw score exceeded that of the single 18 month and 21 month old subjects, 
both of whom were able only to produce mental age scores rather than 
MDis as was one of the two 30 month olds. The two 24 month olds' MDis 
both stood at 54. As norms are only provided for children up to 30 
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Figure 3.1: Mean Raw Scores 
OS Group 
BSID Standardisation sample 
6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
Chronological Age (months) 
Table 3:3 shows the MA scores for all subjects. This table, like Figure 
3:2, demonstrates that although mental age does continue to increase, it 
proceeds at a much slower pace than that seen in normal development 
where chronological and mental ages are roughly equivalent. The 
widening gap between the two populations in terms of rate of 
development is perhaps more clearly expressed through direct 
comparison of chronological and mental ages: MA lags behind CA by only 
0.5 months at CA 3 months, increasing to a difference of 12 MA months at 
12 months of age and to 24 months at CA 54 months. 
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Table 3:3: Mental Ages 
Age Mental Age Difference between 
(months) (months) CA and MA 
3 2-2.5 0.5-1 
6 4.5 1.5 
9 7-8 1-2 
15 14-15 0-1 
18 11-12 7-8 
21 12-13 11 -12 
24 16-17 7-8 
30 18 12 
36 20 16 
42 21-22 20 - 21 
48 26 22 
54 30 24 
60 30+ 30 
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Figure 3:3 presents the decline in the slope that results when 
MA/CA measures are translated into Developmental Quotients. The fact 
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that the path of the curve is slightly interrupted by the high score 
achiev~d by Subject 15 (15 months) and the comparatively lower level of 
performance attained by Subject 17 (21 months) is indicative of the 
tremendous variability existing between individual subjects both within 
and across age groups in levels of functioning. 
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Because of the small numbers of subjects in several of the mid-range 
age groups, it is not possible to identify any clear pattern of increasing or 
decreasing variability in scores with increasing age. Mental ages attained 
by 3 month old subjects range between below 2 months and 2.5 to 3 
months; at 6 months a difference of 2.5 MA months was found between 
highest and lowest scoring subjects; the two 30 month old subjects 
achieved scores 4 to 5 MA months apart; at 36 months this had increased 
to a difference of 6 to 7 MA months; at 42 months MAs ranged between 18 
and 30 months. Overall these figures would seem to indicate that inter-
individual variability of performance rises with increasing age. Given 
that as MA increases, there is more scope for individual differences, this 
pattern may be artefactually exaggerated however. 
An apparent deviation from this pattern was found at 24 months 
where the two subjects in this age group (Subjects 18 & 19) attained 
identical raw scores. Closer analysis of their score profiles, however, 
revealed that these scores were arrived at in very different ways. The 
most striking difference was found in the numbers of items between the 
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two subjects' basal and ceiling levels. Subject 18's profile covered a range 
of 21 items spanning a mental age range between 12.4 and 17.8 months; by 
comparison Subject 19 was presented with 35 items before his ceiling 
level of 19.7 MA months was reached, his basal level having been 
determined at 10.5 months. In addition to this, performance differed in 
almost 35% of the total number of items presented to both subjects. 
Comparison of the protocols of two further subjects of close but differing 
ages who also achieved identical scores - Subject 26 (36 months) and 
Subject 29 (42 months) - revealed a similar diversity of performance, with 
passes and fails differing in 16 out of 40 (40%) of the total number of items 
presented. The majority of items on which these two subjects' 
performance was found to differ fell between their respective ceiling 
levels. The 36 month old peaked at item 160 which has an age placement 
of approximately 5 MA months beyond the ceiling level attained by the 
older subject. These within-profile differences emphasise the need for 
caution in interpreting this type of developmental index, an issue which 
will be returned to in Chapter 5. 
Analyses of test protocols 
A major aim of this study was to investigate whether performance 
on cognitive tasks was a true reflection of subjects' underlying 
competence. The data collected is discussed below in separate age groups 
and in relation to specific subsets of items, but around a common theme: 
whether, for individual subjects, failure on specific test items was due to 
inadequate levels of cognitive ability or whether there was reason to 
believe that inadequate motivation was restricting performance. It will be 
seen that there were many instances in which subjects' performance did 
not meet the stringent statistical criteria necessary to score a pass, but that 
these failures could not be confidently attributed to a straightforward 
absence of the required level of cognitive ability. Children frequently 
failed items by default through failure to engage in the tasks presented. 
Failure to engage was defined as any instance where the child's response 
fell into one of the three following categories: 
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1. refusal to attend to the task, 
2. rejection of the task object by casting, swiping or dropping it orr 
the floor, 
3. repeated production of an inappropriate off-task behaviour in 
response to the task materials. 
It was not possible, for all items, to identify failures by default using 
these criteria. Items at the bottom end of the scale, for example, are largely 
concerned with sensory-perceptual acuities and discriminations and the 
ability to respond appropriately to these (e.g. item 19; turns eyes to ring, 
item 23: reacts to paper on face, item 32: regards cube, item 47: turns head 
to sound of bell) and with what is referred to by Lewis et al (1986) as 
sensory-motor manipulation (e.g. item 43: simple play with rattle, item 
44: carries ring to mouth, item 43: manipulates table edge). In these cases 
there is less scope to distinguish between criterion fails and failures due to 
the child's failure to engage. This distinction does becqme increasingly 
easier to make at higher task levels. There are, however, at all levels in 
the BSID a small number of 'incidental' items in which there is no 
particular task to be engaged in (e.g. item 13: vocalises once or twice, item 
97: repeats performance laughed at); by definition these too could not be 
incorporated into the 'failure to engage' analysis. 
In addition there were many cases in which subjects failed particular 
items despite parental reports that their children did in fact possess the 
requisite skills to pass them. Parental reports were not taken into 
consideration in the first level quantitative analysis of failures to engage 
analysis unless it was clear from the child's behaviour that s/he had 
failed a given item by default. They were, however, used in the more 
qualitative analyses (see below), particularly in the case of younger 
subjects. 
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Table 3:4: Frequency of failures by default 
on specific items across age groups 
Age level 
Item 9 15-21 24 30 36 Total 
88: Picks up cup: secures cube 1 1 
105: Dangles ring by string 1 1 
107: Puts beads in box 1 1 
108: Places 1 peg repeatedly 1 1 
.110: Blue board: 
places 1 round block 1 1 
111: Builds tower of 2 cubes 2 2 
114: Puts 9 cubes in cup 2 1 3 
117: Shows shoes 2 2 
118: Pegs placed in 70 seconds 1 1 2 
119: Builds tower of 3 cubes 2 1 4 
(+142m) 
120: Pink board: 
places round block 1 1 
121: Blue board: 
places 2 round blocks 1 (+142m) 2 
122: Attains toy with stick 1 1 
123: Pegs placed in 42 seconds 1 1 
124: Names 1 object 1 2 4 
(+1 42m) 
24 30 36 42 48 54 Total 
128: Points to parts of doll 1 3 1 1 6 
130: Names 1 picture 1 1 2 1 5 
131: Finds 2 objects (+1 21m) 2 2 2 1 8 
132: Points to 3 pictures 1 2 1 4 
133: Broken doll: 
mends marginally 1 1 1 1 4 
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Item 
135: Differentiates scribble 
from stroke 
138: Names 2 objects 
141: Names 3 pictures 
143: Builds tower of 6 cubes 
144: Discriminates 2: 
cup, plate, box 
147: Imitates strokes: 
vertical and horizontal 
148: Points to 7 pictures 
149: Names 5 pictures 
151: Pink board: reversed 
152: Discriminates 3: 
cup,plate,box 
154: Train of cubes 
155: Blue board: 
completes in 150 seconds 
157: Folds paper 
24 
158: Understand 2 prepositions 
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Table 3:4 summarises the total number of failures by default 
observed on individual items by subjects in the age groups, 9- 54 months 
(the single 60 month old subject showed no failures to engage). Because 
only one child was available for participation at 15, 18 and 21 months, 
these 3 subjects were placed together in a single age group - 15-2.1 
months). The following sections provide a detailed account of the 
performance/ competence differentials found at each age level. 
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Failures to engage: Analysis by age group 
3 months N =8; Subjects 1 - 8 
(raw score range 19-33; MA range< 2m- 2.5/3m) 
For the reasons outlined above, analysis of failures to engage on 
items at this lower level is very restricted and is therefore largely made up 
of parental reports and of observations of subjects' behaviour during 
testing. 
There were few items on which children at this age level could 
clearly be identified as producing below optimal performances. Most 
notable was the frequent tendency for subjects to demonstrate a bias to the 
right side on items which required that they discriminate the direction of 
a sound source, or that they turn their head towards a visual stimulus. Of 
the 8 subjects tested at this age, 5 demonstrated this bias - looking towards 
sounds presented to their right side but not to their left. This bias is most 
likely due to the tonic neck reflex which is known to be more marked in 
DS than in other groups of children. One mother, however, described this 
behaviour as "laziness", and certainly one child who had relatively good 
muscular control of his head nonetheless showed this bias to one side. 
6 months N =5; Subjects 9 - 13 
(raw score range 34-62; MA range 2.5/3m -5/5.Sm) 
Mothers' reports were particularly interesting for this age group -
especially those concerned with subjects' responses to sounds. Subjects 9 
and 12 both failed item 47 in which the child is required to turn the head 
towards the sound of a bell rung outside the range of vision. Both were 
reported to have shown disturbance at loud noises when they were 
younger, but now to show very little response. Subject 9 was later 
diagnosed to have a hearing impairment, although he would occasionally 
react to sounds, albeit very slowly. He was, however, very interested in 
making noises for himself, persistently banging test objects on the table. 
Although Subject 12 demonstrated a clear response to sound, she too 
would not turn her head towards them; in addition to item 47, she also 
failed item 48 (turns head to sound of rattle). This child's mother reported 
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that she would turn towards her own noise-making toy "because she can 
do things with it". 
A third subject - Subject 10 - failed item 34 in which subjects are 
required to glance between a bell and a rattle shaken one after the other 
within their visual field. This subject was reported to turn her head 
towards sound sources "only when she wants to". Of the two remaining 6 
month olds, one was very delayed in turning her head towards the sound 
of the bell or rattle and would only do this very unreliably, while the 
other reacted only to the rattle, not the bell which makes a louder sound, 
indicating that poor ·response to this item was not due to any hearing 
impairment. 
It is possible that this poor response to sound-making objects at 6 
months may be linked to the persistence of the tonic neck reflex seen at 3 
months. At that earlier age level several subjects were unable to turn 
towards the source of a sound on their left. The fact that they did respond 
to sounds presented from the right side suggests that they may have had 
the intention to do so, however. It may be that, due to a mismatch 
between intention and ability at an earlier age, once the ability does 
become available, these children simply do not make full use of it. 
Cunningham (1979) has offered a similar explanation for the absence of 
visually directed reaching in many DS infants. He suggests that due to a 
lack of concordance between visual and motor systems prior to 16-18 
weeks, intention and visuo-manual coordination, the necessary 
prerequisites for the development of reaching, do not emerge in parallel 
in DS. Although children become motivated to reach toward objects, 
infrequent success due to lack of motor control results in a general 
decrease in arm extensions over the pre-reach period. When visual 
motor coordination does appear, these children then demonstrate more 
non-functional proximal activity (e.g fingering of the table edge) than 
reaching, possibly indicating that the visually initiated reaching pattern 
has been extinguished. In the same way the failure of the 6 month olds in 
this study to turn towards the source of a sound may indicate that this 
head turning response has been extinguished. 
Many other items at this age level require that children demonstrate 
a degree of eye-hand coordination and motor control (e.g. item 37: reaches 
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for dangling ring; item 54: picks up cube; item 63 lifts inverted cup). All 5 
subjects in this ag·e group had difficulty with at least one such item, but 
individual subjects responded to this difficulty in different ways. Subjects 
12 and 13 persisted in their attempts to pick up and retain the 1 inch 
cubes, although their responses could not be credited as passes, whereas 
Subject 9 reached out and touched a cube, but made no attempt to pick it 
up - despite his mother's report that he was capable of doing so. This 
same child pushed the inverted cup around the table in an apparent 
attempt to pick it up but eventually lost interest. Subject 11's first 
response on this same item was not sufficiently clear to be credited with a 
pass and on re-presentation she made no attempt whatsoever to pick up 
the cup. 
These different responses may demonstrate two different stages in 
the development of an attitude of 'learned helplessness' towards grasping 
objects (see Chapter 1). The lack of success in attaining the cube observed 
in the first two subjects, despite their clear intention to pick it up, may 
result in the avoidance behaviour seen in the other two subjects. 
. There were few items which subjects at this age level failed in 
common but which, according to mothers' reports, they should have 
been capable of passing. Subject 9 failed to produce the expected behaviour 
on 8 items- 16% of the total number of items falling within his basal and 
ceiling range: had he passed all 8 of these items his MDI would have been 
10 points higher than that actually attained. In most cases however, 
subjects appeared to be underperforming on only two or three items, 
therefore keeping within the standard error of measurement for this age 
group. 
9 months N=2; Subjects 14 & 15 
(raw score range: 79 - 81; MDI/MA range 64 - 69 I 5 - 5.5m) 
The 2 subjects tested at this age attained very similar raw scores. Pass 
and fail patterns were, however, very different: of the total number of 
items presented to both subjects, there was only 54% agreement. Subject 
14 failed to produce the required responses for four items which, 
according to her mother, she was definitely capable of passing (item 62: 
looks for fallen spoon; item 69: transfers objects hand to hand; item 84: 
60 
listens selectively to familiar words). The latter 2 of these items fall into 
the 'incidental' category, however, and could not be included in the 
analysis of failures by default; nor could item 62 as it does not involve a 
specific task in which the child is required to engage. One item which 
could be included in the failure by default analysis was item 88 (picks up 
cup: secures cube). On presentation with this item this subject cast the 
inverted cup off the table. 
Subject 15 also had to have item 88 presented a second time before 
she would produce the appropriate response. This child in fact had 
performed so poorly in testing that her mother offered to bring her back 
for a re-test. Interestingly, although her overall score was improved on 
this second occasion, she also failed two items which she had passed on 
the first test. 
15 -21 months N=3; Subjects 16- 18 
(raw score range 101-113; MA range 12m- 15m) 
Perhaps the most notable feature of performance among the three 
subjects in this age band was the frequency with which they failed items 
by default because they cast test objects from the table. Subjects 16 and 18, 
for example, refused to have anything to do with the red cubes and 
consequently failed at least 3 items each (items 111 & 119: builds tower of 2 
or 3 cubes; items 90, 100 & 114: puts cubes in cup). Other examples of 
possible failure to perform to full competence were also found. Subject 15 
(15m), after having placed one peg on the peg board, completely rejected 
this task (item 118) while Subject 17 (18 months) refused to engage in an 
earlier item with this same board (item 87: fingers holes in peg board) 
after having unsuccessfully attempted to place the pegs. In both cases 
mothers reported that their children should have been able to 
demonstrate the required behaviours and indeed both peg board items 
were successfully passed by both the 9 month olds. 
There was also a certain amount of very clear underperformance in 
evidence. On item 107 in which the child is required to put 6 small beads 
through a hole in the lid of a box, Subject 18 appeared to be having great 
difficulty at first, dropping the beads on the lid or around the box. When 
she was handed the sixth bead however, she placed it very skilfully over 
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the hole and dropped it into the box- almost as if to demonstrate that she 
was capable of passing this item - but only on her own terms. This 
particular child failed 7 items by default- her MA might have been 2 - 3 
months higher and her MDI 16 points higher had she not failed to engage 
in these 7 items. 
24 months N =2; Subjects 19 & 20 
(raw scores 119; MDI 54; MA 16m) 
As already noted, the 2 subjects tested at 24 months produced very 
different performance profiles but attained identical scores. Of the 12 
items on which performance was found to differ, at least 4 were 
reportedly within these subjects' repertoires, but were not produced. Both 
subjects cast several test objects (e.g. the broken doll: item 133; the pink 
form board; items 120, 137 & 151 and the toy and stick: item 122). Both 
subjects also produced inappropriate rather than failing responses to 
other test items. Subject 19, for example, insisted on cuddling the jointed 
doll when presented with item 128 (points to parts of doll) despite 
repeated attempts on both her mother's and E's part to persuade her to 
identify various parts of its body- something which her mother reported 
she was very capable of doing. Both subjects also refused to cooperate on 
the item which requires finding an object hidden under one of two cups 
(item 131), seeming to be deliberately "cheating" by picking up both cups, 
or by pretending to drink out of them. 
30 months N=2; Subjects 21 & 22 
(raw score range 117- 134; MA range 16/17m -20/21m) 
Again the 2 subjects at this age refused to cooperate on the object 
concept item just described (item 131). There was little else in common 
about their performance on specific items, however, as they were 
presented with very different sets of items, with Subject 21 's basal level 
having been set at the item preceding the final item passed by Subject 22. 
Scores differed by 17 raw score points - and MAs by around 5-6 months. 
Despite these differences, in both cases there was evidence of items 
having been failed by default; Subject 22 in particular failed to produce the 
required responses to 7 items although she had reportedly been observed 
to do so previously. Two such items involved verbal responses (item 106: 
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imitates words an~ item 113: says 2 words) which were also failed by 
default by two younger subjects scoring at a similar level to this child. 
Because these two items are incidental, however, they could not be 
included in the 'failure to engage' analysis. There may, however, be some 
developmental connection between failure on these lower-level speech 
items and the failure to produce higher-level verbal responses seen in the 
higher scoring child. The mother of Subject 21 reported that her child was 
very reluctant to name objects on command (items 124, 138 & 146; names 
1,2 or 3 objects), but would approach and name objects by herself. 
36 months N =4; Subjects 23 - 26 
(raw score range 118-141; MA range 16/17m- 23m) 
As can be seen, scores varied substantially in this age group. Subject 
26's protocol extended from items placed at 14 months to those at the end 
of the test, at 30+ months. His basal level had to be set at such a low level 
because he was especially behind in his speech development and 
consequently unable to pass item 113: says 2 words. He also failed several 
other items around t~s age level, how~ver (e.g item 114: puts 9 cubes in 
cup; item 119: builds tower of 3 cubes), despite passing items at the very 
upper end of the scale. . 
In 3 out of the 4 36 month old subjects there was clear evidence of 
underperformance, both from parental reports and from subjects' 
responses themselves, which included deliberately dropping or pushing 
away test objects, flat refusals to engage in the items, or failure to comply 
with instructions. On average each 3 year old failed approximately 5 items 
by default - which translates into a difference in MDI of 10 points at 20 
months (the median mental age level) and an MA difference of 
approximately 2 months. 
42 months N =4; Subjects 27 - 30 
raw score range 126-154; MA range 18-30m 
In this age group mental ages also varied widely, with one child 
(St..!-bject 27) requiring presentation of items at the uppermost age range 
only, while another (Subject 30) attained a basal level of 14 months. 
Although this low basal level was set at the item preceding an apparently 
genuine failure on item 115 (closes round box), several items at the same 
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approximate mental age level were failed by default through casting test 
objects an.d failure to engage fully in the tasks. 
Three out of 4 subjects of this age produced less than optimal 
performances on the blue form board task and also refused to attend to 
the pictures (e.g item 130: names 1 picture; item 148: points to 7 pictures). 
Failures to engage were less ambiguous among subjects at this stage in 
development. There were many more examples of flat refusals and 
failures to cooperate on tasks than at earlier age levels, where it was more 
frequently necessary to consult parents as to whether failures were 
genuine- or by default. Again, on average approximately 6 items per child 
were failed by default - several of which were failed in common by 2 or 
more subjects (see Table 3:5 below). 
48 months N=2; Subjects 31 & 32 
(raw score range 139 -152; MA range 23m- 26/27m) 
The test performance of both subjects in this group peaked at the 
same ceiling level - item 161 (builds tower of 8 cubes) - but there was a 
difference of approximately 6 months in terms of age placement of basal 
levels. With the exception of speech items, the majority of items in this 6 
month range which were failed by Subject 32 (who had the lower basal 
level) were failed as a result of refusals to attend to test objects or of 
inappropriate off-task behaviour in response to test materials. In total this 
child dropped 6 raw score points - accounting for over 2 MA months -
through failure to 'perform'. Subject 31 would have attained an MA of 30 
months had she not refused to cooperate on 3 of the 15 items between her 
basal and ce:Hing levels. Failure to engage in these three items (item 151: 
pink board: reversed; item 154: train of cubes; item 157: folds paper) - for 
which she was reported to possess the requisite skills - resulted in an MA 
score of approximately 3 months lower than she was apparently capable of 
attaining. 
54 months N =2; Subjects 33 & 34 
(raw score range 152- 158; MA range 27m- 30+m) 
Again, although both subjects in this age group attained similar 
ceiling levels, the difference of 8 raw score points between the two scores 
was due largely to Subjects 34's clear refusal to cooperate on at least 6 
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items. In comparison Subject 33 failed a total of only 4 items with no 
evidence that ant of these failures were not genuine. 
60 months N=1; Subject 35 
(raw score 161; MA 30+m) 
This subject proved to be well beyond the mental age level covered 
by the test. She appeared to be cooperating fully and the two items which 
she did fail (items 161: builds tower of 8 cubes; 163: understands 3 . 
preopositions) seemed to be due to a genuine inability to produce the 
required responses. 
Failures by default: an overview 
Table 3:5 shows the number of cases in which specific types of items 
were failed by default by large numbers of subjects (all remaining cases of 
failure by default are summarised in Table 3:4 above). Inspection of this 
table reveals a group of items which were being avoided in common by 
subjects toward the mid - upper MA range of the sample. These items 
have been catergorised according t~ . the types of skills tested (i.e 
discrimination, crayon and paper skills, cube behaviours etc.). Several 
items in each category involved the same basic test procedure being used 
for a series of items of increasing difficulty levels. For example the test 
situation in which children are presented with the picture cards is broken 
down into 6 separate items (names 1/3/5; points to 3/5/7). Failures by 
default were observed at almost every level of this item series; in some 
cases subjects refused outright to cooperate at any level, in others they 
would only cooperate up to a point before rejecting the task, although 
reported as having the ability to pass a higher item in the series (e.g. 
pointing to only one picture despite reportedly being able to name 
several). 
It can be seen that the most frequently avoided single item- 131 - was 
that in which subjects are required to find an object hidden under 1 of 2 
inverted cups; 8 out of the 9 subjects who failed this item failed it by 
default. Next came items involving building towers or a train with the 
cubes, failed by default in 53% of cases of failure. Of items testing 
discrimination skills, almost 40% were failed through refusal to cooperate 
in the tasks. 
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Table 3:5: Frequency of failures by default on specific types of items 
No. Cases No. failures % 
failed by ·default 
Discrimination 
Pictures 
130: Names 1 9 5 55.5 
132: Points to 3 9 4 44.4 
129: points to 5 6 1 16.6 
141: Names 3 7 1 14.2 
148: Points to 7 7 1 14.2 
149: N ames 5 7 1 14.2 
Mean 7.5 2.16 26.5 
Naming objects (ball, watch, pencil, scissors, cup) 
124: Names 1 8 4 50 
138: Names 2 6 1 16.6 
146: Names 3 6 
Mean 6.66 1.6 25 
128: Points to parts of doll 7 . 6 85.7 
Discrim inates cup, plate, box 
144: Discriminates 2 6 5 83.3 
152: Discriminates 3 8 5 62.5 
Mean 7 5 72.9 
Crayon and paper 
125: Imitates crayon stroke 5 
135: Differentiates scribble from stroke 7 2 28.5 
147: Imitates strokes: vert. and horiz. 6 2 33.3 
157: Folds paper 8 3 37.5 
Mean 6.5 1.75 24.8 
Cube behaviours 
111: Tower of 2 3 2 66.6 
119: Tower of 3 7 4 57.1 
143: Tower of 6 8 5 62.5 
161: Tower of 8 9 3 33.3 
154: Train of cubes 7 4 57.1 
Mean 6.8 3.6 55.3 
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Blue form board 
110: Places 1 round block 








129: Places 2 round and 2 square blocks 
142: Places 6 blocks 
155: Completes in 150 sees. 
Mean 
Mends broken doll 
133: Marginally 













During analysis for. the above table, a pattern emerged among the 
mid - upper MA range of the sample. This pattern indicated possible links 
between apparently genuine failures on several items by subjects with 
lower mental age levels, and failures to engage in the same items 
demonstrated by subjects who attained higher mental age scores. To 
examine this in more detail the section of the sample attaining MA scores 
in the mid - upper MA range was divided into 3 groups on the basis of 
raw scores: 
Group 1: raw score range- 113-126 (MA 15-18 months) N=6 
Group 2: raw score range- 130-139 (MA 19-22 months) N=6 
Group 3: raw score range- 141-158 (MA 23-30 months) N=S. 
Item - item default comparisons were then made across these 3 groups. 
The link between mental age level and item default seemed 
particularly strong in items testing discriminatory abilities. Item 128 
(points to parts of doll), for example, appeared to have been genuinely 
failed by 3 subjects in Group 1. Given that this item fell just beyond the 
ceiling levels established for 3 of these subjects, this was unsurprising. 
Although this same item fell well within the basal to ceiling ranges of all 
6 subjects in Group 2, however, it was failed by 4 subjects in this group - in 
3 cases by default. Item 132 (points to 3 pictures) was similarly failed by 4 
subjects in the lower group, none of whom were reported to be 
underperforming; by comparison all 5 failures on the same item Group 2 
were by default. Both items 128 and 132 were below the basal levels 
established for all 5 subjects in Group 3 and were therefore not presented 
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to subjects at this MA level. Item 144 (discriminates 2: cup, plate, box) . 
shows a similar pattern for this higher scoring group, however; failures 
on this item by subjects in Groups 2 and 3 were largely by default. 
This pattern was also evident in items involving the 1 inch cubes: 4 
genuine failures to build a tower in the lower MA group contrasted with 
2 out of 5, and 2 out of 4 failures being by default in Groups 2 and 3 
respectively. Several subjects were also very reluctant to build a train with 
the cubes: 3 out of 5 failures were by default in Group 2 and 1 out of 2 on 
the upper MA group. 
DISCUSSION 
The major aim of this study was to investigate, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively, the performance of a group of infants with Down's 
Syndrome on the wide-ranging. set of cognitive tasks included in the 
mental scale of the Bayley Scales of Infant Development. 
The quantitative analyses carried out revealed an overall pattern of 
declining mean DQs with increasing chronological age. This finding that 
mental age does not t.ise proportionally with chronological age is 
consistent with that found in other cross-sectional and longitudinal 
studies of cognitive development in DS (Oster 1953; Share et al 1961; Koch 
et al 1963; Loeffler and Smith 1964; Fischler et al 1964; Dicks-Mireaux 1966; 
1972, de Coriat et al 1968; Carr 1970; 1975, Eipper and Azen 1978; Ramsay 
and Piper 1980; Hanson 1981; Schnell 1984; Piper et al1986; Sharav and 
Schlomo 1988). Scores were uniformly low; developmental levels at 
almost every age group were well below those of average non-
handicapped children of similar ages, with the gap between the two 
populations widening over each age interval. Mean raw scores and 
mental age levels were found to increase steadily however, indicating 
that DS children do acquire new skills and abilities as they grow older, 
and that tests such as the Bayley can demonstrate this. 
Even in this small sample, however, group means, whether 
representing DQ, MDI, MA or raw score levels, were frequently found to 
obscure individual variations. Indeed one advantage of having a 
relatively small sample is that it does make it possible to see the extent to 
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which individual subjects deviate from the overall pattern. Individual 
deviation patterns may well be masked in larger studies particularly 
when analyses are- as is typical- conducted only on group data. The sharp 
incline of the slope in Figure 3 (group Mental Age levels) at 15 months, 
for example, clearly reveals that the one child at this age level was 
performing at an MA level well beyond that of the two children in the 
two subsequent age groups. This calls into question the value of cross-
sectional measurement of a population in which such substantial 
variation in ability levels can be found (e.g. Carr 1975; Loeffler and Smith 
1964; Cornwell and Birch 1969). The mean raw score of 125 calculated 
from the scores of the two 30 month olds similarly gives little indication 
of the fact that one of these children was performing at a level equivalent 
to that of one of the two 42 month old subjects while the other was doing 
less well than one of the 24 month olds. Nor can this method tell us 
anything about the expected rate of development of either child; the 
mean raw score level attained by subjects at 36 months would indicate a 
predicted drop of 3 raw score points by this age for the higher scoring 30 
month old. 
Even in the case of subjects with highly similar scores, detailed 
analysis of test profiles revealed that in most cases there was very little 
agreement in terms of the individual items passed and failed by these 
children. In many experimental studies requiring children to be pre-
matched on overall levels of ability, these differences would generally be 
overlooked; MA matches are generally made on the basis of scores z,lone. 
For example, little account would be taken of the fact that Subject 26 (36 
months) and Subject 29 (42 months) whose scores were identical 
demonstrated very different levels of verbal ability. The younger child 
who failed almost every verbal item which fell between his basal and 
ceiling levels was able to compensate for this in terms of score by passing 
a number of spatial items which fell beyond the ceiling level of the 42 
month old. This older child did not demonstrate such a delay in language 
and consequently produced a narrower, more consistent profile of passes. 
Can it reasonably be accepted on the basis purely of their scores that these 
two children are developmentally similar ? More importantly, can it 
reasonably be accepted that they are both developmentally similar to a 
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younger non-handicapped child who has attained the same score - but 
have simply reached this developmental stage more slowly? 
Difference versus delay 
The slow development view of development in handicap is largely 
justified by its proponents on the grounds that mentally handicapped 
children achieve the developmental milestones measured in 
psychometric tests in a sequence similar to that found in non-
handicapped children, with the only difference between the two 
populations being one of rate. Similar scores attained by older 
handicapped and younger non-handicapped children are offered in 
support of the view tnat development in handicap is simply slow. On a 
purely quantitative level, the cross section of scores attained by children 
in the present study would support this 'slow' theory of development. 
The analyses which focussed on more qualitative features of performance 
suggest, however, that there may be important differences between levels 
of performance as reflected in test scores and true levels of competence in 
the DS sample tested here. This competence/performance differential is 
not presumed to exist in theories of normal development or in 
psychometric techniques. Such findings do however support a growing 
body of evidence from other studies which suggests that development in 
children with mental handicap may in fact differ in very fundamental 
ways from that seen in non-handicapped children (Rogers 1977; Morss 
1983,1985; Macpherson 1984; Ronda! 1984, 1988; Cherkes-Julkowski et al 
1986; Wishart 1986, 1987; Moss and Hogg 1987; Dyer et al1988). 
Intuition alone suggests that a 'slow' theory of cognitive 
development derived from outcome measures from psychometric tests 
standardised on non-handicapped children must be inadequate. 
'Snapshot' measurements of cognitive ability such as MDI/DQ/IQ 
performance cannot hope to reflect the very different learning 
experiences of the two populations. Mentally ha·ndicapped children may 
be slow to reach developmental milestones but this does not mean that 
their lives whilst approaching these milestones have taken place in slow 
motion. By nature of the fact that they are handicapped, their experiences 
of success and failure prior to reaching any given milestone must 
inevitably have been very different from that of a normal child. 
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It seems reasonable to assume that an exaggerated experience of 
failure must at some point affect a child's willingness to persevere in 
learning attempts. As mentioned previously, Cunningham (1982) 
suggested that the absence of visually directed reaching in young babies 
with DS may be an example of repeated failure resulting in the extinction 
o{ a motor pattern normally seen in most non-handicapped babies of a 
similar age. Normal development is structured in such a way that motor 
abilities and the intention to execute these abilities emerge concordantly. 
Levels of arousal appear to be sustained by the availability of appropriate 
motor abilities. A normally developing child can turn towards the source 
of a sound and therefore learns that it is worthwhile to continue to do so. 
By comparison, findings from the present study seem to indicate that DS 
children of the same age lose the intention to locate sounds, possibly as a 
result of their inability to execute the required motor action at the 
appropriate stage in development. Ability and intention do merge at a 
later stage; the 9 month old child with DS can and will demonstrate this 
ability, but the history of its development is, it would seem, very different 
from that experienced by the normally developing child. 
Similar explanations could be provided for the many examples in 
this study in which children avoided items which they should have been 
capable of passing. Past experience of failure in similar situations may 
simply have reduced these children's motivation to engage in tasks 
requiring demonstration of skills that had had particularly 'difficult' 
learning histories. One such skill may be the processing of auditory 
information. DS children have been found to characteristically 
demonstrate a short term memory deficit for information presented 
aurally (Bilovsky and Share 1965; Burr and Rohr 1978; McDade and Adler 
1980; Marcel and Armstrong 1982). In this study items which involved 
verbal instruction (e.g. item 128: points to parts of doll) or discrimination 
(e.g. between a house and three other objects displayed on a picture card: 
items 130, 132, 139, 141, 148, 149) were beyond the overall ability levels of 
children in the lowest of the three groups (group 1) selected for the 
purpose of demonstrating links between genuine failures and failures to 
engage at differing levels of ability. It could not be concluded therefore 
that there was any such deficit or lag apparent among children at this 
stage of development. Although children in group 2 were reported to 
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have acquired the requisite skills to pass these same items which, in all 6 
cases, fell toward the lower to middle ends of their performance profiles, 
they almost universally refused to demonstrate them. Children in this 
group were clearly well in advance of children in group 1 on other skills 
tested by items around the same MA level as those involving 
discriminatory abilities. There was far less evidence of deliberate 
underperformance on the blue form board items, for example. The high 
frequency of failures by default observed in the same children on the 
discrimination tasks would seem to suggest that this skill had had a 
comparatively more difficult learning history. This interpretation was 
further supported by the large number of below optimal performances 
observed by children in groups 2 and 3 on higher level discrimination 
tasks (items 144/152: discriminates 2/3: cup, plate, box) 
Obviously no conclusions about the developmental role of different 
-learning histories can be drawn from this- or any- cross-sectional study. 
Longitudinal investigations of the performance of individual children on 
these types of items would be necessary to determine the origins of such 
patterns. What can be concluded from this study, however, is that 
although the acquisition of discriminatory abilities may be delayed in 
relation to the development of other skills, the fact that DS children are 
reluctant to demonstrate this ability even once acquired suggests that it is 
insufficient simply to explain the development of this skill in terms of a 
deficit or a delay in relation to normal development. 
It may also be the case that to describe development in handicap as 
simply being different is equally insufficient. Indeed a great many studies 
comparing aspects of development in DS and non-handicapped children 
have failed to produce evidence of significant differences between the two 
populations (e.g. Cunningham et al 1985; Breeghly 1987; Pruess et al 1987; 
Metcalf and Stratford 1986). In a detailed study of the language 
development of children with DS, Rondal (1988), moreover, was able to 
provide examples both of differences and of apparently straightforward 
delays. He argues that there is no clear dichotomy between difference and 
delay, but that the distinction is dependent on the level of analysis. In 
relation to language development, he maintains that a solution to the 
debate depends largely on whether differences are being sought within 
the system of language as a whole, or in its separate components. If there 
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is a delay in varying degrees for different aspects of language, 
development within these separate aspects can simply be described as 
being delayed, but for language as a whole, development must be seen as 
different. 
The development of the 36 month old DS child in this study who 
demonstrated a specific delay in language acquisition can similarly be 
seen either as delayed with respect to that particular aspect of cognitive 
development, or as different in terms of the structure of development as 
a whole. Jt is well established that the development of language in DS 
children commonly lags behind that of other abilities. Many proponents 
of the 'difference' theory of development use this observation to support 
their position. By comparison, however, the similar scoring 42 month old 
did not demonstrate a delay in language relative to her overall level of 
performance. The more concentrated pattern of passes on items within 
one particular mental age range could be taken to indicate that in this 
particular case there was no evidence that development in DS differs 
from the 'normal' pattern; this subject's poor score was simply 
symptomatic of delayed progress through the normal sequence of 
developmental milestones. 
It would in fact appear that the test profile from either of these two 
children can tell us very little about differences and delays in DS 
development. Failure to produce the verbal responses required to be 
credited on an assessment test does not necessarily indicate a delay in 
language acquisition. On the basis of both their behaviour and parental 
reports both children were in fact producing less than optimal 
performances, thereby rendering invalid any conclusions regarding the 
relationship between specific and overall levels of ability. Adoption of a 
level of analysis based purely on what children overtly demonstrate 
themselves to be capable of may not be sufficient to distinguish between 
developmental delay or difference in DS. 
Motivational differences: assessment and handicap 
Many proponents of either delay or difference theories fail to take 
into account the influence that motivational factors can have on test 
performance and on cognitive development. One way in which DS 
children do appear to be clearly different from normally developing 
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children is in their reluctance to demonstrate behaviours which are 
within their repertoires. It is stated in the test manual that the items 
selected for inclusion in the BSID were those found to be the most 
effective at eliciting demonstration of specific abilities from the 
standardisation sample of non-handicapped children. From this study it 
would appear that they are considerably less effective in doing so with 
handicapped children. In itself this could be offered as evidence that 
development in handicap differs from the 'norm.'. 
Whether demonstrating developmental difference or delay, it is 
very clear from the frequency with which children were avoiding BSID 
items that they reportedly should have passed that this test is not an 
effective means of accurately assessing the cognitive abilities of children 
with OS. Despite this it is still very widely used for this purpose both in 
clinical settings and in research. Mental age matches made on the basis of 
outcome measures from the BSID and from other, similar tests of infant 
development are still common in research studies comparing 
handicapped groups of differing aetiologies or groups of handicapped and 
non-handicapped children. Paradoxically, a large number of such 
comparative studies are carried out for the purp·oses of demonstrating 
developmental differences between the populations in question (e.g 
Marcel et al 1988; Mundy et al 1988; Loveland 1987; Cardoso-Martins et al 
1985). The BSID in particular is still widely acclaimed as being "extremely 
well standardised", "very reliable" and "unrivaled at determining a 
child's developmental status relative to its age mates (Francis, Self and 
Horowitz 1987). In a recent international study of the performance of OS 
chi:ldren on the BSID, the authors concluded that "with OS children 
Bayley tests can and should be used beyond the stage of 30 months as long 
as the test captures the performance of the child" (Rauh and Rudinger 
1987). The study presented here has shown that for OS children, whether 
below or beyond 30 months, full levels of ability are not captured in BSID 
performance. 
Results from assessments made in infancy are very often consulted 
in making decisions regarding school placements and eligibility for other 
services provided for the handicapped. The present study suggests 
strongly that single assessment sessions do not provide an accurate 
picture of the developmental status of chldren with OS and indicates that 
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such measures should be regarded with more caution than would 
currently appear to be the case. In many cases, subjects were seen to be 
underperforming by up to two months below their optimal levels of 
performance. Given that children toward the upper end of the sample 
were performing at mental age levels of almost half their chronological 
ages, this difference is not insubstantial. 
Despite the wide dependance on scores from tests such as the BSID, 
few studies have directly investigated their reliability in children with 
mental handicap; testing is generally carried out only once and typically 
by a stranger to the child. One exception is a study carried out with groups 
of handicapped, non-handicapped and minority children by Fuchs and 
Fuchs (1985) who found that on re-testing, considerable improvements in 
scores were achieved; this was attributed by Fuchs and Fuchs to examiner 
familiarity. Given that in the present study, behaviours witheld in testing 
had been observed by individuals more familiar with the children, it is 
possible that a more accurate picture of ability levels could be obtained by 
repeating the tests with a familiar examiner. The next chapter will 
therefore present the results of a study in which OS children were 
assessed and re-assessed by the same examiner at closely spaced intervals. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE PERFORMANCE OF DS CHILDREN ON THE BSID: 
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
The quantitative analyses presented in the previous chapter of the 
BSID performance of a group of infants and young children with OS 
revealed that levels of ability, as reflected in test scores, were consistent 
with those found in other cross-sectional studies of the cognitive 
development of this population of children. Detailed analyses of 
children's performance and parental reports indicated, however, that in 
many cases, demonstrated levels of performance fell short of previously 
demonstrated competence. An obvious implication of this finding is 
therefore that scores were not accurate indices of children's optimal levels 
of ability. This in turn lends support to an argument offered by many 
parents of children with mental handicap: that current test procedures are 
not adequate means of assessing the true cognitive abilities of their 
children. 
Indeed a constant source of frustration to parents is the frequency 
with which their children do tend to underperform in assessment 
situations. Perhaps more frustrating, however, is the fact that although 
this has not gone unnoticed by professionals there seem to have been few 
attempts to investigate this proble·m in detail. This seems surprising 
given the frequency with which these children are formally assessed in 
comparison with non-handicapped children and the importance of the 
decisions made on the basis of these assessments. 
During testing for the previous study there were many instances of 
children failing items for which they were known to have acquired the 
requisite skills and to have demonstrated these skills in other settings. 
From this it could be suggested either that the performance of these 
children in assessment situations is not sufficiently reliable to justify 
dependence on single testing sessions, or that the test procedure itself is 
not a valid means of assessing their cognitive development. The present 
study aims to explore these issues in detail. 
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It has already been mentioned that the question of reliability has 
been tackled indirectly by a group of researchers who had pinpointed 
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examiner unfamiliarity to be a major cause of underperformance in 
handicapped pre-school children in single assessment situations (Fuchs 
and Fuchs 1985). They pointed out that in the majority of clinical and 
educational settings, examiners are strangers to the children they test. 
This was substantiated both by reports from practicing professionals and 
by an analysis of the user manuals of 20 well known intelligence and 
speech/language measures; in only two of these manuals was there any 
recommendation that examiners establish pretest ·contact with their 
examinees. Fuchs and Fuchs' review of a large number of investigations 
of the effects of examiner unfamiliarity on test scores revealed that this 
factor particularly compromised the reliability of scores attained by 
ha~dicapped children: the majority of studies in which children 
performed significantly more poorly with unfamiliar examiners were 
found to involve handicapped, minority and/ or pre-school children. In 
addition, this review was able to show that the test performance of 
handicapped pre-schoolers was particularly adversely affected by 
examiner unfamiliarity. Their own follow-up study directly comparing 
the effects of unfamiliar testers on handicapped and non-handicapped 
preschool and school-age children found that only the groups of 
handicapped children performed differentially with familiar and 
unfamiliar testers (Fuchs et al 1985; Fuchs and Fuchs 1985). 
The examiner unfamiliarity hypothesis is not entirely incompatible 
with t.he motivational hypothesis which is central to this thesis. The 
interaction of both variables - examiner unfamiliarity and motivation -
might explain the high level of discrepancy recorded between parental 
reports of ability and DS children's performance on the BSID in Chapter 3. 
Children had - when in the presence of a familiar adult (i.e. a parent) -
demonstrated that the skills necessary for passing certain items were in 
fact within their repertoires. In testing, many such items were avoided, 
however, and it was suggested in Chapter 3 that this avoidance might 
have been attributable to childrens' past experience of failure in similar 
situations. If this explanation can be accepted, it does not seem unlikely 
that a direction from an unfamiliar adult to produce a skill which has had 
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a particularly difficult learning history should be met with a certain 
amount of resistance on the part of the child. 
However, although capable perhaps of explaining a proportion of 
cases in which children were underperforming, it cannot be assumed that 
examiner unfamiliarity is responsible for all instances in which 
handicapped children have failed to demonstrate optimal levels of ability 
in testing situations. Fuchs et al were able to demonstrate that single 
testing sessions with unfamiliar examiners were not sufficient to attain 
reliable measures of the abilities of their subjects, but they did not deal 
with the issue of reliability in any detail. Their analyses were conducted 
on scores only; no reference was made to the reliability of individual test 
items. Hence, although scores were found to improve when children 
were tested with a familiar examiner, they could give no indication as to 
whether these higher scores reflected a straightforward improvement in 
performance on a small number of specific items or whether, despite 
achieving higher overall scores, subjects might not have reproduced all 
passes attained in previous sessions. Moreover there were no reports of 
qualitative aspects of children's performance in either session - whether 
involving familiar or unfamiliar examiners. In the absence of this sort of 
data it could not therefore -be assumed that these improved scores 
necessarily reflected optimal ability levels. 
In this study the question of reliability will be tackled more directly. 
Children will be tested on two closely-spaced occasions by an examiner 
who is already familiar with them. In addition to straightforward score 
comparisons, test protocols will be compared for evidence of changes in 
performance on specific items. More qualitative aspects of children's 
behaviour during testing will also be recorded. 
The second question to be addressed in this study is that of the 
vaiidity of tests such as the BSID with mentally handicapped subjects. The 
suggestion was made in the previous chapter that although the items 
selected for inclusion in tests such as the BSID had been demonstrated to 
be the most effective means of eliciting evidence from non-handicapped 
children that they had acquired specific skills, it is not necessarily the case 
that they are equally effective in doing so with children with mental 
handicap. At a recent conference on mental handicap the father of a child 
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with OS objected to current assessment procedures on the basis that they 
require children "to perform like dancing bears". This description would 
seem to be especially applicable in cases where handicapped children are 
tested on items which have been designed for use with much younger 
non-handicapped children. The pattern of scores presented in Chapter 3 
clearly demonstrates that as OS children grow older, the gap between their 
chronological and mental ages increases. Only one subject was 
performing at the level which would be expected from a similarly aged 
non-handicapped child. This difference in chronological age between 
handicapped and non-handicapped children of similar levels of cognitive 
ability is simply overlooked in 'IQ' type tests where the same sorts of tasks 
are used for testing the abilities of the two populations of children. 
Failures on tasks are interpreted, for both populations, as evidence that 
the skills they are designed to test for have yet to be acquired. When an 
older handicapped child is seen to fail items which are generally passed by 
much younger children it is generally assumed that his/her development 
is 'slow'. In the absence of performance data on similarly aged non-
handicapped children on these sorts of tasks, such conclusions cannot be 
justified. The tasks may simply - as frequently · appears to have been the 
case with children in the cross-sectional study - have failed to engage the 
older child: again, a case of "won't do", rather than "can't do" (Koegel and 
Mentis 1985, Wishart 1987). 
This is not to imply that all cases of failure in test situations are by 
default and cannot therefore be attributed to deficits in cognitive ability. 
There were many examples in the previous study of chHdren showing 
genuine difficulties with specific BSIO tasks. It will, however, be recalled 
that OS children in the errorless learning study (Chapter 2) were more 
likely to perform poorly following presentation with a task which they 
perceived to be difficult, but that non-handicapped children did not 
demonstrate this differential response. Many parents of mentally 
handicapped children express concern that such differences in perceptions 
adversely affect their child's performance in a test situation. Whereas a 
non-handicapped child is likely to perceive a testing situation as an 
opportunity to demonstrate what s/he can do, for a child with mental 
handicap the same situation is often one in which s/he has little option 
but to concede to what s/he cannot do. 
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It seems unlikely, given the substantial and inevitable differences in 
learning histories, both in terms of length and experience of 
success/failure, that handicapped and non-handicapped children should 
approach assessment situations in similar ways. The BSID, like most 
other tests of this sort, included only non-handicapped children in its 
standardisation sample. Issues such as examiner unfamiliarity, suitability 
of test items, and lowered expectations of success were given little 
consideration. As the BSID is one of tests most wid~ly used with young 
mentally handicapped children, it seems important to examine the 
assumption that its reliability and validity are unaffected when used with 
this population. The major aim of this study was therefore to investigate 
the reliability of performance of infants and young children with DS on 
the BSID by comparing performance on two closely-spaced testing 




Eighteen DS children in the age range 6 months to 4 years took part 
in this study, three at each of the following ages 6, 12, 18, 24, 36 and 48 
months. All subjects had also participated in the study reported in 
Chapter 3. 
Procedure 
All children were tested with the BSID on two occasions. Testing 
sessions were separated by one week at the two younger age levels and by 
two weeks at older ages. The same examiner was used in both sessions. 
All subjects were already familiar with the examiner from previous visits 
to the laboratory. Procedure was identical in both sessions and was in 
accordance with that described in the previous study. 
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RESULTS 
As in the cross-sectional study both qualitative and quantitative 
analyses of BSID performance were carried out.l 
Raw scores 
Table 4:1 shows the mean raw scores and corresponding MAs in the 
two sessions for the six age groups tested. As in the cross-sectional study, 
it can be seen that although raw scores increased significantly with 
increasing age, even the six month olds scored 1 to 2 months below the 
norm for their age, with this deficit in performance widening as age 
increased. 
Table 4.1: Raw Scores and Mental Ages 
Age (months) Testing I Session II 
Mean Raw Scores (Mental Age) 
6 55. 3 (4.5) 53.3 (4.5) 
12 77.3 (7.0) 75.6 (7.0) 
18 100 (11.0) 99.7 (11.0) 
24 109 (13.6) 108.7 (13.0) 
36 131 (19.0) 130.3 (19.0) 
48 142 (22.0) 142.3 (22.0) 
Reliability of performance 
It can also be seen from Table 4:1 that mean raw scores do not differ 
greatly over the two sessions; gains and losses in scores amounted to a 
maximum of two points and these had no effect on MAs. A t-test 
comparison of raw scores indicated that there was no significant 
lThese findings have already been reported in The British Journal of Educational 
Psychology (J.G. Wishart and L. Duffy, (1990)) Instability of Performance on Cognitive 
Tests in Infants and Young Children with Down's Syndrome, 60, 10-22. 
81 
difference in performance over the two sessions (t = 0.76, (df 17); NS). The 
correlation coefficient for the two· sets of scc,:>res was 0.98. 
A second measure of reliability of performance, however, produced 
a very different picture. Examination of individual performance profiles 
showed that even where raw scores were very similar over the two 
sessions, performance had in fact changed over a substantial number of 
items. Subject 14 (36 months), for example, attained a raw score of 128 
(MA 19m) on both occasions. Her performance was found to vary on 6 
out of 23 - or 26% of the total number of items presented over the two 
sessions, however. Similarly, whereas a comparison of raw scores 
achieved by Subject 12 (24 months) indicated a minor drop in 
performance in the second session (3 raw score points), item-item 
comparison revealed that his performance had in fact differed on 11 items 
- 31% of the total of 35 items presented. Half of the children in this sample 
in fact performed differently on 25% or more of items presented. Table 4:2 
summarises the number of items on which performance varied over the 
two sessions for each age group. 
Table 4:2 Performance Variability 
Age Total No. Items Varying Total No. of % 
(Months) over sessions Items Agreement 
Presented 
Fail to Pass Pass to Fail 
6 12 19 130 76.2 
12 10 15 146 82.9 
18 11 13 86 72.1 
24 16 16 108 70.4 
36 12 25 97 72.2 
48 13 13 113 77.0 
Total 74 91 Mean 75.1 
Although item-item agreement over sessions in individual children 
would seem to be the most obvious and sensitive measure of a test's 
reliability, no such normative data are provided with the BSID. The only 
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measure of reliability presented comes from a test-retest study which used 
the 1958-60 version of the Scales (the immediate predecessor of the 
current version). The sample on which the current version of the BSID 
was founded involved 1262 infants. In contrast the reliability study 
involved only a very small sample of children (28) of only one age level 
(8 months) and with only the reliability of a restricted number (59) of test 
items reported (Werner and Bayley 1966). Item-item agreement figures 
were only reported for items showing the highest and lowest reliabilities; 
no reference was made to the remaining 171tems which were in the mid-
range. Moreover of the 21 items which did obtain particularly low 
reliabilities, only 11 appear in the present version of the test. It was not 
therefore possible to make an overall comparison of reliability figures 
obtained for all of the items included in the present study and those given 
by Werner and Bayley. A t-test comparison of the test-retest agreement 
figures obtained for those items showing the highest reliability in the 
Werner and Bayley study with reliability found for the same items in the 
present study, however, revealed a significant difference in favour of the 
Werner and Bayley study (t = 3.71, df 21, p < 0.005) indicating that DS 
performance was less reliable ev~n on items which normally produce 
highly reliable performances. 
The only other data on reliability of the BSID comes from an item-
item reliability study by Horner (1980) of the test-retest performance of 
non-handicapped· children at two ages, 9 and 15 months. Only 76 items 
were presented in the Horner study; items 70 - 109 were presented to 9 
month old children and items 100 - 145 to 15 month olds. Mean 
percentage agreement for the entire range of 76 items was 84.55%. This 
compares with a reliability figure of 75.3% for the same items in the DS 
group. A t-test comparison of DS percentage agreement figures with 
Horner's data produced a similar result to the comparison with Bayley's 
reliability figures (t = 4.267, df 75, p < 0.0005), that is, DS performance was 
again found to be less reliable. 
Although no indication of individual children's test-retest reliability 
is provided for the BSID, what is provided is the standard error of 
measurement at each age level. This allows variability in performance in 
each individual DS child's scores over the two testing sessions to be 
compared to the variability which would be expected on the basis of the 
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SEm for the range of mental ages covered by the test. The SEm was, 
however, calculated from the distribution of MDI scores and, as will be 
recalled, most DS scores were too low to be converted into MDis. 
Comparisons were therefore carried out between the variability predicted 
in raw scores on the basis of the SEm and MA level observed for each 
child. For example: the performance of Subject 12 (24 months) was found 
to vary on 11 items. This subject scored at an MA level of 16 months. The 
SEm for 15 months (the nearest age level for which an SEmis provided 
in the BSID) is 6.7 which, using the norms tables, translates into a 
maximum of 4 raw score points at this mental age level. Hence, using the 
SEm, a raw score obtained at this level would be expected to fall within 4 
points of the 'true' raw score. Clea,rly, the variability in Subject 12's 
performance was in excess of that expected on the basis of the SEm. A t-
test between observed and expected variability in all subjects indicated 
that there was a significant difference over the two sessions (t = 2.78, 
df (17), p < 0.01) again indicating that DS performance was less reliable 
than that of non-handicapped children. 
Direction of performance variability 
Remaining with the example of Subject 12, of the 11 items on which 
his performance was found to vary, 7 changed in a pass-to-fail direction, 
(i.e. were passed in the first session and failed in the second) and 4 in the 
opposite direction. Although there were two cases in which performance 
varied in only the pass-to fail direction, most children, like subject 12, 
showed a combination of both passes-to-fails and fails-to-passes. In total 
there were 165 cases of unreliability: in 74 cases, items which had been 
failed in the first session were passed in the second session (fail-to-pass); 
in 91 cases the change was in the pass-to-fail direction (see Table 4:2). 
A fail-to-pass change could result from a genuine developmental 
advance having been made between testing sessions. Given, however, 
that sessions were separated by a maximum of two weeks, this was 
unlikely to be the case when performance was found to improve on as 
many as 8 or 9 items in the second session. As the examiner was already 
familiar with subjects on the first testing session, it is also unlikely that 
increased examiner familiarity could have been responsible for such 
improvements. More likely is that fluctuating levels of task engagement 
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were resposible for the unreliability shown. In this respect a pass-to-fail 
pattern is less ambiguous. Clearly the required behaviour was in the 
child's repertoire but was not for some reason being produced in the 
second testing. 
Since Bayley items in general cannot be passed by chance, any passes, 
whether produced in the first or second session, are likely to have been 
genuine. An optimal score was therefore calculated for each child in 
which credit was given for all the items on which a pass had been scored 
in either session. Not surprisingly, this score proved to be consistently 
higher than the score actually achieved in either testing session (1st/2nd 
session: t = 2.60/3.24 (df 17); p < 0.01/0.005). 
Difficulty level of unreliable items 
An analysis of the difficulty level of those items which proved to be 
unreliable was carried out by relating each item which varied to the 
developmental level of each child. The midpoint between lowest basal 
and highest ceiling levels attained over the two sessions for each child 
and the numbers of pass-to fail and fail-to-pass items which fell above 
and below this midpoint were calculated. Numbers of fail-to-pass items 
fell equally on either side of this midpoint. There was, however, a trend 
for more pass-to-fail items to occur above than below this midline and for 
these to exceed the number of fail-to-pass items above this point 
(t = 1.40/1.24 (df 17); p < 0.10/NS respectively). 
Items showing poor reliability 
Table 4:3 shows those tE!St items on which performance was found to 
vary most over the two sessions in the 6 age groups, together with the 
test-retest item agreement figures available from Werner and Bayley 
(1965), and from Horner (1980). As indicated by the t-test comparisons 
presented above, the variability in OS performance was greater than 
would have been expected on the basis of either of these two reliability 
studies. 
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Table 4:3 Items Showing Poorest Reliability 
No. Instances of unreliable 
performance 
Test-Retest % Agreement 
No. of OS Non-handicapped subjects 
Age Group S's .. subjects 
Item Horner Horner Werner 
& 
6 12 18 24 36 48 9m 15m Bayley 
Bm 
45: Inspects own hands 1 1 - - - - 4 50 
53: Mirror image approach 2 - - - - - 4 50 
55: Vocalises a ttitudes 3 1 - - - - 4 0 
56: Reta ins 2 cubes 1 1 - - - - 4 50 
60: Reaches persistently 1 1 - - - - 6 66.6 
62: Turns head after fallen spoon 2 1 - - - - 6 50 
00 
0'\ 67: Sustained inspection of ring 2 - - - - - 5 60 
70: Picks up cube deftly and directly 1 1 - - - - 5 60 100 - 91 
77: Reta ins 2/3 cubes offered 1 2 1 1 - - 6 16.6 92 - 95 
81: Coopera tes in games - 1 1 1 - - 7 57 71 - 58 
82: Attempts to secure 3 cubes - 1 2 1 - - 7 43 71 
86: Uncovers toy - 1 1 - - - 6 66.6 92 - 85 
88: Picks u p cup: secures cube - - 2 1 - - 6 50 92 
98: Holds crayon adaptively - - 1 2 - - 8 63 100 - 92 
99: Pushes car a long - - 2 1 - - 8 63 96 
104: Pats whistle d oll in imitation - 1 - 2 - - 7 57 62 70 
106: Imita tes words - - 1 1 - - . 5 60 88 71 88 
107: Pu ts beads in box - - 1 2 - - 5 40 96 96 
108: Places 1 peg repeatedly - - 1 1 - - 4 50 92 100 
No. Instances of unreliable Test-Retest % Agreement 
performance 
No. of OS Non-handicapped subjects 
Age Group S's* subjects 
Item Horner Horner Werner 
6 12 18 24 36 48 9m 15m Bayley 
8m 
111: Builds tower of 2 cubes - - 1 1 - - 4 50 63 
112: Spontaneous scribble - - 1 1 - - 5 60 - 75 
113: Says 2 words - - - 1 - 1 6 66.6 - 75 
114: Puts 9 cubes in cup - - - 2 1 - 7 57 - 75 
115: Closes round box - - 1 1 2 - 7 43 - 92 
117: Shows shoes - - 1 2 2 - 7 29 - 92 
122: Attains toy with stick - - - 2 2 1 6 16.6 - 67 
125: Imitates crayon stroke - - - 2 1 1 7 43 - 75 
133: Broken doll: mends marginally - - - - - 2 6 66.6 - 79 
00 
~ 134: Pegs placed in 30 sees - - - - 1 1 6 66.6 - 75 
135: Differentiates scribble from stroke - - - - 1 1 6 66.6 - 83 
140: Broken doll mends approx. - - ' - - 1 1 4 so - 67 
143: Builds tower of 6 cubes - - - - 1 1 4 so - 96 
151: Pink board: reversed - - - - - 2 4 50 
161: Builds tower of 8 cubes - - - - - 1 2 so 
162: Concept of one - - - - - 1 2 50 
* This column represents the Number of Subjects who were presented with these items 
Many of the items on which performance was found to vary most were 
the same items on which children in the cross-sectional study had failed 
by default due. to failure to engage fully in the tasks. This link was 
particularly strong for the 'tower of cubes' items (items 111/119 /143/161; 
builds tower of 2/3/6/8 cubes). 53% of children who failed items in this 
series failed them by default in the cross-sectional study; here, 41% of 
children presented with these items changed performance over the two 
sessions. Other particularly unreliable items which large numbers of 
children failed by default in the previous study included those involving 
the crayon and paper (item 125; imitates crayon stroke, item 135; 
differentiates scribble from stroke) and the broken doll (items 
133/1401153; mends broken doll marginally I appro)timately I exactly). 
These again proved to be particularly unreliable in this study. 
Failures to engage 
It became very apparent during testing that in many cases where 
passes were not being repeated on the second session, or children were 
passing items they had failed in the first session that failure had been by 
default. For example, subject 17 (48 months) very capably and willingly 
pointed to 3 of the pictures in item 141 in the first session, but simply 
refused to cooperate on the same item in the retest. Similarly, he would 
not even attempt the crayon and paper items in the second session, and 
actually broke the crayon in a fit of rage, despite having passed both items 
125 and 135 (imitates crayon stroke and differentiates scribble from stroke) 
in the first session. In contrast he was far more willing to attempt item 
151 (pink form board: reversed) in the re-test, actually succeeding in 
passing it on this occasion, whereas he had repeatedly insisted on turning 
the form board to its original position before he would place any of the 
three blocks when presented with this item in the first session. 
Given the high incidence of failures by default observed over both 
sessions, it seemed worth investigating the extent to which variable 
performance could directly be attributed to children failing to engage in 
the tasks on either of the two testing sessions. Forty seven out of the 165 
cases of unreliability had to be excluded from this analysis because it was 
not possible for these items to distinguish between criterion fails and 
failures by default (see p. 55). It is perhaps worth noting however that as 
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Table 4:4 Items in which subjects most frequently failed to engage 
Subjects showing 
unreliable 
No. Subjects failing to engage performance 
Item 12 18 24 36 48 Total No. %Overlap 
77: Retains 2/3 cubes offered 2 1 1 - - 4 5 80 
82: Attempts to secure 3 cubes 1 1 1 . - - 3 4 75 
88: Picks up cup: secures cube - 2 1 - - 3 3 100 
18: Holds crayon adaptively - 1 2 - - 3 3 100 
100: Puts 3 or more cubes in cup - 1 1 - - 2 2 100 
00 
\0 104: Pats whistle doll in imitation 1 2 3 3 100 - - -
107: Puts beads in box - 1 2 - - 3 3 100 
111: Builds tower of 3:cubes - 1 1 - - 2 2 100 
114: Puts 9 cubes in cup - - 2 1 - 3 3 100 
115: Closes round box - 1 1 2 - 4 4 100 
117: Shows shoes - 1 2 2 - 5 5 100 
125: Imitates crayon stroke - - 1 - 1 2 4 50 
130: Names 2: picture - - 1 1 - 2 2 100 
135: Differentiates scribble from stroke - - - 1 1 2 2 100 
performance on these items did not in all cases change in the fail-to pass 
direction, it seems highly probable that something other than lack of the 
required cognitive ability was determining poor performance in one or 
other session. 
In the 118 remaining eligible cases subject records were re-examined 
for evidence of failures which met the criteria for failures to engage given 
in Chapter 3. In over half the cases, failure was clearly due to the child 
refusing to engage in the task: in 40/64 pass-to-fail cases and in 27/54 fail-
to-pass cases. 
Table 4:4 shows the items which were most often failed through 
children failing to engage in the tasks. Comparison with Table 4:3 reveals 
that, to a significant extent, performance variability can be attributed to 
failures by default. 
The difficulty level of each item failed by default by individual 
children was calculated using the basal - ceiling midpoints. Instances of 
failure to engage were found to occur equally as often above (32) as below 
(34) these midpoints indicating that subjects were as likely to avoid 
relatively easy items as they were to avoid more difficult items. 
DISCUSSION 
On a strictly quantitative level, results from this study again .lend 
support to the 'slow' development theory. On average, performance in 
the DS subjects was at approximately half the level expected from non-
handicapped children of similar chronological ages. Comparison of 
individuals' test-retest profiles, however, once again indicated that the 
performance of this group of DS children did not reliably reflect their 
'true' levels of competence. This held true even after allowing for the 
variability expected between test and retest scores on this particular test. 
It will be recalled that the practice of MA matching children with DS 
with much younger non-handicapped subjects was avoided in the study 
presented in Chapter 2 on the basis that it implicitly prejudges the 
delay I difference issue. The validity of this practice was also questioned on 
the grounds that two children with widely differing performance profiles 
can achieve identical MAs. Evidence in support of this objection was 
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presented in the DS cross-sectional study in Chapter 3. The results of the 
present study demonstrate ·that not only can two different DS children 
attain similar scores via different routes, but also that it is possible for the 
same DS child to produce two very different performance profiles over 
closely-spaced testing sessions which nevertheless result in two identical, 
or very similar, scores. It will be recalled that no significant difference was 
found between scores attained in the two sessions. The reliability 
coefficient found - 0.98 - was in fact substantially higher than typically 
reported from other tests of cognitive ability in infancy (Herring 1937, 
Hindlay 1960, Gilliland 1948, Conger 1930). Clearly comparisons of this 
sort- made purely on the basis of scores and giving no indication of how 
scores on either session were attained - are not adequate measures of test 
reliability. 
Comparison with normative studies 
Reliability coefficients were not reported for overall scores in the 
Werner and Bayley study. As already noted, only percentages of test-retest 
agreement were presented for those items administered to their reliability 
sample of 8 month old infants, this ranged from 41% - 95%. Despite 
substantial variations in performance on individual items, the overall 
perfoi'I"ilance of DS children came very close to meeting Bayley's mean for 
test-retest reliability: the mean agreement across the two examinations in 
Bayley's own study was 76.4%, while in the present study the mean figure 
obtained across the 6 age groups was 75.1 %. 
Bayley's mean reliability figure of 76.4% is very low and has been 
given surprisingly little attention either in research studies or in 
educational practice. The Bayley is generally regarded to be a highly 
reliable test and is still in wide use with both normal and handicapped 
infants 30 years after its first appearance. There are a number of reasons to 
suggest, however, that the 76.4% figure quoted in the BSID manual is a 
poor indicator of the item-item reliability for the current version of the 
test. It is, for example, implied in the manual that the overall figure of 
76.4% was 'pulled down' by the high level of variation observed in the 
Werner and Bayley study on items concerned with performance of a 
social-interpersonal nature. Whereas test-retest reliabilities for the 21 
items falling into this category ranged between 41 -74%, a range of 85-95% 
91 
was obtained for the most reliable third of the 59 items used in that study. 
The Werner and Bayley study, however, was carried out on the 1958-60 
version .of the Scales - the immediate predecessor of the current version. 
Although this is fleetingly mentioned in the BSID manual there is no 
reference to the fact that almost 50% (10/21) of the social-interpersonal 
items on which performance was found to be most variable have in fact 
been excluded from the 1969 version of the test. This would suggest that 
the overall test-retest figure for the current version must in fact be higher 
than 76.4%. 
This suggestion is supported by the contradiction found between the 
outcome of the above comparison and that of the SEm comparison. 
Although the OS mean percentage agreement figure is similar to that 
obtained in the Werner and Bayley study, when individual DS subjects' 
reliability figures are compared with the SEm this results in a significant 
difference in favour of the standardisation sample. Using this method of 
comparison DS performance was found to be considerably more variable. 
Again this result indicates a discrepancy between the 76.4% agreement 
.figure obtained in the Yyerner and Bayley study and the 'true' reliability 
figure for the current version of the test. 
Further evidence of much higher levels of overall and item-item 
reliability come from the recent study by Horner (1980) in which the 
average agreement figure was 84.55% and item-item reliability varied 
between 54% and 100%. Of the two studies, Horner's is preferable as an 
estimate of the test-retest reliability of the BSID for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it has the advantage that it was carried out more recently and used 
the current version of the test. Secondly, it involved a somewhat less 
restricted sample of children: 24 infants at both 9 and 15 months in 
contrast to Werner and Bayley's sample of 28 infants at only one age level 
(8 months). Thirdly, and most importantly, the test was presented in 
accordance with the standard testing procedure. Although it is not 
entirely clear, it is implied in the Werner and Bayley study that all 
children were given the same number of items (59), irrespective of their 
ability levels. No such procedural variation is evident in the Horner 
study which, because it included two age groups, has the additional 
advantage of including a substan tially larger number of items (76). 
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A further reliability comparison was therefore carried out on the DS 
data by focussing on the same group of 76 items used in Horner's study. 
DS mean performance was found to be considerably more variable than 
in Horner's sample of non-handicapped children (DS mean percentage 
agreement 74.3%; Horner study 84.55%). 
Unreliable performance: the examiner unfamiliarity hypothesis 
Subjects in the Horner study were tested once in a clinic setting and 
once at home. Performance in the younger age group was found to be 
influenced to a relatively greater extent by the setting, cumulative 
experience with the examiner and test item familiarity. These variables 
were found to influence the distribution of passes and fails on 
inconsistently performed items with there being a statistically significant 
greater likelihood that the failure would occur in the clinic when it was 
also the first testing. This pattern of variability did not however affect 
overall scores, a finding which is at variance both with those of Fuchs and 
Fuchs (1985) and of Durham and Black (1978) who found that there was 
moderate improvement in scores among 16-21 month olds when home 
testing followed testing in an unfamiliar setting. Despite this, an overall 
similarity between the 3 studies is in the direction of performance 
variability: where setting or familiarity with the examiner or with test 
items was found to affect performance on individual items this was 
predominantly in a fail-to-pass direction. Concordant with findings from 
the Horner study, DS children's scores in the present study did not 
significantly differ over sessions. Variability in performance in individual 
test items was, however, as likely to lie in a pass-to-fail as in a fail-to-pass 
direction. This result lends little support therefore to the hypothesis that 
DS children will perform better if they are more familiar with the 
examiner, the test items and the test setting. 
Indeed, given that there was a greater incidence of pass-to-fails than 
fail-to-passes it could be suggested that increased familiarity with the test 
setting actually adversely affected these children's retest performance. 
Further support for this can be found in the observation that a larger 
proportion of failures to engage occured in the second session than in the 
first. Neither of these findings were statistically significant, however, and 
given the substantial number of changes occuring in the opposite 
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direction, it would appear that something more than simply increased 
familiarity with the testing situation must be affecting children's 
willingness to perform to full competence on certain items. 
What is significant about this pattern of variability is the fact that 
where performance on individual items was found to improve in the 
second session, these improvements were often confounded by the fact 
that they were achieved at the expense of items which children had 
shown themselves capable of passing in the first session. Consequently 
scores from neither session in fact reflected children's optimal or 'true' 
levels of ability. Interestingly findings from a second study by Horner 
(1988) revealed a pattern of results highly similar to those of the present 
investigation. From a more detailed analysis of the test-retest profiles 
obtained from his original group of 9 and 15 month olds, he was able to 
demonstrate a 50% probability that an infant's actual Developmental 
Quotient from a single examination will differ from his/her optimal 
score by more than one standard deviation of the BSID. Discussing these 
findings Homer asserts that 
"There is of course expectable error in any score produced 
by single examinations. No subject is ever expected to 
perform maximally during any given examination, and 
test behaviours of infants epitomise this fact. Elementary 
principles of sampling hold that a true score for an 
individual is the mean, and not the maximal score in a · 
hypothetical distribution of that individual's scores under 
conditions unaffected by experience or fatigue. Practically 
speaking however the clinician does not deal with a set of 
hypothetical scores but rather with a set of real scores (typically a 
single score) where experience, fatigue etc do play unavoidable 
roles in the derivation of these scores." 
(my italics) 
This latter point would seem especially pertinent in the case of 
mentally handicapped children. It has already been demonstrated that the 
overall level of variation in performance observed in DS children 
exceeded that found in Horner's non-handicapped subjects. This 
difference aside, the outcome of a below optimal assessment performance 
is likely to have far more serious implications for a handicapped child. If 
scores obtained from these children are not reflecting their optimal ability 
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levels, it is very likely that any decisions made on the basis of these scores 
will be inappropria~e. 
The many failures to engage observed by DS children in the present 
study suggest that motivational factors play an important role in the 
variability of test scores in this population of children. This is not to 
suggest that similar variables do not affect the test performance of non-
handicapped children. Given the levels of performance variability 
observed in Horner's study, it is likely that non-cognitive factors were 
also to some extent responsible for the discrepancy between optimal and 
obtained levels of performance in his subjects. The link between 
cognitive and motivational variables is increasingly being recognised to 
be an inextricable one, regardless of the ability level of the child. However 
the negative implications of these non-cognitive factors are likely to be 
more resounding for a child with mental handicap and not only in terms 
of decisions made on the basis of assessments. It is also possible that the 
adverse influence on performance of motivational variables may have 
wider-reaching effects on the development of cognition in the 
handicapped child (see below). 
Suitability of the test items 
The frequency with which children were seen to 'switch out' of BSID 
items is of significance on two other fronts. The first relates to the 
suitability of test items for use with older children with mental handicap 
who are older than the infants for whom these infants were first 
designed. As previously mentioned, data from psychometric tests is often 
used to support t~e theory that development in handicap is simply 
delayed in relation to normal development. Implicit in the use of such 
tests is the assumption that this 'slowness' applies not only to the rate at 
which children approach and reach developmental milestones, but to the 
pace of their lives in general. This point may best be illustrated with an 
example. On presentation with item 88 (picks up cup: secures cube; age 
placement 9 months; range 6-14 months), an 18 month old child with DS 
whose overall performance was well beyond this level flung both objects 
from the table and refused to cooperate on any subsequently presented 
items until, to pacify her, she was given the jointed doll. She was unable 
to follow the directions to put the doll on the chair, wipe its nose etc. 
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(item 126; age placement 17-18 months; range 14-26 months), nor would 
she point to parts of the doll's body (item 128; age placement 19.1 months; 
range 15-26 months), not, it appeared, because she was refusing to engage 
in these tasks, but simply because they were too advanced for a child at 
her level of cognitive functioning (optimal raw score 107; MA 13 
months). Despite this, she clearly found the doll far more interesting than 
either the cup or the cube. This is hardly surprising given that she was 18 
months of age. The test procedure however demanded presentation of 
item 88 to establish her basal level. 
The BSID manual states that examiners should use their discretion 
when attempting to establish basal levels. It states that because infants can 
quickly outgrow specific reactions, failure to perform a specific task may 
indicate that the child has 'surpassed' that item and should therefore 
receive credit for it. This decision can generally be based on the child's 
response to higher level items in the same set. Fqr example there are a 
number of tasks in the BSID which, like item 88, test the development of 
the object concept. To be confident that the child referred to above had 
surpassed item 88 it would be necessary to ensure · that she had reached a 
higher stage in the development of this skill. Her performance on the 
other object concept tasks was ambiguous, however. She failed items 86 
(uncovers toy) and 96 (unwraps cube), attending in both tasks to the tissue 
rather than to the object it concealed. Her performance on item 102 
(uncovers blue box) seemed to be worthy of a credit, however; she was 
able to remove the lid of the box by toppling the box onto its side and she 
immediately reached for the object inside it in apparent indication that 
she understood the relationship between the two objects. To an examiner 
who had had no contact with this child prior to this testing session it 
would be almost impossible to establish from her performance, at what 
level she was capable of functioning. It would appear that she had 
'outgrown' the objects used to test this skill but neither the test procedure 
nor ·the guidelines could accommodate this. Consequently, in the absence 
of sufficient information with which to determine whether or not she 
had surpassed item 88, it was not possible to credit her with a pass. 
In constructing the BSID, test materials and tasks were selected on 
the basis of their proven suitability for use with non-handicapped infants 
in the target age ranges. Objects such as cups and cubes do hold the interest 
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of the average 9 month old, both by nature of their relative novelty and 
their relevance in terms of the developing repertoire of cognitive and 
motor skills of children of this age. The age placements of the simpler 
items involving such objects precede those of the more complex tasks 
with the same objects by only a few months. The handicapped child, 
however, will inevitably have taken considerably longer to progress 
between these two developmental stages. In terms of day-to-day 
experience however their lives have not taken place in slow motion and 
there is no reason to assume that these objects should remain interesting 
for handicapped children for twice as long as they should for normally 
developing children. 
Developmental implications of unreliable performance 
Poor engagement in cognitive tasks, whatever its origins, must, if 
generalised to everyday learning situations, also have considerable 
implications for the progress of development. Although failures to 
engage were equally as prevalent on low level items, there were many 
instances of unreliability and avoidance towards the upper ranges of 
children's performance profiles. Given that in many cases children were 
also seen to experience genuine difficulty with other items at similar 
difficulty levels, failures by default and unreliable performance on these 
items are not as readily attributable to failure on the part of the items to 
capture the interest of these children. It may be that failures to engage in 
specific items are related to children's previous experience of failure on 
similar tasks. 
It will be recalled that the cross-sectional study presented in the 
previous chapter indicated a possible link between items avoided by older 
children and those with which many younger childen had experienced 
difficulty. Although in itself this pattern of results does not directly 
indicate any longer term effects of early experience of failure, 
identification of similar links in the longitudinal performance of 
individual children would add considerable credibility to this hypothesis. 
Previous longitudinal research with 3-5 year olds and with infants with 
OS, using tasks designed to tap very early cognitive development, has 
indicated that the failures on these tasks by older subjects may not 
represent straightforward failures to acquire the requisite skills, but may 
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in fact result from failures to consolidate these skills when they were first 
acquired in infancy (Wishart 1987,1988). Younger subjects were frequently 
observed to 'switch out' of tasks which they were known to have 
previously mastered, with performance typically falling away in the 
months following acquisition. 
In both the Wishart studies and the present study, avoidance was 
observed on tasks at levels of difficulty above, or at the upper ends of 
children's overall ability level. Although perhaps less surprising than 
avoidance of easy tasks, this would suggest that DS children are creating 
further obstacles for themselves at the acquisition stages of learning. 
Unreliable or incomplete engagement at this early stage is likely to 
increase the probability of error. As indicated in the results from the 
errorless learning study (Chapter 2), experience of error is in turn likely to 
increase the probability of poor or below optimal performance. Reluctance 
to perform to full competence on BSID items may reflect the operation of 
the same effects. Difficulty and failure experienced at the acquisition stage 
of certain skills could result in a tendency to withold production of these 
skills even when they have been acquired. As the Wishart data suggests, 
this avoidance could then result in a failure to consolidate these skills. 
If this spiral of initial failure - unreliable performance-failure to 
consolidate is characteristic of the cognitive development of children 
with DS, clearly DS developmental progress must be consistently 
undermined. Obviously a cross-sectional study such as the one presented 
in this chapter cannot provide any direct evidence on development or 
dev·=lopmental processes. To explore in more detail the relationship 
between short-term unreliable performance demonstrated in assessment 
situations and the stability of skills in the longer term a longitudinal 
study of performance profiles is required. The following two chapters 
therefore report the findings of a study in which children were regularly 




LONGITUDINAL PERFORMANCE ON THE BSID: 
A REASSESSMENT OF THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT IN 
DOWN'S SYNDROME 
A repeated finding throughout the two Bayley studies reported so far 
in this thesis has been that although on a quantitative level, the 
performance of OS children has been consistent with ability leyels found 
in other OS studies, a very different picture emerges when the focus of 
analyses is shifted away from scores and other aspects of test performance 
are examined. Study 3 addressed the issues of reliability and validity in 
relation to the performance of young children with OS on the BSIO. Item-
item comparisons carried out on test and retest protocols of a group of OS 
children of varying ages revealed that perf~rmance in two closely spaced 
testing sessions could vary substantially. Although there were no 
significant differences found between score~ attained in the two testing 
sessions, percentage agreement figures were found to be significantly 
lower than those found in similar studies with non-handicapped infants. 
An obvious implication of this finding was that neither testing session 
was able to provide an accurate estimate of children's 'true' levels of 
cognitive functioning. 
Qualitative analyses indicated that low levels of reliability were in 
part attributable to the frequency with which children were observed to 
avoid the tasks presented to them in one or other session. In itself the 
prevalence of this type of 'cognitive avoidance' behaviour can be used to 
question the validity of this method of assessing the abilities of mentally 
handicapped children. Results were also discussed in terms of the 
suitability of items designed for and standardised on much younger non-
handicapped children for use with children with mental handicap. It was 
argued that given the inevitable age differences between the two 
populations of children it should not be assumed that the same sets of 
items will be equally appropriate for eliciting demonstration of specific 
skills from both groups. 
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A great deal of research with DS and other mentally handicapped 
children has, however, been carried out under the assumption that 
psychometric tests of infant development, the BSID in particular, can 
provide accurate estimates of DS children's levels of cognitive 
functioning. Indeed various studies have been carried out comparing 
different psychometric tests of infant development in an effort to 
determine which are most appropriate for use with these particular 
populations (Ramsay and Piper 1980; Maisto and Germain 1986). A new 
test, the Battelle Development Inventory (1984), designed specifically for 
use with handicapped populations, has, moreover, been repeatedly 
investigated for reliability and validity against the BSID because of its 
"good psychometric properties" and because it is "considered one of the 
best instruments for assessing infant development, making it a good 
choice for use in (eg) a criterion-related study" (McLean et al 1987; see also 
Guidubaldi and Christie 1982; Guidubaldi and Perry 1984; Guidubaldi et al 
1981; McLean et al 1987; Sexton et al 1988; Boyd et al 1989). Clearly, if 
neither statement can be substantiated with respect to the BSID when 
used with mentally handicapped children, nor can either be applied to 
any newly devised test which uses the BSID as a standard for comparison. 
The purpose of the majority of the above studies has been to 
establish a reliable means of evaluating the effectiveness of early 
intervention programmes. Garwood (1982) has repeatedly questioned the 
suitability of using psychometric tests in this way unless the population 
under study has been included in the norming process. He advised 
against the assumption that, because these tests may be reliable and valid 
methods of determining the cognitive abilities of non-handicapped 
children, they will necessarily be equally so when used with populations 
of handicapped children. 
In the present chapter these same assumptions about reliability and 
validity will be addressed in relation to the use of psychometric tests for 
devising theories and models of development in DS. Particular emphasis 
will be placed on studies of the rate of development in DS. A longitudinal 
study reporting both quantitative and qualitative analyses of BSID data 
will be presented and its results contrasted with the results of a number of 
longitudinal studies which have reported quanti tative data only. 
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The organisational approach; hidden contradictions 
In addition to its use in measuring 'typical' rate of cognitive 
development in DS, psychometric data has often been collected on cross-
sectional samples for the purpose of making more generalised statements 
about this population. It is not a recent notion, however, that the 
exclusive use of such data for determining levels of cognitive functioning 
in DS is too limiting. In his critical review of studies of the educability of 
people with DS, Rynders suggested in 1978 that data from studies of non-
cognitive aspects of development should be incorporated into a broader 
perspective on this issue. 
Proponents of the organisational approach to development in DS 
claim to have "moved away from an approach emphasising the cognitive 
deficits of these children to a more broad-based developmental 
perspective" (Cicchetti 1987). Instead of repeated reports of the extent of 
cognitive retardation in this population, more recent investigations of 
children . with DS have focussed on a number of different behavioural 
systems. These have included Piagetian stages and sequences of 
sensorimotor development (Cardoso-Martins and Mervis 1985; Cicchetti 
and Mans-Wagener 1987), organisation of the attachment system 
(Cicchetti and Serafica 1981), interrelationships among affective and 
cognitive development (Cicchetti and Sroufe 1976, 1978), self-other 
understanding (Beeghly et al 1986), and negativism (Spiker 1979). 
Findings from these studies, it is claimed, suggest that the development 
of young children with DS is "markedly coherent and lawfully organised" 
(Cicchetti 1987), and that it undergoes patterns and sequences which are 
highly similar to those observed in normal development. 
The increase in research into such areas of development does 
represent a shift away from an emphasis on the cognitive deficit. 
Unfortunately, however, although the perspective on development in DS 
has widened, it has not widened sufficiently to loosen the hold of the 
paradigm of psychometric testing Because a large number of such studies 
still incorporate psychometric data - generally for purposes of matching 
handicapped and non-handicapped groups - the whole approach contains 
a major contradiction. Underlying the use of normative tests are a set of 
assumptions which are a legacy of the predominantly cognitive approach 
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- one such assumption being that psychometric tests are both a reliable 
and valid means of determining levels of cognitive functioning in both 
populations. Results from Chapter 4 strongly suggest that this assumption 
is inaccurate in relation to OS; children's patterns of passes and fails 
changed considerably over two closely spaced testing sessions. The 
prevalence of failures to engage uncovers a further assumption built into 
psychometric testing i.e. that children will perform to full competence. 
Clearly this was not the case with this sample of OS children. Many 
children were producing test scores well below their 'true' levels of 
cognitive functioning. Not only does this finding indicate that theories 
supported by MA matches of handicapped and non-handicapped groups 
must be flawed, it also exposes a fundamental circularity in _the 
organisational approach. It is not possible to broaden the perspective on 
development in OS if, at the outset, this perspective is inherently 
restricted by the parameters of the psychometric approach. By definition, 
any 'broad' perspective should consider the influence of motivational 
and other non-cognitive factors on cognitive performance. 
Rate of development in DS 
Another major approach to the study of development in OS is based 
almost entirely on psychometric data. Over the last 50 years a number of 
studies have been carried out for the purpose of determining the rate of 
development in this population. Although this approach, unlike the 
organisational approach, does not itself claim to be broad, its overall 
objective seems to b·~ to contribute to the development of early 
intervention programs and as such its implications are necessarily wide-
reaching. 
The majority of studies of the rate of development in OS have 
reported that the syndrome is associated with a decline in levels of 
intelligence with increasing age. With the exception of a study conducted 
by Kostrzewski (1974) almost all investigations of ability levels in this 
population have shown that, despite a steady increase in MA, IQ in OS 
declines with age. This decline has consistently been found in both cross-
sectional and longitudinal studies conducted over the last 50 years (Gesell 
1946 ; Oster 1953; Koch et al 1963; Loeffler and Smith 1964; Fischler et al 
1964; Share et al 1961, 1964; Oicks-Mireaux 1966, 1972; de Coriat et al 1968; 
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Carr 1970, 1975, 1982; Eipper and Azen 1978,; Ramsay and Piper 1980; 
Hanson 1981; Schnell 1984; Piper et al 1986; Sharav and Schlomo 1988) 
and has emerged regardless of which tests are used (Ludlow and Allen 
1979; Morgan 1979; Ramsay and Piper 1980). 
Various controversies have arisen in the literature concerning the 
nature of the decline in DS IQ levels. One such controversy, particularly 
longstanding, relates to the exact nature of the decline: whether the rate of 
intelligence in DS simply declines relative to the normal rate (i.e. can be 
represented by a linear mathematical function) or whether it in fact 
decelera,tes (i.e. can be represented by a curvilinear mathematical 
function). Figure 5:1 a - d demonstrates these two different patterns of 
development. In a) development proceeds at a constant rate; with every 
increase in chronological age there is a proportional increase in mental 
age. Because CA is rising more rapidly than MA, DQ, which is calculated 
as a function of CA and MA, must fall. This decline is represented by the 
increasing divergence of the 2 curves in figure a) and can be seen more 
clearly when DQ is plotted against CA as in b). In Figures c) and d), 
however, it can be seen that the rate of development is not only slowing 
relative to the normal rate, but is also decelerating, i.e as CA increases the 
increments in MA made between each interval gradually reduce. This 
results in a downward curvilinear pattern of DQ as shown in d). 
The majority of earlier studies lend support to a curvilinear model 
of development in DS. In 1979 Cunningham pointed out that despite a 
number of methological flaws and other shortcomings in investigations, 
a striking consistency among reports of intelligence in DS was evident 
with respect to the specific timing of the major period of this decline. 
Almost all studies reported a substantial decrease in IQ between the first 
and second year. The curvilinear function best fits this model of a delay 
plus early arrest. The only major opponent to this model was Dicks-
Mireaux (1974) who found no evidence of a decline after 6 months and on 
the basis of these findings proposed a linear model of development in DS. 
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Figure 5.1: Linear and curvilinear models of development 
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Figure S.lb: Developmental Quotient 
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Curvilinear model of development 






Figure S.ld: Developmental Quotient 
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It has been su ggested that to some extent the debate over the nature 
of the intellectual decline in OS can be attributed to the contradiction 
between the decline in DQ and the simultaneous rise in MA. Carr (1975) 
has proposed, moreover, that the decline in DQ in the second year may in 
some cases be an artefact of the ratio of chronological to mental age. 
Cunningham (1979) however reported that even when the Dicks-
Mireaux data were converted to MAs, the resulting curve still indicated a 
gradual slowing over time. This analysis of mental age was claimed to 
bypass ar tefactual possibilities associated with the use of DQs and "thus 
within the limits of the data available one must assume a relative decline 
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in mental functioning" (Cunningham 1979). Several later St!J.dies, 
however, have found quotients to be relatively constant between 6 and 24 
months. (Eipper and Azen 1978; Ramsay and Piper 1980; Schnell 1984) 
Both linear and curvilinear models assume that the rate of 
development is being accurately monitored through the administration 
of single tests at each age level. Both assume that the scores attained at 
each age fully reflect childrens' overall levels of cognitive functioning 
and that any score increases made between ages accurately measure the 
extent of developmental progress made over that time. Both of these 
assumptions will be addressed in the longitudinal study to be reported 
below. 
The linear model fits well with the 'slow' theory of development in 
handicap, with development proceeding steadily but at a slower pace than 
the normal rate. By c<:mtrast the curvilinear model implies that 
development actually decelerates. Both models have, however, been 
challenged by the discovery that DS children tend to reach 'plateaux' in 
development i.e. that for certain periods of time it appears that they. do 
not make any developmental progress. The notion of plateaux was first 
proposed by Carr ·(1975) who noted periods when scores reflected little or 
no development having occurred between testing intervals. Rather than 
remaining constant, or decelerating slowly, she noted that some 
children's developmental levels showed large variations in both upward 
and downward directions. Carr suggested that the pattern of development 
in DS may not only be slower, but may also differ from · that of normal 
children. Remaining longer on plateaux of achi~vements could explain 
the fluctuations in DQ levels. A reduction in DQ could be due to the fact 
that intervals between tests were not sufficiently long to span these 
extended plateaux. For example, if a child was tested towards the end of a 
plateau during which his/her developmental progress had been 
relatively stable for some time his/her DQ would seem to have fallen; if 
he/she were tested later having just made the step up from this plateau, 
his/her DQ would appear to have gone up. 
Kirman (1974) tried to explain these developmental plateaux by 
suggesting that the anomalies in OS do not become manifest until the 
relevant stages of development are reached, and that these anomalies 
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may be related to specific loci of damage. Cunningham (1979) 
subsequently found that errors in visually directed reaching tended to 
coincide with the commencement of the DQ decline. On the basis of this, 
he interpreted the decline and plateaux in development in DS in terms of 
specific inherent learning difficulties. In contrast, the more generalised 
notion of progressive deceleration would be represented in a 
developmental curve which would show relatively steady declines with 
little correlation to specific areas of development. 
The discovery of developmental plateaux in DS may to some extent 
resolve the linear I curvilinear debate. It could be that studies reflecting 
the curvilinear (i.e progressive deterioration) pattern have contained a 
bias towards lower scores because of a proportionally larger number of 
'plateauing' children being included in their samples. By contrast, a more 
constant rate of development would be reflected if larger numbers of. 
children had recently 'stepped up' from plateaux, thereby maintaining 
the gap between mean chronological age and mean mental age at a more 
stable level. 
A possible major flaw in the plateaux theory can be found in the fact, 
however, that its proponents used only quantitative data in their 
analyses. Plateaux were identified on the basis that scores did not appear 
to have increased over time. It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that many 
DS _children were found to have attained very similar scores by very 
different routes. It may well be the case that plateaux can be explained in 
the same way - children may be producing similar scores over these 
apparent periods of no development, but these scores may have been 
achieved through very different patterns of performance. An obvious 
corollary of this could therefore be that plateaux are as much the result of 
failures to reproduce previous passes as from failure to acquire new skills. 
The most recent international study of developmental rate in DS 
does not address the issue of plateaux. Instead this study focusses on the 
original linear I curvilinear debate which it may, to some extent, have 
resolved. This study involved BSID data collected from a sample of 229 
children (age range 3 - 61 months) from 3 countries, West Germany, 
Australia and Canada (Rauh et al, 1990 in press). Using highly 
sophisticated statistical techniques attempts were made to fit this data base 
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to both linear and curvilinear models of development. Although at a 
group level both models fitted the data tolerably well, random 
comparisons of individual children's BSID data resulted in the 
concession that 'there is insufficient theoretical and empirical evidence 
that sophisticated mathematical functions, linear or curvilinear represent 
best developmental growth'. From this it was concluded that it may be 
more appropriate to classify children according to the qualitative 
characteristics of their individual growth curves. 
To a degree, in admitting that DS children cannot be considered to be 
homogeneous in terms of their rate of developmental progress, the 
approach of this latest study indicates a step in the right direction. A 
major shortcoming still however sterns from the reliance on test scores 
for the purpose of determining individual growth curves. The following 
analysis of the results of a longitudinal study of DS childrens' BSID 
performance aims to demonstrate that until test performance is 
considered from a wider perspective than that permitted through simple 
comparisons of scores, few claims to an overall model of developmental 
progress in DS can be made. Rate of development will be considered 
through an item-item analysis of performance similar to that reported in 
Chapter 4. As in that study children will be tested twice at each age 
interval. This will serve two purposes: the first being to attempt to 
replicate the findings from the previous study in relation to 'optimal' 
scores exceeding scores attained in either of two closely spaced tests; the 
second to determine whether this method of score analysis has any effect 





A total of 24 subjects participated in this longitudinal study, 16 
females and 8 males. All subjects had already participated in the cross-
sectional study reported in Chapter 3. Age on entry ranged between 3 
months and 5 years. 
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Table 5:1 Longitudinal Study Sample 
Age 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 42 48 54 60 Period• 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 
2 2 2 2 2 2 12 
3 2 2 2 2 2 12 
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 
5 1 2 2 2 2 12 
6 2 2 2 2 9 
7 1 2 2 2 2 12 
8 1 2 2 2 2 12 
9 1 2 2 2 2 12 
10 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 18 
11 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 18 " 
........ 12 1 2 2 2 2 2 15 
0 13 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 18 
~ 14 2 2 2 2 2 15 -
15 1 1 2 2 2 2 15 
16 1 1 1 2 2 2 18 
17 2 2 2 2 18 
18 2 2 2 2 18 
19 2 2 2 2 18 
20 2 2 2 2 18 
21 2 2 2 2 18 
22 1 2 2 2 18 
23 2 2 2 12 
24 2 2 2 12 
A,.,. 3 6 12 12 12 11 11 8 6 3 4 5 7 8 8 6 
n•• 3 5 6 10 11 9 9 7 5 2 4 5 6 8 7 6 
1 = Tested once at this age level; 2 = Tested twice at this age level; 2 =Tested twice but score not included in group analyses (see text). 
* Length of period followed in months. 
**A=> Number of subjects tested at least once at these age levels; B=> Number of subjects tested twice at these age levels. 
Procedure: 
With the exception of one subject who was followed for only 9 
months, all Ss were repeat-tested over periods of 12 - 18 months. The 
BSID was administered at 3 monthly intervals up to the age of 36 months 
and at 6 monthly intervals thereafter. In most instances Ss were tested 
twice at each age level (see below). Test and retest sessions were separated 
by 1 week for subjects aged up to 12 months and by two weeks beyond this 
age level. Table 5:1 shows the number of subjects tested at each age level 
and the number of sessions administered for each subject. 
Due to funding and other difficulties encountered at the beginning 
of this study it was only possible to arrange single testing sessions with 
some children. In analyses where test and retest performances are directly 
compared therefore, scores and performance profiles are included only for 
subjects who had been tested twice at each age level. 
Subjects 7 and 21 were tested twice at 12 and 54 months respectively 
but in both cases one of the two sessions had to be terminated before 
completion. These scores are not therefore included in the analyses of 




Table 5:2 shows the mean raw scores and corresponding MAs, MDis 
and DQs attained in the first testing session at each age level. MDI levels 
below 50 were obtained from Naglieri's (1981) extrapolated indices. As 
these are only provided up to 30 months of age, scores attained beyond 30 
months can be interpreted only as MAs or DQs. 
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Table 5:2: Session 1 mean Scores: Raw Scores, MDIS, MAS & DQ's 
Age No. Mean Raw Mean MDI Mean MA Mean DQ 
(months) Subjects Score (mths) 
3 3 28 83 2-21;2 75 
6 6 50 66 4-41;2 71 
9 12 74 63 5-51;2 58.3 
12 12 82 46 7-8 62.5 
15 12 89 40 9-10 63.3 
18 11 97 36 10-11 58.3 
21 11 106 39 13 62 
24 8 109 39 14 58.3 
27 6 117 45 16 59.2 
30 3 134.3 60 20-21 71.6 
33 4 131 19-20 59.0 
36 5 130 19-20 54.1 
42 7 135 20-21 48 
48 8 144 24 50 
54 7 148 25 46.2 
60 6 156 30 50 
Table 5:3 shows the differences in raw scores between each age level 
together with the corresponding changes in MA, MDI and DQ. It can be 
seen that the magnitude of raw score changes fluctuates between -3.3 and 
+24 raw score points. Because of the differing numbers of items presented 
at different mental age levels, however, fluctuations in the average 
number of items acquired between ages do not correspond proportionally 
to fluctuations in MA, MDI and DQ. MDI levels do nevertheless decline 
sharply twice within the first year and fall more gradually thereafter. 
These patterns are very similar to those obtained in previous studies of 
developmental rate in DS, suggesting a curvilinear model of 
development. Developmental rate is rapid in the first few months and 
seems to decelerate thereafter. 
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Table 5:3 
Mean Raw Score and Mental Age Increases and Corresponding 
Changes in MDl and DQ made between each Age Level 
Age Raw Score MA Increase MDI Change DQChange 
Increase 
3-6m 22 2m -17 -4.0 
6-9m 24 1m -3 -12.7 
9-12m 8 21f2m -17 +4.2 
12-15m 8 2m -4 +1 .2 
15-18m 7 1m -6 -5.0 
18-21m 9 2m +3 +3.7 
21-24m 3 1m -3.7 
24-27m 8 2m +6 +0.9 
27-30m 17 5m +15 +12.4 
30-33m -3.3 -1m -12.6 
33-36m -1 -4.9 
36-42m 6 lm 6.1 
42-48m 10 3m +2 
48-54m 2 1m -3.8 
54-60m 8 5m +3.8 
Figures 5:2 - 5:4 present the group curves for MA, MDI and DQ when 
plotted against CA. MA rises steadily with increasing age. Excessively low 
scores attained at 18 months and excessively high scores at 30 months 
give the impression of aU-shaped MDI curve. As MDis are not provided 
beyond 30 months it is not possible to demonstrate the overall decline in 
rate observed after this age level in MDI terms. This is more clearly 
represented in the DQ curve in Figure 5:3, however. With the exception 
of the minor interruption to the MA and DQ curves at 30 months, it 
would appear that a linear model, similar to that reported by Dicks-
Mireaux (1974) most accurately describes developmental progression after 
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Developmental curves of individual subjects 
As noted in Chapter 3, an advantage of having a small sample is that 
mean figures do not obscure fluctuations in the overall pattern to the 
same extent that the means obtained from larger samples inevitably do. 
The predominantly linear nature of the group data was clearly at variance 
with the scoring patterns of many individual children and it was 
therefore decided to investigate the extent to which the group data might 
be masking individual score fluctuations. The growth curves 
representing scoring patterns of 6 children were examined. This group of 
children were randomly selected from the 12 who were followed for the 
longest priod, 18 months: their growth curves are presented in Figures 5:4 
- 5:9. Scores obtained by Subjects 1 and 10 are presented as MDis. MA 
curves are presented for Subjects 4, 18 and 19 because they did not attain 
sufficiently high raw scores to permit conversion into developmental 
indices. Subject 22's scores were converted into DQs to provide an 
example of a longitudinal pattern of scores expressed in this way. 
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Subject 1: MDI (3 - 21 months) - Figure 5:5 
Although the initial decline in this subject's MDI level between 3 
and 6 months mirrors the group curve, the recovery of 16 MDI points at 9 
months contrasts markedly with the group data at this age level. It can be 
seen from Table 5:4 that, rather than increasing, this subject's raw score 
actually decreased between 9 and 12 months and that this had a 
considerable effect on his MDI level which remained below 50 until 18 
months. Between 12 and 18 months therefore this curve closely resembles 
the group curve. The sharp increase of 22 ~DI points achieved at 21 
months is not, however, reflected in the group curve; at this age level a 
much smaller increase in developmental rate is represented. 
Table 5:4 
Age (months) 3 6 9 12. 15 18 21 
Raw score 33 54 83 81 88 99 118 
MDI 91 70 86 50 38 40 62 
Figure 5:5: Subject 1 (3 -21 months): 
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Subject 4: MA (6 - 24 months) - Figure 5:6 · 
Two plateaux can be seen on this subject's MA curve, corresponding 
to a drop in raw score between 6 and 9 months and a very small raw score 
increase between 18 and 21 months. Neither are evident on the group 
curve. Between these plateaux, however, this subject's rate of 
development was proceeding close to the normal rate as indicated by the 
similarity of the gradient to that produced by plotting MA against CA. By 
comparison the DS curve from the group data changes direction slightly 
between 15 and 18 months, shifting away from the MA = CA curve and 
indicating an overall slowing in rate between these ages for the group as a 
whole. 
Table 5:5 
Age (months) 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
Raw score 62 61 72 80 89 92 108 

















Figure 5:6: Subject 4 (6- 24 months) 
Session 1 MA Scores 
6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
Chronological Age (months) 
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Subject 10: MDI (9 - 27 months) - Figure 5:7 
Again, a somewhat erratic pattern of developmental rate indicating 
declines, inclines and a period of near stability of MDI level is shown by 
this subject. The sharp decline between 15 and 18 months corresponds to a 
loss of 2 raw score points between these ages. A similar, but less sharp 
decline is demonstrated on the group curve. This S's MDI rises by 10 
points between 18 and 24 months however, in contrast to the much 
smaller increase of 2 points demonstrated on the group curve. In 
addition, whereas the group mean MDI level continues to rise beyond 24 
months, a raw score increase of only 4 points corresponds to a small drop 
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Subject 18: MA (30 - 48 months) - Figure 5:8 
Clearly, this subject's BSID performance reflects little or no 
developmental progress having been made over the 18 month period 
during which she participated in this study. After an MA increase of 1-2 
months between 30 and 36 months she remained on a score plateau for 
the next year. The group growth curve, by comparison, indicates a rise of 
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Figure 5:8: Subject 18 (30 - 48 months) 
Session 1 MA Scores 
30 36 42 






Subject 19: MA (36 - 60 months) - Figure 5:9 · 
Between 36 and· 42 months this subject gained only one raw score 
point, demonstrated by the plateauing effect seen between these ages. No 
such plateau is evident on the group curve. Also noteable is a loss of 6 
raw score points between 48 and 54 months, resulting in a sharp decline 
of 4 MA months. The slight change in direction on the group MA curve 
between this same pair of ages may to some extent be attributable to this 
particular reduction in raw score. Only months later this subject had 
reached a ceiling on the BSID, however, and was scoring beyond an MA 
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Figure 5:9: Subject 19 (36 - 60 months) 
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Subject 22: DQ (42 - 60 months) - Figure 5:10 
A steady decline and eventual levelling out in DQ level is 
demonstrated in this subject's growth curve which quite closely 
resembles the group DQ curve. On the basis of scores from single sessions 
it would appear that this subject made steady but slow progress over this 
18 month period. 
Table 5:9 
Age (months) 42 48 54 60 
Raw score 133 138 141 148 
48 44 42 42 
Figure 5:10: Subject 22 (42 - 60 months) 
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Overall then, although the group figures do not themselves produce 
clearly linear developmental curves, at the same time they obscure a great 
deal of the variation which existed in individual growth curves. In 
general the group data produces a pattern in which MA rises and MDI 
and DQ fall with increasing age. This pattern is very much at variance 
with those produced by individual children's score profiles. As Rauh et al 
(in press) have suggested, it may be more appropriate to abandon the 
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notion of an overall rate of development in DS and to focus more on 
individual patterns of growth. 
Raw score reductions 
In each of the individual cases reported above, MDis and DQs were 
at times seen to decrease between various adjacent pairs of ages. This 
finding is consistent with the overall pattern found in this and other 
longitudinal studies of developmental rate in DS. A characteristic which 
has not as frequently been noted however is the frequency with which 
raw scores were actually seen to reduce over the 3 and 6 monthly 
intervals between testing sessions. Almost half this sample (11 Ss) were 
found to lose raw score points over these intervals on at least one 
occasion. Although many of these reductions amounted to only 1 or 2 
raw score points, there were some considerable losses; these ranged 
between 5 and 13 points, translating into MDI losses of between 10 and 28 
points. Given that even where raw scores have increased, gains have not 
been of a sufficient magnitude to sustain stable MDI levels, these further 
MDI reductions have a considerable effect on individual growth ctp"ves. 
Cunningham (1979) also noted similar pass-to-fail patterns over 
successive 6 weekly assessments and remarked tha~ this was more 
common for some items than others (this was also found in the present 
study and will be discussed in the following chapter). Children were only 
tested once at each age interval in the Cunningham study however. By 
retesting children at each age, it was possible to investigate whethe-r these 
raw losses were present over two testing sessions, or whether they were · 
simply the result of failures to perform to full competence in the first 
session. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that Ss were often seen to change 
their pass/fail patterns in both directions over closely-spaced intervals. 
Optimal scores calculated by combining all passes attained in both 
sessions were found to be higher than scores attained in either single 
session. Optimal scores were therefore again calculated and compared 
with the scores attained in the first of the two testing sessions. 
As was the case in the study presented in Chapter 4, in almost every 
case where Ss were tested twice at the same age level in the present study, 
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pass/fail patterns changed considerably (the resulting low item-item 
agreemen~ figures will be discussed in Chapter 6). Table 5:10 compares the 
two sets of mean scores for subjects. Clearly, when all passes attained over 
the 2 sessions are credited this has a substantial effect on the overall 
pattern of raw scores. Mean optimal MDI and DQ levels are consequently 
substantially higher than those obtained in session 1; MAs increase by an 
average of 2 months. 
Table 5:10 A Comparison of Session 1 Mean Scores versus Optimal 
Mean Scores 
Session 1 Optimal 
Age No Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
mths Subs. Raw MDI MA [Q Raw MDI MA [Q 
Score mths Score mths 
3 3 28 83 2-21;2 75 33.6 92 2V2-3 91.6 
6 5 53 69 41;2 75 57.4 74 4V2-5 79.1 
9 6 71 55 51;2-6 63.8 75.6 67 6-7 72.2 
12 10 80 41 7-8 62.5 84 52 7-8 62.5 
15 11 89 40 9-10 63.3 93.45 50 9-10 63.3 
18 9 94 29 9-10 52.7 98.1 38 11-12 63.8 
21 9 104 35 12 57.1 110.6 47 14 66.6 
24 7 107 35 13-14 56.25 112 44 14-15 60.4 
27 5 118 47 16 59.2 122.2 51 17-18 64.8 
30 2 138 65 21-22 71.6 143 73 23 76.6 
33 4 131 19-20 59.0 136 21-22 65.15 
36 5 130 19-20 54.1 135.2 20-21 56.9 
42 6 136 20-21 48 142.16 22-23 53.5 
48 8 146 24 50 149 25-26 53.0 
54 7 149 25-26 47.2 152 26-27 49 
60 6 155 29-30 49.1 158 30+ 50 
Table 5:11 shows 10 cases in which Ss' raw scores in the first session 
were seen to drop between adjacent age levels and for which optimal 
scores attained over the same intervals were available. In the majority of 
cases it can be seen that optimal raw scores either increased or remained 
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the same over these periods. Three subjects' optimal scores however also 
dropped over the 3 I 6 monthly intervals, indicating that they failed items 
at a later age which they had passed 3 or 6 months previously. Moreover 
in the 2 cases where optimal scores did increase between adjacent age 
levels, these increases were very small: 1 and 4 raw score points 
respectively. This suggests that these children were not only 
underperforming in testing sessions, but that their overall 
developmental levels may have reached genuine plateaux. The small 
optimal score reductions made by subjects 8, 19 and 20 also indicate a 
possible plateauing of development in the intervals between 3 and 6 
monthly tests, attributable not only to failures to pass new items but also 
to items dropping out. 
Table 5:11 Raw Score Reductions over 3 and 6 Monthly Intervals 
compared with Optial Scores attained over the same terms 
Raw Score/ Raw Score/ 
Optimal Optimal 
Subject No. Age (Mths) Score Age (Mths) Score 
+ 
* 
4 6 62/66 9 61/66 
1 9 83/85 12 81/85 
11 9 79/* 12 75/79 
8 12 95/96 15 90/94 + 
9 15 83/91 18 82/92 
10 15 101/104 18 99/108 
14 21 104/111 24 96/111 
16 24 119/* 27 114/* 
15 30 151/* 33 148/* 
17 30 134/* 33 133/* 
21 36 139/* 42 126/141 
19 48 157/158 54 151/154 + 
20 48 153/153 54 145/152 + 
Despite use of optimal scores, raw scores still decreased between adjacent 
ages. 
Not tested twice at this age level. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that Ss frequently attained similar 
scores via different pass patterns in closely-spaced testing sessions. It was 
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therefore decided to investigate whether a similar phenomenon was in 
evidence for subjects whose scores had remained the same over 3 and 6 
monthly intervals. An item-item comparison of the protocols of 
individual Ss whose optimal scores had either reduced, or reached 
plateaux between adjacent age levels was therefore carried out. 
Development was considered to have plateaued if scores increased by no 
more than 2 raw score points over the 3 or 6 monthly intervals. 
Table 5:12 shows all cases of plateaux and score reductions. It can be 
seen that in 3 cases plateaux occurred between raw scores 80- 105 (MA 7.5 
- 12.5 months). This is the raw score level at which Cunningham (1979) 
found that plateaux were most likely to occur among his sample of 
subjects (who were aged between 18 weeks and 24 months). It can also be 
seen from Table 5:12 that in all cases where Ss' scores had dropped or had 
plateaued between adjacent pairs of ages, this plateauing effect was in part 
attributable to items having been dropped from childrens' ·protocols. 
Table 5:12 Raw Score Plateaux Observed between Adjacellt Age Levels 
No. Items 
Subject No Age(mths) Raw Score Age(mths) Raw Score DroEEed 
,.. 
1 9 85 12 85 3 
4 6 66 9 66 8 
8 12 96 15 94 7 
9 15 91 18 92 3 
11 9 79* 12 79 4 
14 21 111 24 105 6 
15 18 121,.. 21 121* 3 
15 30 156 33 149 8 
16 24 119* 27 114* 6 
16 33 132 36 131 5 
18 36 128 42 127 4 
18 42 127 48 128 4 
19 48 158 54 154 5 
20 48 153 54 152 4 
24 54 156 60 158 2 
Denotes cases in which subjects were only tested once at the relevant age 
levels. In these cases single session scores are compared. The remaining 
scores are optimal scores. 
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For every subject an item-item comparison was carried out between 
optimal protocols obtained over every 3 and 6 monthly interval in order 
to determine the extent to which item loss might be influencing 
individual growth curves. In total there were 81 cases in which items 
which had been passed at a younger age were failed twice by the same 
children when tested at the next age level. In 35 cases the same items were 
again reliably failed a following 3 or 6 months later. In total 217 items 
were dropped at least once, with a further 51 items remaining absent from 
Ss' protocols at subsequent age levels. An average of 3.2 items were 
therefore lost in each case. This mean figure however obscures the 
magnitude of several individual cases of item loss in which as many as 8 
items which had previously been passed were failed by the same child at a 
later age. 
To exemplify the extent to which this phenomenon can affect the 
growth curves of individual children the scores of the 6 individual Ss 
whose first session growth curves were described above were amended to 
include all items which they had been observed to pass at least once 
during the period of time in which they had participated in this study. 
Figures 5:11 - 5:15 demonstrate the effect on scoring patterns of these 
6 Ss when: 
• firstly, optimal scores are used-at each age level, crediting all passes 
attained over the 2 closely-spaced intervals (optimal curve) 
• secondly, all items passed at previous age intervals are added in to 
these optimal scores (optimal plus curve). 
(In amending scores in this way it is not intended to imply that the 
resulting scores should be taken as 'true' indicators of levels of cognitive 
functioni.ng. Clearly, if skills are being lost from children's repertoires it 
would serve no useful purpose to overlook this. The objective of this 
particular investigation is to explore the nature of the decline which 
seems to characterise the rate of development in OS. It may be that the 
loss of skills is actually contributing to this decline). 
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Subject 1: MDI (3 -21 months) - Figure 5:11 
A total of 10 items were dropped from this S's repertoire of passes- 3 
between 9 and 12 months, (which were also failed at 15 months) 4 
between 12 and 15 months (2 of which he failed again at 18 months), and 
a further 3 between 15 and 18 months. 
The most dramatic difference between the session 1 curve and the 
optimal-plus curve can be seen between 12 and 18 months. At 12 months, 
by including all items previously passed, t:Pis S's raw score is enhanced by 
7 points, translating into a 17 point difference in MDI level. At 15 and 18 
months a raw score difference of 9 points at both ages corresponds to a 
difference of 20 and 18 MDI points respectively. When this S's scores are 
amended in this way it can be seen that the magnitude of the MDI decline 
between 9 and 15 months, although still substantial at 35 points, is 9 MDI 
points less than the drop from 82 to 38 seen in the optimal curve. 
Moreover the optimal-plus curve would indicate a more constant rate of 
development between 9 and 21 months, rather than the steep incline seen 
in the session 1 curve. 
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Figure 5:11: Subject 1 (3 - 21 months) 
Session 1 MDI Scores Versus Amended 
MDI Scores 
-a-- Session 1 
100 Optimal 
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Subject 4: MA (6 - 24 months) - Figure 5:12 
Clearly, with this subject, the major effect of amending scores is to 
almost abolish the 2 plateaux previously existing in her developmental 
curve between 6 and 9 months and between 18 and 21 months. Between 
the two earlier ages this was achieved by including items which had 
dropped out. Session 1 scores indicated a loss of 1 raw score point between 
6 and 9 months (6 months: raw score 62; 9 months: raw score 61). Optimal 
scores still, however, indicated a plateau at a slightly higher raw score of 
66. These simple score comparisons however obscure the fact that 
although 7 new items were passed between 6 and 9 months, a total of 8 
items were also dropped over the same period. When these 8 items are 
included in the 9 month score (optimal-plus curve), it can be seen that 
rather than remaining constant, this subject's MA does increase slightly. 
Between 18 and 21 months the· plateau observed between session 1 
scores was abolished by plotting optimal scores. Comparison of session 1 
scores attained at these 2 age levels revealed a raw score increase of only 3 
points. This small increase made no difference to this S's MA which 
remained at 9.5 months. By comparison, the difference in optimal scores 
between 18 and 21 months reached 14 raw score points, pushing the MA 
level up to 12.5 months at the later age, a rise of 3.5 months. By including 
the additional 3 raw score points corresponding to the 3 items which this 
subject" had dropped between these ages it can be seen from the optimal-
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Figure 5:12: Subject 4 (6- 24 months) 
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Subject 10: MDI (9 - 27 months) - Figure 5:13 
-Because this subject was only tested once at 9 and 12 months it is not 
possible to present optimal scores for either of these ages. However, the 
effect of including all passes attained in either of the two closely-spaced 
sessions can dearly be seen at 15 months. This effect is most pronounced 
at 18 months where the session 1 I optimal score difference amounted to 9 
raw score points - or 18 MDI points. Comparison of the session 1 curve 
and the optimal-plus curve shows that the largest decline - between 9 and 
18 months - is reducec;l by 20 MDI points if all previous passes are 
included in the score at 18 months. 
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Figure 5:13: Subject 10 (9 - 27 months) 
Session 1 MDI Scores Versus 
Amended MDI Scores 
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Subject 18: MA (30 - 48 months) - Figure 5:14 
As in Figure 5:11 it can be seen that the plateau in this S's session 1 
curve, between 36 and 54 months is abolished when optimal scores are 
plotted. Rather than making no developmental progress between these 
ages, as would appear to be the case from session 1 scores, this subject was 
in fact developing at a rate almost consistent with that seen between 30 
and 36 months. When all previous passes are credited as in the optimal-
plus curve, development would appear to be progressing at a near 
constant rate. 
Figure 5:14: Subject 18 (30- 48 months) 
Session 1 MA Scores Versus 
21 
Amended MA Scores 
-a-- Session 1 -] 20 Optimal .... 
c:= Optimal plus 0 e 19 -cu 
00 




24 30 36 42 48 
Chronological Age (months) 
128 
Subject 19: MA (36 - 60 months) - Figure 5:15 
Again the effect of plotting optimal scores is to abolish the plateau · 
between 36 and 42 months seen in this S's session 1 curve. She in fact 
reached a ceiling on the BSID at 48 months, 12 months earlier than 
appears to be the case in the session 1 curve. Although this subject did 
drop several items from her performance repertoire at 48, 54 and 60 
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Subject 22: DQ (42 - 60 months) - Figure 5:16 
In this graph both session 1 and optimal curves demonstrate a 
decline in DQ. This decline is not present, however, when all items 
previously passed are added to this S's scores as shown in curve c/. He 
dropped 5 raw score points between 48 ahd 54 months, corresponding to 
an DQ difference of 4.5 points. At 60 months the difference in DQ made by 
a gain of only 2 raw score points amounts to over 4 points. Although 
these differences are extremely small they do have the effect of producing 





Figure 5:16: Subject 22 (42- 60 months) 
Session 1 DQ Scores Versus 
Amended DQ Scores 
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Transformation of group curves: Although sizeable effects are 
produced on individual growth curves by including all items previously 
passed, this effect is substantially diminished when the overall group 
curves are amended in the same way. Figures 5:17 - 5:19 show the 
difference made to group MA, MDI and DQ curves when mean optimal 
scores are plotted and when all items which Ss had dropped between age 
levels are included in scores. In each case, although, inevitably, scores are 
slightly higher at each age level, the general shape of the curves remains 
largely unchanged. MA rises and DQ and MDI decline at almost 
equivalent rates in curves a/ and .c/ in all 3 graphs. This contradictory 
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pattern seen between individual and group results substantiates the claim 
that it may simply be inappropriate to describe developmental rate in DS 
in terms of a simple mathematical function. 
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Figure 5:17: Session 1 Mean MA Scores 
Versus Amended Mean MA Scores 
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Figure· 5:18: Session 1 Mean MDI Scores 
Versus Amended Mean MDI Scores 
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Figure 5:19: Session 1 Mean DQ Scores 
Versus Amended Mean DQ Scores 
----a- Session 1 
Optimal 
• Optimal plus all items passed 
in previous sessions 
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This study reported the findings of a longitudinal study of the 
performance of a group of children with DS on the BSID. Children were 
tested twice at each age level and in depth and individual as well as group 
quantitative analyses were carried out on performance protocols. 
The overall pattern of developmental rate generated from only the 
first of the two testing sessions at each age level was generally consistent 
with that reported in previous longitudinal studies of DS infants and 
children. At 3 months scores were just over 1 sd below the 
standardisation mean but withi~ the first year average performance fell 
rapidly against the norm. After this period of rapid decline, 
developmental rate levelled out, gradually falling behind the normal rate 
but proceeding at a largely constant rate up to 60 months of age. A linear 
model therefore most closely describes the developmental progress of this 
group. 
Comparisons of individual Ss' growth curves of first session 
performance, however, revealed many idiosyncratic periods of change 
which were obscured in the group curve. The developmental rate of these 
individual children did not proceed at a constant rate but showed many 
fluctuations in rate between adjacent pairs of ages; in several ·cases little 
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development appeared to have occurred within the 3 and 6 monthly 
intervals between testings. The prevalence of these variations in rate 
between ages suggests that any attempt to describe development in DS in 
terms of a single mathematical function is to some extent fruitless. This 
conclusion fits with that of the authors of the most recent large-scale 
study of DS BSID performance, the results of which are only now being 
published (Rauh et al in press). 
One pattern relating less to age than to the magnitude of score 
increases between ages was in evidence around raw score levels 80 - 105. 
Rate of development did appear to decelerate as children reached this 
particular mental age level (7.5 - 12.5 months). As already mentioned, 
Cunningham (1979) reported a strong plateauing effect around this raw 
score level. In that study Ss were tested at 6 weekly intervals; the 
likelihood of detecting such periods of little or no developmental 
progress was therefore greater than in the present study .. Because of the 
wide range of chronological ages (9 - 24 months) at which children in this 
sample were performing at this mental age level, this pattern is not clear 
when MA is plotted against CA. It does, however, have the effect of 
lowering group MDis between 9 and 24 months. The suggestion was 
made in the introduction that the linear I curvilinear debate may be in 
part attributable to the differing numbers of 'plateauing' Ss being 
included in samples. By excluding the age levels at which plateaux were 
most prevalent in this sample it is possible to demonstrate this effect. One 
of the most rapid periods of decline occurs at 12 months when almost half 
the sample (10) have reached the MA level covered by items 80 -105. 
Although, beyond this point, the declin•? is more gradual, a definite 
slowing in rate is evident as children approach this stage in the test. If 
testing intervals had been sufficiently large to by-pass this particular 
period of slow progress, there would have been little evidence to suggest 
that developmental rate had· decelerated over this period. 
Any description of development in DS which aims to be accurate 
should not, however, by-pass what would appear to be a particularly 
distinctive stage in the development of this population of children. 
Clearly, if developmental progress is genuinely slowing at this point it 
would make little sense to overlook this anomaly. Over an MA range of 
7.5 to 12.5 months, the developmental rate of many childen with OS does 
133 
not appear to be progressing at a rate consistent with that seen at both 
earlier and later stages in development, whether or not a linear model 
can conveniently be fitted to the group data as a whole. . 
The data of Rauh et al demonstrates just how this period of slowing 
developm~ntal rate can be obscured by grouping together a large data set. 
(see Figure 5:20) Mean MA scores for their entire international sample, 
consisting of 229 DS children, produce a clearly linear progression, one 
which closely resembles that produced in a study of the BSID performance 
of 83 OS children carried out in the U.S.A. (Pueschel 1984). As well as 
plotting mean scores, Rauh et al also plotted lowest and highest scoring Ss 
separately. Curves representing these scores reveal a relative slowing in 
rate as MA approaches 12.5 months. Indeed it would appear that the 
mean MA level of lowest scoring Ss in this sample actually declined from 
15 months to just over 10 months between 30 and 35 months. Both these 
changes in direction are however masked in the mean MA curve because, 
as with the sample used in the current study, MA ranges at each CA 
interval were wide. The narrower MA ranges which inevitably emerge 
from separate analyses of maximum and minimum scores, by contrast, 
result in a clearer picture of the CA/MA relationship. Moreover, where 
individual growth curves are presented for children in the Rauh et al 
sample, it is possible to see a number of plateaux as Ss reach MAs between 
7.5 and 12.5 months. (Figures 5:21- 5:23) 
It has been suggested that the prevalence of these apparent plateaux 
in development may simply be artefactual, a function of the way in which 
the BSID has been constructed. The 'step size' between individual items 
(as measured by mean rate of acquisition in the standardisation sample) 
necessarily relates to rate of development. Over periods when normal 
development proceeds at a rapid rate therefore, the step size between 
items increases proportionally. Plateaux may simply exaggerate the 
difference in rate between normal development and the slower progress 
of development in DS over such periods. 
134 
~ 
Figure 5:20. Rauh et al (1990) 
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Figure 5:21. Rauh et al (1990) 
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Figure 5:22. Rauh et al (1990) 
Bayley Mental Scale: Berlin . ~Ia 
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Cunningham rejected this possible explanation for two reasons: 
firstly, he noted a prevalence of plateaux on the BSID motor scale at a 
stage in the test when relative step size was constant; secondly, some of 
the most frequently failed items falling between items 80 - 105 do not 
have larger than average step sizes. As an alternative explanation 
Cunningham supported Kirman's (1974) hypothesis that developmental 
plateaux reflect specific deficiencies in DS which become manifest only 
when the relevant stages in development are reached. Data from the 
present study, however suggests that a more complex explanation is 
required for these periods of little or no developmental progress - one 
relating as much to motivational factors as to deficiencies directly 
attributable to the handicapping condition. 
By comparing the percentage failure rates of individual items, 
Cunningham noted two areas in which specific difficulties seemed to 
appear in early development and suggested that these may indeed predict 
plateaux at later stages. One such area of difficulty related to the 
coordination of vision and fine motor movements in early reaching, the 
other to sustained attention and the beginning of more purposive 
behaviour. At this age level there are a number of items (e.g item 68: 
exploitive string play) which can be passed despite low levels of activity 
on the part of the child. Normally developing infants usually 
demonstrate these behaviours with a high level of excitement and 
activity, however; parameters such as speed of response and level of 
activity are assumed and not directly tested. DS children, by comparison, 
often demonstrate particularly low levels of activity when presented with 
such items, particularly for the first time, although their responses do fall 
within the criteria for passing. When tested when slightly older, 
however, the same infant may produce a more 'normal' response. 
Cunningham suggests that by just passing items at criteria levels, DS 
infants may create a plateau situation. Not only must the infant bring 
these specific behaviours 'up to strength', but to raise his/her score, new 
items must be attained. One implication of this is that to test such 
behaviours adequately in DS infants, items should be more precisely 
defined in relation to their components. This would lead to a series of 
sub-items, in turn reducing the step size which would be determined 
more by the nature of the behaviour than the rate of attainment. 
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A second implication of Cunningham's theory is that when plateaux 
occur they result from assessed behaviours which r~quire to be broken 
down into a better defined set of sub-items for the OS infant. Because OS 
infants require longer periods of time to consolidate such behaviours and 
to produce qualitatively more skilled performances, Cunningham 
suggests in turn that OS is associated with some impairment in the 
processes by which new learning is consolidated. 
As stated above, Cunningham suggests that these emerging 
difficulties in visuo-motor coordination and sustained attention, predict 
the later emergence of plateaux. At the stage at which plateaux were most 
prevalent (i.e. around raw scores 80- 105), Cunningham reported highest 
failure rates for items which demand high levels of fine motor 
coordination (such as placing pegs and building towers with cubes). He 
similarly found items requiring s~stained attention or an increase in 
attention span (such as placing 3 cubes in a cup (item 100) or attempting to 
attain a third cube (item 82)) to be an).ong those most frequently failed at 
this level. 
As will be seen in the following chapter several of the items for 
which Cunningham reported high percentage failure rates among 
'plateauing' subjects were found in the present study to be among those 
on which performance was most frequently seen to change over closely-
spaced testing sessions. It will be recalled that low item-item agreement 
figures between test and retest protocols obtained at the same age level 
were to a large degree attributable to motivational factors. Often children 
demonstrated themselves to be capable of passing specific' items on one 
occasion, yet withheld production of that same behaviour when it was 
tested on another occasion. Such failures by default were equally likely to 
occur in either of the two sessions. This may suggest that many of the 
failures which Cunningham observed in single testing sessions may not 
have been genuine failures at all but were the result of Ss refusing to 
perform to full competence. 
If this explanation is accepted, it has two implications. The first 
relates to the consolidation of these behaviours. Cunningham suggests 
that the processes by which they are consolidated are impaired in OS. To 
support this he reports, firstly that certain behaviours take longer in OS to 
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achieve the quality normally associated with the acquisition of these 
behaviours; and secondly, that these items are frequently failed. By 
comparison, results from the present study reveal that many of these 
items are not simply being frequently failed due to a genuine inability to 
produce the required behaviours, but that these behaviours are being 
withheld. Failures to produce behaviours even after they have been 
acquired would also suggest difficulties with consolidation, but in this 
explanation a motivational component is incorporated. Rather than 
simply taking longer to consolidate behaviours due to some impairment 
in the physiological processes associated with consolidation, it would 
appear that DS children are providing themselves with further obstacles. 
If skills are being unreliably produced it would not seen unreasonable to 
suggest that, as a consequence, they might take longer to consolidate. It 
may, however, be the case that a high level of failure experienced at the 
earlier stage in development, during the acquisition of similar but lower 
level skills, could explain the avoidance seen at later age levels. 
A second implication relates to the overall decline in rate of 
intelligence. Where failures by default are recorded as genuine failures, 
test scores necessarily reflect a below-optimal estimate of a child's true 
level of cognitive functioning. Exaggeratedly low scores, particularly 
when they are recorded at periods when development is slowing, would 
imply a much sharper decline than may actually be occurring. In this 
study where ·individual Ss' optimal scores were compared with scores 
attained from individual sessions, this would appear to be the case: the 
magnitude of MDI decline was substantially reduced when 'fuller' 
performances, measured over two sessions, were considered. This held 
true even in cases where, despite the use of optimal scores, Ss did appear 
to have reached genuine plateaux in development. 
An even more complex picture, however, emerged when these 
optimal score plateaux were investigated. It was revealed tha t the 
plateauing effect was in part attributable to the loss of items from 
performance repertoires. An average of 5 raw score points was being 
dropped between ages where, on the basis of optimal scores, plateaux were 
recorded. To maintain scores at equivalent levels between age intervals 
therefore, 5 new items must have been attained over the same period. At 
most MA levels, a gain of 5 raw score points corresponds to a 1.5 month 
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increase in mental age level. If, as has previously been claimed (Berry et al 
1984; Rauh et al in press), development in DS proceeds at approximately 
half the normal rate, in cases where tests were administered at 3 monthly 
intervals, MA would be expected to increase by 1.5 months between these 
intervals. In other words, if these items were not being dropped, rather 
than appearing to plateau, development would maintain a constant 
upward rate. 
When group curves were amended to include all items previo1.1.sly 
passed, however, thPre was little evidence to suggest that plateaux and the 
frequency with which items were lost from performance repertoires could 
explain the overall decline in developmental rate. This is perhaps not 
surprising for the following 3 reasons. Firstly, plateaux were not in 
evidence in all cases. Secondly, as has already been demonstrated, 
development in DS cannot be described as progressing at a constant rate; 
even when children were making progress, the extent of this progress 
varied between each age interval. Thirdly, although where plateaux did 
occur, an average of 5 raw score points were being lost over age intervals, 
this figure obscures a considerable degree of variation among individual 
cases. There were cases in which, even when score losses were accounted 
for, developmental rate still appeared to have declined. Just as it appears 
fruitless to attempt to describe the course of development in DS in terms 
of a single mathematical function, it would appear to be equally fruitless 
to focus on a single explanation for the decline in developmental rate -
which may itself be less characteristic of development in DS than has 
previously been believed. 
It could moreover be suggested that even in these cases where 
developmental rate still appeared to have declined even this decline may 
not in fact have been genuine. There is little reason to suppose that these 
apparent losses of skills are any less likely to be examples of childrens' 
refusals to perform to full competence than were unreliable performances 
observed over more closely-spaced intervals. Indeed the same could be 
said of optimal scores - why should children withhold demonstration of 
certain behaviours on one occasion only? It often in fact appeared to be 
the case that children were refusing to engage in the same task in both 
sessions. 
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If the above points are accepted, perhaps any attempt to assess the 
cognitive functioning of children with DS will always be fraught with 
difficulties relating to unreliable performance. Whether attributable to 
motivational problems, to an impairment in the processes of 
consolidation or to a complex interaction between the two, clearly this 
lack of reliability invalidates any attempt to devise any model of 
development in DS on the basis of performance on psychometric tests. 
Poor reliability may, however, provide some insight into the 
developmental process in this particular population. If.. as it would seem, 
skills are lost from DS children's repertoires, it would seem prudent 
firstly, to investigate the cause of their loss, and secondly, to explore any 
possible effects this may have on the process of development itself. The 
next chapter re-examines the data from the longitudinal study just 
described with these two aims. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
LONGITUDINAL PERFORMANCE ON THE BSID: 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNRELIABILITY AND 
INSTABILITY 
Findings presented in study 4 revealed a number of shortcomings 
inherent in the practice of devising models of development in DS 
children on the basis of scores from psychometric tests. In addition to 
p~oblems relating to validity and reliability which were discussed in study 
3, it emerged that a further issue - developmental instability - had also 
been implicitly overlooked by researchers relying on this method of 
assessing cognitive functioning in this population of children. Item-item 
comparisons of BSID protocols obtained from the longitudinal study 
revealed that DS children frequently failed to reproduce passes attained at 
earlier age levels. In addition the high degree of discrepancy between pass 
and fail patterns produced in pairs of closely-spaced testing sessions lent 
further support to the findings presented in study 3, with test-retest 
reliability again proving to be far lower than would be expected on the 
basis of normative studies with non-handicapped children. It was 
concluded that unless these issues of reliability and stability are fully 
considered, any theory of development in DS constructed solely from 
psychometric data is likely to be be inacc.urate. 
Although these findings have very negative implications in relation 
to the use of psychometric methods of assessment with DS children, at 
the same time they may provide useful insights into the development of 
cognition in this group of children. DS children appeared to be losing 
skills over adjacent age levels suggesting that their development does not 
follow the steady, incremental pattern seen in normally developing 
children. Given that unreliability was also found to be characteristic of DS 
test performance this would seem an obvious starting point for 
investigating the possible cause(s) of these apparent losses of skills. This 
chapter aims therefore to explore any relationship that may exist between 
unreliable performance on certain tasks at given ages and the apparent 
loss of ability to succeed on these same tasks at la ter stages in 
development. 
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· Loss of skills: implications for the developmental process as a whole 
It would appear that failure to perform to full competence is not 
simply characteristic of the behaviour of DS children in testing situations. 
According to the parents of many of the children who took part in the 
studies reported thus far, refusal to perform on demand is equally 
prevalent in other situations. Often when asked about their children's 
usual responses to being asked to demonstrate specific skills parents 
would give replies such as "sometimes - when it suits him" or "only 
when she feels like it". 
As already stated, by nature of their handicapping condition, DS 
children are already disadvantaged in relation to learning; failure to 
reliably produce those skills that they do acquire can only add to this 
disadvantage. Although it has already been argued that development in 
DS cannot accurately be described simply as being slow in relation to 
normal development it cannot nevertheless be denied that DS children 
do take longer than their non-handicapped peers to reach each individual 
developmental milestone. This process can only be further prolonged if 
new acquisitions are not regularly rehearsed and consolidated, allowing 
the child to build on these consolidated skills and to advance to more 
complex activities. 
Relatedly and perhaps more importantly, if the outcome of 
unreliable production of skills is the eventual loss of these skills, this 
could imply that acquisitions made subsequent to ones which have 
disappeared would not be fully understood. Since the work of Piaget it has 
become widely accepted that development proceeds as a series of stages; a 
full grasp of the skills and concepts relevant to each stage being essential 
before the next can be attained. Morss (1980) has reported that it often 
appears that DS learning is 'incomplete'. Where successes do occur these 
seem to be more of the nature of one-off achievements rather than 
reflecting the acquisition of any general understanding. It may well be 
that this lack of understanding is the cumulative result of DS childrens' 
failures to cement the building blocks which they have used to advance 
onto higher-level skills. If this is the case, clearly a predominant focus of 
early intervention should be to ensure that lower level behaviours are 
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fully consolidated before children are encouraged to advance onto more 
complex activities. 
Loss of skills: are losses genuine or do they reflect the inadequacy of 
the BSID? 
The aim of this chapter is to determine whether any relationship can 
be found between unreliable performance and longitudinal instability in 
BSID profiles. Before attempting to speculate on the nature of any such 
relationship it seems necessary to examine the possibility that unstable 
performance - the apparent 'loss' of skills at later ages - may simply be 
characteristic of DS behaviour in testing situations. Parents' reports 
would seem to imply that unreliability is as prevalent outside the testing 
room as it is during assessments. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
however, it cannot be assumed that when a child fails an item passed at 
an earlier age he/ she has necessarily lost the requisite skills for passing 
that item. Over closely-spaced intervals where performance on certain 
items was seen to change this change often appeared to result from the 
child's failure to engage in the task on one of the two occasions. Many 
failures could not therefore be confidently attributed to any 
straightforward absence of the required levels of cognitive ability. The 
apparent disappearance of skills over 3 and 6 monthly intervals may 
simply be explained in the same way: rather than indicating difficulties 
with consolidation, consistent failures at later ages may have si~Jlply 
resulted from refusals to perform to full competence on certain tasks on 
both testing occasions. Rather than having any wider implications in 
relation to the learning process it may be that an explanation for the 
frequency with which children with DS were found to drop test items 
may be provided in the nature of the tests themselves. As was discussed 
in study 3, for example, the items included in the BSID may simply be 
inappropriate for use with this - or indeed any - group of mentally 
handicapped children. A DS child of 5 years of age may be functioning at a 
level similar to that of a non-handicapped child of half that age but this 
does not mean that he/ she has not outgrown the sorts of tasks and objects 
which are stimulating for the younger child. 
It was also mentioned in study 3 that, for similar reasons, a child 
may fail to produce the behaviour required for passing a given item 
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because he/ she has gone onto a more constructive or complex activity 
with the objects presented. In the BSID manual, examiners are advised to 
consider such failures when setting basal levels. The example which is 
given to illustrate this point involves the 1 inch cubes. It is stated that a 
child may not demonstrate him/herself capable of, for example, retaining 
2 cubes because to that child the cubes may provide an opportunity to 
demonstrate a more advanced skill (e.g. building a tower with the cubes). 
In this case it is stated that the child 'surpasses' the item rather than 
passes or fails it and should receive a credit. 
This study will re-examine the longitudinal BSID protocols in an 
attempt to determine why it is that items passed at earlier ages are not 
reproduced after 3 and 6 monthly intervals. In particular this 
investigation will focus on evidence of unreliability at earlier 
developmental stages as a possible cause of this apparent loss of skills at 
later ages. Other, more 'practical' reasons such as lack of suitability of test 
items and the possibility that children have surpassed certain items will 
also be considered, however. 
STUDY 5 
METHOD 
Data from the longitudinal BSID protocols were re-examined in two 
separate analyses; an analysis of short-term test-retest reliability and an 
analysis of the longer term stability of performance profiles. 
AI Test-retest reliability 
As in the study reported in Chapter 4, protocols were investigated for 
any variation in pass/ fail patterns produced in the two closely-spaced 
sessions administered at each age level. A child's performance on any 
item was considered unreliable if s/he had passed that item in one of the 
two closely-spaced sessions but had failed it in the other. 
B/ Long-term stability 
Longi tudinal performance was investigated for evidence of item 
loss. An item was considered 'lost' if it had been passed in at least one of 
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the two closely-spaced sessions at any age level but was failed in both 
closely-spaced sessions at a later age level. In cases where items were lost 
from protocols, performance on those items was considered to be unstable. 
As already mentioned, examiners using the BSID are alerted to the 
possibility that children may surpass certain low-level test items. It is 
stated in the test manual that rather than indicating the absence of the 
skills required to pass such items, failures may indicate that the child has 
advanced onto higher-level activities with the test materials. In the 
present study, given the frequency with which performance was seen to 
change both in the long-term and in the short-term and on both high-
and low-level items, it was impossible to determine with any confidence 
whether each individual case of item loss could be attributed to the 
subject having surpassed that particular item. In scoring test performance 
it was therefore decided only to credit items in each session if the requisite 
skill to pass had actually been demonstrated during that session. 
RESULTS 
AI Test-retest reliability 
Table 6:1 contrasts the mean percentage agreement figures for 
individual BSID items with, where possible, the reliability data for these 
same items from the Werner and Bayley (1966) and the Horner (1980) 
BSID reliability studies (see alsop. 85-86). 
146 
Table 6:1 Test-Retest percentage agreement figures for each item 
% test-retest agreement 
Item NT-R NU OS S's H S's H S's W&B 
9mths lSmths S's 
10: eyes follow moving person 2 100 nr nr nr 
11: responds to voice 1 100 nr nr nr 
12: vertical eye 1 100 nr nr nr 
coordination: light 
13: vocalises once or twice 1 100 nr nr nr 
14: vertical eye coordination: 1 100 nr nr nr 
red ring 
15: circular eye coordination: 1 100 nr nr nr 
light 
16: circular eye coordination: 3 100 nr nr nr 
red ring 
17: free inspection of 
surroundings 
5 2 60 nr nr nr 
18: social smile: E talks and 5 3 40 nr nr nr 
smiles 
19: turns eyes to red ring 5 100 nr nr nr 
20: turns eyes to light 5 100 nr nr nr 
21: vocalises at least 4 times 5 100 nr nr nr 
22: anticipatory excitement 5 100 nr nr nr 
23: reacts to paper on face 5 100 nr nr nr 
24: blinks at shadow of hand 5 100 nr nr nr 
25: visually recognises 
mother 
5 100 nr nr nr 
26: social smile: E smiles, 5 100 nr nr nr 
quiet 
27: vocalises to E's social 6 100 nr nr nr 
smile and talk 
28: searches with eyes for 6 3 50 nr nr nr 
sound 
29: eyes follow pencil 6 100 nr nr nr 
30: vocalises 2 different 6 100 nr nr nr 
sounds 
31: reacts to disappearance of 7 100 nr nr nr 
face 
32: regards cube 8 100 nr nr nr 
33: manipulates red ring 8 4 so nr nr nr 
NT-R =>Number of Test-Retest presentations; NU=> Number of times unreliable; 
OS S's => OS Subjects; H S's Horner Subjects; W & B S's => Werner & Bayley Subjects; 
nr => figures which were nor reported in the Homer and the Werner & Bayley studies. 
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% test-retest agreement 
Item NT-R NU DS S's H ·s·s H S's W&B 
9mths lSmths S's 
34: glances from one object to 8 2 75 nr nr nr 
another 
35: anticipatory adjustment 
to lifting 
8 100 nr nr nr 
36: simple play with rattle 8 1 87.5 nr nr nr 
37: reaches for dangling ring 7 1 85.8 nr nr nr 
38: follows ball visually 10 100 nr nr nr 
across table 
39: fingers hand in play 10 5 so nr nr nr 
40: head follows dangling 11 100 nr nr nr 
ring 
41: head follows vanishing 10 1 90 nr nr nr 
spoon 
42: aware of strange situation 10 1 90 nr nr nr 
43: manipulates table edge 11 1 80.9 nr nr nr 
slightly 
44: carries ring to mouth 13 4 69.3 nr nr nr 
45: inspects own hands 13 4 69.3 nr nr nr 
46: closes on dangling ring 11 2 81.82 nr nr nr 
47: turns head to sound of bell 12 1 91.7 nr nr nr 
48: turns head to s6und of 11 2 81.82 nr nr nr 
rattle 
49: reache!? for cube 8 1 87.5 nr nr nr 
50: manipulates table edge 
actively 
8 1 87.5 nr nr nr 
51: eye-hand coordination in 9 1 88.9 nr nr nr 
reaching 
52. regards pellet 9 3 66.6 nr nr nr 
53: mirror image approach 9 4 55.6 nr 95 
54: picks up cube 11 3 72.8 nr nr nr 
55: vocalises attitudes 17 2 88.3 nr 73 
56: retains 2 cubes 16 7 56.25 nr nr nr 
57: exploitive paper play 15 1 93.3 nr nr nr 
58: . discrirnina tes strangers 16 100 nr 59 
59: recovers rattle in crib 19 1 94.8 nr nr nr 
60: reaches persistently 19 4 79 nr nr 95 
61 : likes frolic play 21 100 nr nr 58 
62: turns head after fallen 21 8 62 nr nr 95 
spoon 
63: lifts inverted cup 23 5 78.3 nr nr 86 
64: reaches for 2nd cube 24 10 58.4 nr nr 95 
65: smiles at mirror image 25 5 80 nr nr nr 
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% test-retest agreement 
Item NT-R NU DS S's H S's H S's W&B 
9mths 15mths S's 
66: bangs in play 24 3 87.5 nr nr 95 
67: sustained inspection of red 24 8 66.6 nr nr 86 
ring 
69: transfers object hand to 25 2 92 nr nr 95 
hand 
70: picks up cube deftly and 
directly 
26 5 80.8 100 91 
71: pulls string: secures ring 25 3 88 100 nr 
72: interest in sound 26 3 88.5 100 nr 
production 
73: lifts cup with handle 26 7 73.1 92 89 
74: attends to scribbling 29 4 86.3 100 nr 
75: looks for fallen spoon 28 11 60.8 92 85 
76: playful response to mirror 31 4 81.1 71 nr 
77: retains 2 of 3 cubes offered 39 16 59 92 95 
78: manipulates bell: interest 
in detail 
38 10 73.7 92 nr 
79: vocalises 4 different 39 3: 92.4 71 67 
syllables 
80: pulls string adaptively: · 39 6 84.7 75 nr 
secures ring 
81: cooperates in games 43 8 81.4 71 58 
82: attempts to secure 3 cubes 45 16 64.5 71 nr 
83: rings bell purposively 45 9 80 75 nr 
84 listens selectively to 42 1 97.7 83 41 
familiar words 
85: says "dada" or equivalent 44 10 79.3 54 51 
86: uncovers toy 44 13 70.5 92 85 
87: fingers holes in peg board 43 7 83.8 83 nr 
88: picks up cup: secures cube 44 13 70.5 92 nr 
89: responds to verbal request 44 5 88.7 62 nr 
90: puts cube in cup on 
command 
45 9 80 70 70 
91: looks for contents of box 45 7 84.4 88 85 
92: stirs with spoon in 45 6 86.7 75 nr 
imitation 
93: looks at pictures in book 48 6 81.5 100 nr 
94: inhibits on command 42 4 90.5 88 72 
95: attempts to imitate 43 7 83.8 92 96 
scribble 
96: unwraps cube 42 8 81 83 85 
97: repeats performance 42 6 85.8 71 54 
laughed at 
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% test-retest agreement 
Item NT-R NU DS S's H S's H S's W&B 
9mths 15mths S's 
98: holds crayon adaptively 42 5 88.9 100 92 
99: pushes car along 42 9 78.6 96 nr 
100: puts 3 or more cubes in cup 42 6 85.8 88 100 nr 
101 : jabbers expressively 44 14 66.6 67 88 nr 
102: uncovers blue box 45 10 77.8 67 96 nr 
103: turns pages of book 46 5 89.2 75 100 nr 
104: pats whistle doll, in 46 11 76.1 62 79 91 
imitation 
105: dangles ring by string 42 10 76.2 71 96 nr 
106: imitates words 29 7 75.9 88 46 88 
107: puts beads in box 28 14 50 96 100 nr 
108 ·places 1 peg prepeatedly 29 4 86.2 92 96 nr 
109: removes pellet from bottle 30 11 63.4 100 100 nr 
110: blue board: places 1 round 
block 
32 9 71.9 100 nr 
111: builds tower of 2 cubes 38 18 52.7 96 nr 
112: spontaneous scribble 37 11 70.3 88 86 
113: says 2 words 33 2 94.4 54 91 
114: puts 9 cubes in cup 35 9 74.3 92 nr 
115: closes round box 35 12 66 100 nr 
116: uses gestures to make 
wants known 
38 5 87 100 nr 
117: shows shoes 38 16 58 100 nr 
118: pegs placed in 70 sees 34 6 82.4 71 nr 
119: builds tower of 3 cubes 39 7 82.1 54 nr 
120: pink board: places round 
block 
35 11 68.6 92 nr 
121: blue board: places 2 round 34 8 72.5 75 nr 
blocks 
122: attains toy with stick 35 15 58 83 nr 
123: pegs placed in 42 sees 38 4 89.5 42 nr 
124: names 1 object 33 5 84.8 33 nr 
125: imitates crayon stroke 33 11 67 75 nr 
126: follows directions, doll 34 5 85.3 79 nr 
127: uses words to make wants 34 3 91.2 92 nr 
known 
128: points to parts of doll 32 3 90.7 96 nr 
129: blue board: places 2 round 35 8 77.2 88 nr 
and 2 square blocks 
130 names 1 picture 39 8 79.5 79 nr 
131: finds 2 objects 39 12 71.4 67 nr 
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% test-retest agreement 
Item NT-R NU DS S's H S's H S's W&B 
9mths 15mths S's 
132: points to 3 pictures 36 10 69.3 88 nr 
134: pegs placed in 30 sees 35 6 86.2 75 nr 
135: differentiates scribble 35 12 82.6 83 nr 
from stroke 
136: sentence of 2 words 38 6 65.8 96 nr 
137: pink board: completes 35 6 84.3 67 nr 
138: names 2 objects 34 10 82.9 88 nr 
139: points to 5 pictures 34 9 70.6 92 nr 
140: broken doll: mends 33 5 73.6 67 nr 
approximately 
141: names 3 pictures 33 5 84.9 96 nr 
142: blue board: places 6 blocks 38 7 84.9 71 nr 
143: builds tower of 6 cubes 34 15 55.9 96 nr 
144: discriminates 2: cup, 32 11 65.7 100 nr 
plate, box 
145: names watch, 4th picture 33 7 78.8 100 nr 
146: names 3 objects 33 9 72.8 nr nr 
147: imitates strbkes: vertical 33 12 63.7 nr nr 
and horizontal 
148: points to 7 pictures 30 5 83.4 nr nr 
149: na.mes 5 pictures 36 2 94.5 nr nr 
150: names watch, 2nd picture 30 9 70 nr nr 
151: pink board: reversed 27 5 81.5 nr nr 
152: discriminates 3: cup, 27 8 70.4 nr nr 
plate, box 
153: broken doll: mends exactly 29 6 79.4 nr nr 
lSi: train of cubes 29 6 79.4 nr nr 
15.:;: blue board: completes in 29 6 79.4 nr nr 
150 sees 
156: pegs placed in 22 seconds 30 10 66.6 nr nr 
157: folds paper 30 9 70 nr nr 
158: understands 2 prepositions 28 7 75 nr nr 
159: blue board: completes in 29 7 75.8 nr nr 
90 sees 
160: blue board: completes in 27 7 74.1 nr nr 
60 sees 
161: builds tower of 8 cubes 18 9 so nr nr 
162: concept of one 11 6 45.5 nr nr 
163: understands 3 prepositions 4 1 75 nr nr 
NT-R => Number of Test-Retest presentations; NU=> Number of times unreliable; 
DS S's => DS Subjects; H S's Horner Subjects; W & B S's => Werner & Bayley Subjects; 
nr => figures which were nor reported in the Homer and the Werner & Bayley studies. 
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For the total range of 154 items -presented toSs in this study (items 10 
- 163), test-retest agreement averages 79.6%. This overall reliability figure, 
higher than that found in the smaller test-retest study presented in 
Chapter 4, is also higher than that found for the small subsection of items 
tested for reliability in the Werner and Bayley study (1966). As has already 
been pointed out, however, (p.91) the low level of reliability found in that 
study - 76.4% - is likely to have been influenced by the particular items 
tested (many of which were subsequently dropped). When compared to 
the reliability demonstrated by Horner's more recent sample of 9 and 15 
month old non-handicapped children, DS performance proved to be 
considerably less reliable. Mean percentage agreement for the set of items 
(70 - 109) presented to the 9 month olds in the Horner study was 84.8% 
For the same set of items the mean figure found in this study was 79.33% 
Similarly, the percentage agreements on items presented to .Horner's 15 
month sample (items 100-145) was 76.06% in this study in comparison to 
Horner's 84.5%. T -test comparison of item-item agreement figures for the 
entire set of items used in the Horner study (items 70 -145) with DS 
agreement figures obtained for the same items revealed a significant 
difference (t = 3.626, df 75, p < 0.0005). 
Table 6:2 presents the group of items on which performance was 
found to be most unreliable. As was found in the study presented in 
Chapter 4 DS performance proved to be particularly variable on items 
testing cube behaviours and those involving the crayon and paper. 
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Table 6:2 Items showing poor reliability over closely spaced 
t t • es 1ng sessiOns. 
% Agreement less than 60 %Agreement less than 70 
53: mirror image approach 55.6 44: carries ring up to mouth 69.3 
56: retains 2 cubes 56.25 45: inspects hands 69.3 
64: reachesfor2ndscube 58.4 52: regards pellet 66.6 
77: retains 2<3 cubes offered 59 62: turns head after fallen spoon 62 
107: puts beads in box 50 67: sustained inspection of ring 66.6 
111: builds tower of 2 cubes 52.7 75: lifts cup with handle 60.8 
117: shows shoes 58 82: attempts to secure 3 cubes 64.5 
122: attains toy with stick 58 101: jabbers expressively 66.6 
143~ builds tower of 6 cubes 55.9 109: removes pellet from bottle 63.4 
161: builds tower of 8 cubes 50 115: closes ronnd box 66 
162: conceptof1 45.5 120: pink board: places round 68.6 
block 
125: imitates crayon stroke 67 
131: finds 2 objects 69.3 
135: differentiates scribble from 65.8 
stroke 
144: discriminates 2: cup, plate, 
bix 
65.7 
147: imitates strokes: vertical & 63.7 
horizontal 
156: peg placed in 22 sees. 66.6 
Failures by default 
As in the study reported in Chapter 4, test-retest protocols were 
examined to determine the extent to which unreliable performances may 
have been attributable to failures by default. Again it was found that a 
substantial proportion of cases of item variability were attributable to 
children's failures to engage in the item in one of the tw~ sessions. A 
total of 853 occurrences of performance change were recorded. Ninety-two 
such cases were omitted from the analysis below on the grounds that it 
was not possible to distinguish between criterion fails and fails by default 
(see p ). In the 761 remaining cases of variability 487 - 64% - were clearly 
due to Ss' refusal to engage in the tasks. 
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Test-retest reliability measures can only identify items on which 
children underperformed on one of two occasions. In many cases, 
however, children were seen to avoid (and consequently fail) the same 
item in both sessions. Because of such cases in which performance on a 
given item does not change, the resulting high test-retest 'reliability' 
figure for a particular task may obscure the fact that performance may not 
necessarily be reliably reflecting children's true competence. 
Table 6:3 shows the items which were most often failed by default in 
either or in both sessions. It can be seen that although the majority of 
these items obtained low test-retest reliability figures, many were also 
frequently avoided on both testing sessions thereby artefactually inflating 
the reliability figures obtained. For example, only 3 of the 32 Ss who were 
presented with item 128 (points to parts of doll) changed their 
performance on this item giving it a high percentage agreement figure of 
90.7. All 3 failed to engage in this item on one of the two occasions. A 
further 12 Ss however failed this item by default in both sessions. Item 
130 (names 1 picture) also already showing a comparatively high 
reliability figure - 79.5 - was failed twice by an additional 8 Ss who refused 
to engage in this task when it was presented to them, suggesting an even 
lower reliability figure for this item. 
Other, less extreme examples can also be seen in Table 6:3. Item 107 
(puts beads in box), for example, was avoided and consequently failed by 
57.14% of Ss presented with this task. Other items frequently failed by 
default included items 111 (builds tower of 2 cubes), item 131 (finds two 
objects), and item 144 (discriminates 2: cup, plate, box). In addition a large 
proportion of items avoided in common by Ss were those testing cube 
behaviours and discrimination skills. 
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Table 6:3 Items most frequently failed by default 
In one In both % Test-Retest 
Item session sessions Agreement 
64: reaches for 2nd cube 6 2 58.4 
77: retains 2'3 cubes offered 9 3 59 
82: attempts to secure 2nd cube 10 6 64.5 
107: puts beads in box 13 3 50 
110: blue board: 1 round block 4 3 71.9 
111: builds tower of 2 cubes 14 4 52.7 
117: shows shoes 7 4 58 
120: pink board: places round block 7 2 68.6 
128: points to parts of doll 3 12 90.7 
130: names 1 picture 3 8 79.5 
131: finds 2 objects 12 8 71.4 
132: points to 3 pictures 8 3 69.3 
133: broken doll: mends marginally 5 10 72.3 
135: differentiates scribble from 
stroke 7 2 82.6 
143: builds tower of 6 cubes 7 4 55.9 
144: discriminates 2; cup, plate, box 8 6 65.7 
152: discriminates 3: cup, plate, box 2 4 70.4 
154: train of cubes 3 4 79.4 
161: tower of cubes 5 1 50 
B/ Long-term stability of performance profiles 
Items lost over adjacent pairs of ages 
By contrast, failure to engage was found to account for only 16% of 
instances of item loss. Of the total of 268 items which were dropped from 
Ss' protocols over age levels, only 44 were failed by default in either or 
both testing sessions administered at the age level at which they were 
found to have disappeared. 
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Table 6:4 shows the items which most frequently disappeared from 
childrens' protocols over adjacent ages. It can be seen that few of these 
items also attained low reliability figures. This does not necessarily 
suggest, however, that there is little association between items which 
were both produced unreliably and those which were dropped over ages-
in fact it may suggest the opposite. For this study reliability figures were 
calculated for each item from the total number of cases in which that item 
was presented to any child on any occasion. As most items were presented 
to the same children at more than one age level this means that if a 
child's performance was unreliable on a specific item at one age level but 
was reliably failed at the next, the item-item disagreement found at the 
earlier age level would be cancelled out by the agreement at the next age 
level. As will be seen below, however, there were in reality few items on 
which Ss did in fact produce both unreliable and unstable performances 
in common. Overall reliability figures for individual items were not 
therefore affected to any great extent by this effect. The fact that there was 
a high degree of agreement between reliability figures obtained in this 
study and those reported in the cross-sectional reliability study presented 
in Chapter 4 suggests that this effect, even if present, would be weak. 
Although in the minority, there were several items on which 
performance was particularly variable in closely-spaced sessions and 
which were also frequently dropped from protocols over adjacent age 
levels. This correspondence was strongest on items testing cube 
behaviours (item 77: retains 2/3 cubes; item 82 :attempts to secure 3 cubes: 
item 161: builds tower of 8 cubes) and on item 117 (shows shoes).This 
suggests that these particular items may have been especially problematic 
for this group of children. 
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Table 6:4 Items most frequently dropped over age levels 
No. cases No. cases %Test-
dropped dropped Retest 
over at least over more agreement 
Item 1 age level than 1 age 
level 
73: lifts cup with handle 4 2 73.1 
77: retains 2<3 cubes offered ' 4 6 59 
78: manipulates bell - interest 8 5 73.7 
in detail 
81: cooperates in games 5 2 81.4 
82: attempts to secure 3 cubes 6 2 64.5 
85: say "dada" or equivalent 6 77.3 
86: uncovers toy 5 5 70.5 
88: picks up cup: secures cube 4 1 70.5 
92: stirs with spoon in 4 1 86.7 
imitation 
94: inhibits on command 6 5 90.5 
%: unwraps cube 4 81 
105: dangles ring 5 76.2 
117: shows shoes 5 2 58 
130: names 1 picture 5 79.5 
133: broken doll: mends 4 2 86.2 
marginally 
161: tower of 8 cubes 4 1 50 
Group data: items showing low reliab ility/high instability 
Item 82 was also frequently dropped from children's performance 
repertoires in the Cunningham (1979) study. Bayley, however, specifically 
identified low level cube behaviour items of this sort to be ones which 
children may fail because they have surpassed them i.e have advanced 
onto more complex activity. It was therefore decided to investigate the 4 
cases in which item 77 was dropped from Ss' protocols and the 6 cases in 
which item 82 was dropped for evidence that children had in fact 
developed more advanced cube skills. 
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Item 77: retains 2/3 cubes 
This item was dropped by S4 at 9 months, S12 at 12 months and Ss 1 
and 8 at 15 months. The performance of Ss 1,4 and 8 on this item had 
varied over closely-spaced sessions administered at the preceding age 
level. Both Ss 1 and 4 had passed it in only one of the two sessions; 
Subject 8, although gaining a credit for this item in both sessions 
produced a more sophisticated response in session 1 (see case study 1 p ). 
Subject 12 was only tested once at 9 months. It is not therefore possible to 
identify any link between unreliable and unstable performance in this 
particular case. Nevertheless, over the entire subsequent 15 months 
during which he participated in this study Subject 12· did not once 
reproduce this item. It was regained in subsequent sessions by Subjects 1 
and 4 but was not reliably produced over closely-spaced tests in either 
case. In fact it again disappeared and reappeared from Subject 4's protocol 
between 18 and 24 months. Only Subject 8 reliably produced this item on 
2 occasions 3 months after it had first dropped out. 
This item remained absent from the protocols of Ss 4 and 12 for 6 
and 9 months respectively with no evidence that any higher level cube 
items had been attained during these periods. In fact, in both cases, even 
lower level items in this series were also either dropped altogether or 
were failed in 1 of 2 sessions presented at the same age level (item 49: 
reaches for cube; item 54: picks up cube; item 56: retains 2 cubes; item 64: 
reaches for 2nd cube). Both Ss did eventually gain higher level items at 
much later ages (Subject 4: 15 months - item 90: puts cube in cup; item 82: 
attempts to·secure 3 cubes; 21 months- item 100: puts 3 or more cubes in 
cup; Subject 12: 21 months - item 90: 24 months - item 100) but in every 
case these items were produced unreliably at these age levels. 
Item 82: attempts to secure 3 cubes 
Three Ss who had dropped item 77 also dropped this item (Subject 8 
at 15 months; Subject 1 at 15 months; Subject 4 at 24 months) Item 82 also 
disappeared from the protocols of Ss 5 (15 months), 9 (18 months) and 10 
(15 months). Ss 1,4 and 5 had passed this item in only one of the sessions 
administered 3 months prior to its disappearance from their protocols. 
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In only one case (Subject 5) was there no evidence that any higher 
level cube item had been attained. Subjects 8 and 10 both passed item 100 
(puts 3 or more cubes in cup) for the first time at 15 months, although 
that particular item again became unreliable for Subject 10 at 18 months 
when item 82 actually reappeared - but was unreliably produced. It was 
dropped once more from this S's protocol at 21 months although items 
111 (builds tower of 2 cubes) and 114 (puts 9 cubes in cup) were attained-
albeit unreliably - at this age level. Item 111 remained unreliable until 27 
months for this subject. Subject 8 also gained item 111 at 18 months 
although it was not produced reliably either at this age or at 21 months. 
Similarly, every higher level cube item gained by Ss 1,4 and 9 was 
unreliably produced at the age level at which item 82 was lost. 
More qualitative analyses of individual S's performance on these 
cube items will be presented in the case studies below. 
Item 117: shows shoes 
This item was also found to have a low test-retest percentage 
agreement figure and to be among the group of items which most 
frequently disappeared from childrens' protocols between age levels. This 
item is the earliest discrimination item to appear in the BSID. 
Five children dropped item 117 after having passed it at an earlier 
age level. Subject 10 failed it twice at both 24 and 27 months, having 
passed it in one of the two sessions presented at 21 months. This item was 
also passed (once) by Subject 14 at 21 months and in both sessions at 27 
months but she failed twice at 24, 33 and 36 months. Subject 18 passed it 
in one of each of the two sessions at 36 and at 48 months, failing it twice at 
42 months and again in both sessions at 54 months. Ss 21 and 22 lost this 
item only once at 42 and 54 months respectively; in both cases it was 
regained at the next age level although Subject 21 failed it in the second 
session. 
Subjects 10 and 14 had attained this item for the first time at the age 
level preceding that in which it had first dropped out. In both cases it was 
only passed in one of the two closely-spaced testing sessions but in neither 
case could failure clearly be attributed to failure to engage. In fact both 
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subjects seemed genuinely unable to pass this item on each of these 
occasions. Failure to engage occurred at later ages: at 27 months for 
Subject 10 and~ at 33 and 36 months for Subject 14. Subject 18 failed to 
engage in this task in the second session at 36 months (the age level at 
which she entered this study), but passed it in session 1 at this age. She did 
not appear to fail this item by default in any subsequent session, however, 
and genuinely seemed to have lost the ability to pass this task. Subject 21 
refused to engage in item 117 in both sessions at 21 months but this did 
not seem to be the case for Subject 22 who, at 54 months, seemed 
genuinely unable to provide the correct response to E's request to point to 
his shoes. 
It is unlikely that failures to engage on this item could be attributable 
to any subject having surpassed it - this is not the sort of behaviour that 
can really be surpassed. The protocols of these 5 children were therefore 
examined in an attempt to provide an explanation as to why this item 
was dropped in all 5 cases. 
This investigation revealed that when item 117 was dropped this 
generally occurred when Ss had attained higher level discrimination 
items for the first time, or were avoiding these more difficult items. 
Although there was no evidence that either Subjects 10 or 14 had attained 
any higher level discrimination skill when item 117 was first dropped, 
both Ss were seen to avoid other discrimination items when this item 
disappeared for the second time. When presented with the picture cards 
in the first of two sessions administered at 27 months, Subject 10 refused 
to engage in this task. She did however cooperate in the second session 
and was credited with items 132 and 139 ( points to 3/5 pictures). In 
contrast, Subject 14 refused to engage in every discrimination item she 
was presented with at 33 and 36 months (item 128: points to parts of doll; 
item 130: names 1 picture; item 132: points to 3 pictures). The same items 
were also avoided in both closely-spaced sessions by Subject 18 when she 
first dropped item 117 (42 months) which then reappeared at 48 months 
when item 132 was passed (once) for the first time. The picture items 130 
and 132 were unreliably passed by this S at 54 months when item 117 
again dropped out of her protocol. Items 128 (points to parts of doll) and 
144 (discriminates 2: cup, plate, box) were also avoided in both sessions at 
this age level. 
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When item 117 was first dropped by Subject 21 at 42 months, he also 
refused to engage in every discrimination item with which he was 
presented. At 48 months he again refused some of the same items -
including item 117 - although items 144 (discriminates 2: cup, plate, box) 
and 146 (names 3 objects) were produced in the second of the two sessions 
administered at this age level. Neither item was passed in the first 
session, however, whereas he did receive credit in this session for item 
117. 
At 48 months Subject 22 passed item 117 twice but refused to engage 
in item 128 (points to parts of doll) on either occasion. Item 144 
(discriminates 2: cup, plate, box) was passed for the first time at this age 
level although it was avoided in the second session. It was then avoided 
twice at 54 months, together with items 117 and 128 (points to parts of 
doll) and items 145/150 (names watch 2nd/ 4th picture). He did however 
pass picture items 130 and 132 on both occasions at this age level. 
I tern 161; builds tower of 8 cubes 
This item disappeared from the protocols of 4 subjects: Subject 17 (24 
months), ~ubject 19 (48 months), Subject 20 (54 months) and Subject 24 
(60 months). In every case it had been unreliably passed at the preceding 
age level. 
Data from individual subject's protocols: items which were both 
unreliable and unstable 
Although there were few items on which Ss were found in common 
to produce both unreliable and unstable performances there were many 
instances in which this link between unreliable and unstable production 
of specific items was in evidence in the protocols of individual Ss. 
It will be recalled that, when this study commenced, several Ss were 
only tested on one occasion at each age level. Although several of these Ss 
were found to drop items over adjacent ages it was not possible to include 
these single session protocols in this particular analysis, the purpose of 
which was to explore the possible link between short-term unreliability 
and long-term instability. Of the total of 217 cases in which an i tern had 
dropped out over at least one age level therefore, 34 had to be omitted. (It 
161 
is perhaps worth noting that given the extent to which protocols were 
found to differ over closely-spaced intervals, it seems highly probable that 
prior performance in several of these 34 cases of item loss might well 
have varied had Ss been tested twice at the earlier age level). This left 181 
cases of item loss to be investigated for evidence of previous unreliable 
production. Performance at the preceding age level was found to have 
been unreliable in 105/181 of these cases - 58% This suggests that there 
may be a causal relationship between unreliable and unstable 
performance. 
Table 6:5 presents every item for which a correspondence betwe_en 
unreliable and unstable performance was found. It can be seen that these 
items cover a wide range of different skills and that for several items the 
link between performance change and later disappearance was found in 
single cases only. To investigate this relationship between unreliability 
and instability in more detail the longitudinal profiles of 3 children were 
examined for evidence which might explain the disappearance of these 
skills between successive age levels. 
Table 6:5 Items snowing both unreliability and instability 
Cube Behaviours No. Cases 
56: retains cubes 2 
64: reaches for 2nd cube 2 
70: picks up cube deftly & directly 1 
77: retains 2 of 3 cubes offered 2 
82: attempts to secure 3 cubes 3 
143: builds tower of 6 cubes 2 




62: turns head after fallen spoon 
75: looks for fallen spoon 
86: uncovers toy 
88: picks up cup: secures cube 
91: looks for contents of box 
96: unwraps toy 
131: finds 2 objects 
Crayon & Paper 
74: attends to scribbling 
95: attempts to imitate scribble 
112: spontaneous scribble 
125: imittes crayon stroke 
135: differentiates scribble from stroke 
157: folds paper 
Discrimination 
117: shows shoes 
124: names 1 object 
130: names 1 picture 
144: discriminates 2: cup, plate, box 
148: points to 7 pictures 
149: names 5 pictures 
150: names watch: 2nds picture 


















































fingers holes in peg board 




closes round box 
attains toy with stick 
blue boards: places 1 round block 
pegs placed in 30 sees. 
pink bo~rd: completes 
blue board: places 6 blocks 



























Speech & No. Cases 
Comprehension 
79: vocalises 4 different syllables 1 
85: says dada 3 
89: responds to verbal request 1 
94: inhibits on command 1 
136: sentence of 2 words 2 
158: understands 2 prepositions 1 
162: concept of 1 2 
163: understands 3 prepositions 1 
12 
Other No. Cases 
45: fingers .hands 2 
52: regards pellet 1 
63: lifts inverted cup 1 
67: sustained inspection of ring 2 
72: interest in sound production 1 
73 lifts cup with handle 1 
78: manipulates bell: interest in 4 
detail 
81: cooperates in games 2 
15 
Total 105 
Individual case studies 
To give as broad a perspective as possible of the range of issues 
which emerged from analyses of the relation between unreliable and 
unstable test performance, 3 subjects exemplifying contrasting themes 
were selected for in-depth case study. 
Subject 8 (H) was selected because the majority of items which were 
dropped from her protocol between adjacent age levels fell into 3 clear 
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categories: items testing imitation skills, those testing the development of 
the object concept, and items involving the 1 inch cubes. 
The profiles produced by Subject 12 (N) were selected for two 
reasons: firstly, because he became progressively more 'untestable' as he 
grew older; secondly because it appeared that this particular subject's 
difficulties were largely attributable to the severity of his motor deficit 
which seemed to be having a cumulative effect on his cognitive 
development. 
The third subject- Subject 18 (S) was selected as a case study because 
of the contrast between the MA curve derived from her session 1 scores 
and that obtained when all items previously passed were included in her 
scores (see p.128). It will be recalled that when session 1 scores only were 
considered, this particular subject seemed to have made very little 
developmental progress over the 18 month period during which she 
participated in this study, remaining on a plateau for 12 months. In 
comparison, when her score profile was amended to include all items 
passed at earlier age levels, the resulting MA curve r~presented a pattern 
of constant developmental progress. 
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CASE STUDY 1 
Subject 8 (H): 9 - 21 months 
Personal details 
Sex- F 
Karyotype- standard trisomy 21 






12m 15m 18m 
2 
21m 
2 2 2 
Unreliable items 
12m 18m 
81 cooperates in games 98 : holds crayon adaptively 
85 says dada 101 : jabbers expressively 
90 puts cube in cup 106 : imitates words 
95 attempts to imitate .scribble 111 : builds tower of 2 cubes 
105: dangles ring by string 116 : uses gestures to make wants 
known 
117 : shows shoes 
15m 21m 
81 cooperates in games 104 : pats whistle doll 
92 stirs with spoon in 111 : builds tower of 2 cubes 
imitation 115 : closes round box 
96 unwraps cube 117 : shows shoes 
97 repeats performance laughed at 121 : blue board : places 2 
round blocks 
98 holds crayon adaptively 129 : blue board: places 2 
round & 2 square blocks 
101 : jabbers expressively 131 : finds 2 objects 
132 : points to 3 pictures 
137 : pink board : completes 
142 blue board: 
places 6 blocks 
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Unstable items 
Items dropped at 15m 
77 retains 2/3 cubes offered 
82 attempts to secure 3 cubes 





picks up cup: secures cube 
attempts to imitate scribble + 
104 : pats whistle doll in imitation 
Item dropped at 18m 
96 : unwraps cube+ 
Item dropped at 21m 
106 : imitates words + 
+ denotes items which were also unreliable at the preceding age level. 
Analysis of Performance Profiles 
Between 9 and 12 months H made rapid progress, gaining a total of 
14 items. Seven of these items involved imitation skills, 3 items tested 
object concept development, and 3 play I social items. No items which had 
been passed at 9 months were failed in either session at 12 months. 
At 15 months however, although H attained a further 5 items she 
also dropped 7 items which she had passed at 12 months (she therefore 
reached a score plateau). No new imitation items were attained but she 
lost two which she had acquired at 12 months (item 95: attempts to 
imitate scribble; item 104: pats whistle doll in imitation). One new 
acquisition involved an object concept skill (item 96: unwraps cube), but 
this item was apparently acquired at the expense of 2 object concept items 
which had been attained at 12 months (item 86: uncovers toy; item 88: 
picks up cup: secures cube). Similarly, although item 102 (uncovers blue 
box) was attained at 18 months, item 96 (unwraps cube) which had been 
passed for the first time at 15 months then disappeared from her protocol. 
A number of changes in response to items testing cube behaviours was 
also present. 
A more qualitative analysis of H 's behaviour on presentation with 
the above items may provide some explanation for these patterns of gains 
and losses of imitation, object concept, and cube items. 
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Imitation items 
Of the 7 new acquisitions made at 12 months which ·involved 
imitation-type skills, only 2 were reliably passed at this age level and at all 
subsequent ages (item 83: rings bell; item 87: fingers holes in peg board). 
At 12 months H 's performance changed in a pass-to-fail direction on item 
105 (dangles ring by string) and in the opposite direction on items 90 (puts 
cube in cup) and 95 (attempts to imitate scribble). The crayon and paper 
item was lost at 15 months as was item 104 (pats whistle doll in imitation) 
which had been reliably passed at the preceding age level. Also reliably 
passed at 12 months was item 92 (stirs with spoon in imitation) although 
this particular item was only passed in the first of the two sessions 
administered at 15 months. 
Items 106 (imitates words) and 111 (builds tower of 2) were attained 
but unreliably produced at 18 months. Although item 111 was again 
produced in one session at 21 months, item 106 was dropped. In addition 
item 115 (closes round box) was passed for the first time at this age level 
but only in the second of the 2 sessions administered. 
The next section will provide detailed descriptions of H 's behaviour 
when presented with these imitation items on which her performance 
was found to change over closely-spaced sessions. 
Items 90: puts cube in cup; 95: attempts to imitate scribble; 105: dangles 
ring by string 
As stated above these 3 items were attained at 12 months but were 
not reliably passed at this age level. Also common to H's performance on 
these items was that when they were first passed, in each case her 
response only just met the criteria for passing. 
Item 90 may have been passed by chance in session 1 at 12 months. 
At this age level H was particularly interested in noise production and 
she persistently banged many of the test objects either together or on the 
table. She had been banging the cube on the side of the cup before she let 
it drop into the cup. Whether she intended to imitate E's demonstration 
is questionable but her behaviour fitted the criteria for passing this item. 
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In session 2 at 12 months, after again persistently banging the .cube 
on the table H did put her hand (and the cube) inside the cup. She would 
not, however, let go of the cube this time and eventually continued to hit 
it against the side of the cup. This item was presented a second time in 
this session. On this occasion H held her hand over the brim of the cup as 
though she fully intended to put the cube inside it, hesitated and then 
threw the cube behind her (thereby scoring a fail). 
On presentation with the crayon for item 95 H also banged this up 
and down on the paper. She was however given credit as she had closely 
attended toE's demonstration and appeared to be watching the marks she 
was making herself on the page. This was not the case in session 2 when 
she continued to bang the crayon on the page while looking away in 
another direction. H responded in a similar way to this item in both 
sessions administered 3 months later at 15 months. In neither session was 
there any evidence that she was aware of the marks that she was making 
with the crayon on the paper. 
To pass item 105 the child is required to secure the ring by its string 
and then to dangle it over the edge of the table in imitation of E's 
demonstration. In session 1 H secured the ring but could not then 
coordinate the action necessary to pull the ring off the table. She was 
credited with this item in session 2 although her success may have been 
attributable to her having moved by chance away from the table at the 
right time whilst still holding the string 
Items 92: stirs with spoon in imitation; 104: pats whistle doll in 
imitation 
One imitation item which was clearly passed on both occasions at 12 
months involved patting the whistle doll (a squeaky toy) in imitation of 
E's demonstration. This item seemed to excite her at this age level as she 
was so interested in noise production. At 15 months, however, she did 
not engage at all in this task; in both sessions she watched E's 
demonstration and looked away. 
H also appeared disinterested in item 92 in the second session 
administered at this age level. Although keen to demonstrate this activity 
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2 weeks earlier (and in both sessions at 12 months) she would not attempt 
to imitate E's demonstration until her mother put the spoon inside the 
cup for her. She did not therefore receive credit for this item. 
Item 106: imitates words 
This item was unreliably produced at 18 months and was then 
dropped from H's protocol 3 months later. At 18 months, during 
presentation of item 99 (pushes car) H imitated the word 'car'. Her 
mother reported that H would do this occasionally. She was very quiet in 
session 2, however, and received no credit for this item or for item 101 
(jabbers expressively) which had also been attained in the first session. 
This lower-level vocalisation item was again passed at 21 months but in 
neither session was there any evidence that H was attempting to imitate 
any words. Again H 's mother reported that she would do this 
occasionally- but not on demand. 
Object concept items 
Items 86: uncovers toy; 96: unwraps cube; 88: picks up cup: secures 
cube 
At 9 months, on presentation with both items 86 and 96, H made no 
attempt in either case to retrieve the toys once they had been hidden by 
the tissue used to cover and wrap them. Similarly in item 88, although 
she did lift the inverted cup and looked at the toy which had been placed 
underneath it, she made no attempt to secure it. These responses are 
typical of a child who has not yet developed any understanding of object 
permanence. 
In session 1 at 12 months H at first responded in a similar way to 
both items 86 and 88. AI though she was credited for passing both items 
there was some delay before she produced the requisite behaviours in 
both cases. When presented with item 86 she at first seemed to be 
attending more to the tissue which she stared at for some time before 
lifting it and securing the toy. Similarly she hesitated before lifting the 
cup and retrieving the toy in item 88. Although she briefly put the cup to 
her mouth, her intention seemed clearly to be to reach for the toy. It 
seemed almost as if she was demonstrating two levels of activity with the 
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cup at the same time. When she put it to her mouth she was exhibiting 
her recognition of the use of this object. She was also aware of its 
properties as an occluder, however. 
Both items 86 and 88 were passed without hesitation in the second 
session administered at 12 months. 
Three months later, in the first of the two sessions administered at 
15 months, H reverted to the level of behaviour seen at 9 months on item 
86, simply reaching for and tearing up the tissue. Her response to item 96 
(unwraps toy) was similar. No attempt was made in either item to secure 
the object hidden under /inside the tissue. Rather than attempt to secure 
the toy which had been hidden under the cup in item 88 H responded by. 
banging the cup on the table and then casting it. When this item was 
presented a second time she simply hit the toy with the cup, making no 
attempt to retrieve the t<?Y· 
H again preferred to tear the tissue when presented with item 86 in 
session 2 at 15 months. She did nevertheless clearly pass item 96 for the 
first time in this session. Item 88 was again failed; H lifted the cup, looked 
at the toy and then started to wave the cup in the air. She did not reach 
for the toy until her mother drew her attention to it. 
Both items 86 and 88 were clearly passed in session 1 and 2 at 18 
months. H did not, however, receive credit for item 96 in either session; 
on both occasions her response was to tear the tissue. This item was 
regained at 21 months; in both sessions she very carefully unfolded the 
tissue wrapped aro':.md the cube. 
Item 102: uncovers blue box 
This item was first passed at 18 months. In previous sessions H had 
occasionally managed to remove the lid from the box but this had always 
appeared to be accidental. In the first session administered at 18 months, 
H very deftly tipped the box with the clear intention of removing the lid 
and securing the toy which had been put inside it. In session 2, however, 
she needed several attempts at this item before producing the same 
successful response. She had twice pushed the box away from her when it 
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was initially presented. She received credit for this item in both sessions 
administered at 21 months. 
Item 131: finds 2 objects 
H attained this item for the first time at 21 months but only in the 
second of the two testing sessions. In this item the child is required to find 
an object which has been hidden under one of 2 cups. Six trials are 
presented in total - 3 with a ball and 3 with a toy rabbit. To pass the child 
has to pick up the correct cup in two out of three trials with each object. 
In session 1 H passed all 3 ball trials and the first rabbit trial; in the 
second rabbit trial, she picked up both cups and in the third, swiped the 
cup from the table. In session 2 the first two of each of the ball and the 
rabbit trials were passed successfully. She picked up the wrong cup in the 
third trial with each object however - although she was still credited for 
passing this item. 
Cube tasks 
Items 77: retains 2 of 3 cubes offered; 82: attempts to secure 3 cubes 
Having successfully passed items 77 and 82 at 9 and 12 months H 
dropped both items at 15 months. At this later age level her behaviour 
did not suggest that she had perhaps surpassed these items but rather that 
her own criteria for succeeding with the tasks had changed. Credit is 
given for item 77 if the child retains 2 cubes after being offered a third and 
for item 82 if he/she then attempts to secure the third cube by "banging at 
it, reaching with his mouth or by more adaptive scooping, trying to get 
and hold all 3 at once even though not successful". 
At 9 months H passed this item by banging the third cube with one 
of the two she was holding in either hand in an apparent attempt to 
secure it. At 12 months her response to the same item had become more 
sophisticated. In session 1 she not only retained the 2 cubes but also 
demonstrated her ability to hit them together in the midline. She also 
succeeded in picking up the third cube when it was presented and then 
continued to hit the two cubes against the one she was still holding in her 
other hand. This behaviour was not repeated in session 2 although she 
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was still given credit for item 82 as she reverted to banging ·the cube with 
one of the two she was holding, as at 9 months. 
At 15 months this response had disappeared. In session 1 she held a 
cube in each hand and hit them together in the same way as she had done 
in the first session at 12 months. When presented with the third cube this 
time she threw the other two cubes onto the table, paused, and then 
threw them one by one onto the floor. In the second session she seemed 
unable to retain 2 cubes when a third was put on the table in front of her, 
dropping one from one hand each time this item was presented. 
In both sessions at 15 months H had passed item 100 (puts 3 or more 
cubes in cup). It could therefore be suggested that because she was able to 
perform this more complex task with the cubes, she had surpassed items 
77 and 82. Two aspects of her performance suggest othe:rwise. The first is 
that she had still been keen to demonstrate her ability to hit the two cubes 
together in the midline, suggesting that she was still interested in this 
lower level activity with these objects. The second is that she did not 
reject the cubes until the task became more difficult. Although in session 
1 she did not even attempt to secure the third cube she did reveal herself 
incapable of doing so in session 2 on 3 occasions. In neither session 
however did she attempt to secure the third cube by hitting it as she had 
done at 9 months and in the second session at 12 months. In the case of 
item 82 it may be that H had indeed surpassed this particular response, 
seeing the more sophisticated response which she had demonstrated in 
session 1 at 12 months to be more appropriate. If the unreliability of this 
higher level response at 12 months accurately reflects the level of use of 
this action of picking up a third object, it would not be surprising if it was 
not fully consolidated into H's repertoire. It would appear that this may 
have led not only to this skill being compromised but also to its possible 
loss. 
There may be some connection between H's apparent loss of this 
skill and her response to a more advanced cube task at 18 and 21 months. 
At 18 months, although she was very willing to put 9 cubes in the cup 
(item 114), she was far less cooperative when presented with a task which 
required a greater degree of motor skill (item 111: builds tower of 2 cubes). 
Her initial response to E's demonstration and request to imitate this task 
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was to bang the cubes on the table. After a great deal of persuasion she 
eventually attempted to put one cube on top of the other and succeeded -
although with difficulty. She then threw both cubes at her granny who 
was watching this particular session. Two weeks later she refused outright 
even to attempt this task and threw the cubes off the table. 
Three months later, at 21 months, H was no more cooperative on 
this tower building task. In session 1 she initially responded to the cubes 
by picking them up one by one and dropping them onto the table again. 
She then pushed one off the table. When she did eventually put one on 
top of another she immediately knocked it off, looked away, made a silly 
face and dropped the cubes onto the floor. Similarly in session 2, although 
she did build a tower of 2 cubes, when asked to try to place a third on top 
of it, she pointed away and then swiped at the cubes. Clearly H was 
providing herself with little opportunity to improve her performance on 
this task. Rather than try again, when faced with a failure, or a situation 
of potential failure, her response to these tasks was simply to reject them. 
Summary 
It can be seen from the above that H's development in the 12 
months in which it was monitored did not show the steady incremental 
pattern expected by the BSID. In three skill areas in particular- imitation, 
object concept and cube behaviours- there was repeated evidence both of 
unreliability of new developmental acquisitions and apparent failure to 
consolidate these new skills into her behavioral repertoire. 
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CASE STUDY 2 
Subject 12 (N): 9-24 months 
Personal details 
Sex-M 
Karyotype- standard trisomy 21 










44 carries ring to mouth 
45 inspects own hands 
15m 
2 
50 manipulates table edge actively 
55 vocalises attitudes 
62 turns head after fallen spoon 
65 smiles at mirror image 
70 picks up cube deftly and directly 







looks at pictures in book 
looks for fallen spoon 
cooperates in games 
fingers holes in peg board 
pushes car along 









54 picks up cube 
56 retains 2 cubes 
64 reaches for 2nd cube 
67 sustained inspection 
of ring 
69 transfers object 
hand to hand 
70 picks up cube deftly 
and directly 
72 : interest in sound 
. production 
75 looks for fallen spoon 
76 playful response to mirror 
78 manipulates bell : interest 
in detail 
80 pulls string adaptively: 
secures ring 
83 rings bell purposively 
101 jabbers expressively 
21m 
56 retains 2 cubes 
63 lifts inverted cup 
64 reaches for 2nd cube 
66 bangs in play 
67 sustained inspection of ring 
69 transfers objects hand to hand 
72 interest in sound production 
73 lifts cup with handle 
75 looks for fallen spoon 
85 says dada 
86 uncovers toy 
90 puts cube in cup 
92 stirs with spoon in imitation 
93 looks at pictures in book 
97 repeats performance laughed at 
99 pushes car along 
103 turns pages of book 
105 dangles ring by string 
109 removes pellet from bottle 
116 uses gestUres to make wants 
known 
Unstable items 
Items dropped at 12m 
77 retains 2/3 cubes offered 
78 manipulates bell: 
interest in detail 
83 rings bell purposively 
Items dropped at 18m 
56 retains 2 cubes + 
64 reaches for 2nd cube + 
66 bangs in play 
67 sustained inspection of ring + 
177 
24m 
83 rings bell purposively 
87 fingers holes in 
pegboard 
95 attempts to imitate 
scribble 
98 holds crayon adaptively 
99 pushes car along 
100 puts 3 cubes in cup 
102 uncovers blue box 
104 pats whistle doll 
109 removes pellet 
from bottle 
122 attains toy with stick 
Items dropped at 15m 
63 lifts inverted cup 
73 lifts cup with 
handle 
77 retains 2/3 cubes 
offered* 
91 : looks for contents of 
box+ 
Items dropped at 21m 
77 retains 2/3 cubes 
offered * 
78 manipulates bell: interest 
in detail* 
Unstable items (continued) 
items d.ropped at 18m 
72 interest in sound production+ 
77 retains 2/3 cubes offered* 
78 manipulates bell 
interest in detail + 
83 rings bell purposively + 
Items dropped at 24m 
56 retains 2 cubes + 
77 retains 2/3 cubes offered* 
78 manipulates bell 






stirs with.spoon in imitation + 
unwraps cube 
dangles ring by string+ 
Item_.s dropped at 21m 
83 rings bell purposively * 
87 fingers holes in 
pegboard+ 
+ denotes items which were also unreliable at the preceding age level. 
denotes items which were first dropped at a previous age level. 
Subject 8 (N): Analysis of Performance Profiles 
This child's profile of scores represents the clearest example found 
among this group of OS children of a decline in rate of development as 
measured by the BSID. At 9 months N attained a raw score of 69 which 
translates into an MDI of SO. Fifteen months later he had only gained 30 
raw score points, not all of them reliably attained. Even his optimal score 
of 99 at 24 months is too low even to be converted into an extrapolated 
MDI level. The lowest MDI provided by Naglieri (1981) is 28 which would 
require a raw score of 103. 
This child also demonstrated one of the clearest examples of loss of a 
low level skill. At 24 months of age he could not be given credit for item 
56: retains 2 cubes. Despite apparent full engagement in this very simple 
task he was unable simultaneously to retain a one inch cube in each 
hand. His mother confirmed that he had lost this ability, one which he 
had demonstrated at 9 months. He nonetheless passed item 100 (puts 3 or 
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more cubes in the cup) at this age level and made an (unsuccessful) 
attempt at item 111 (builds tower of 2 cubes). 
Before the age of one yearN developed the habit of casting virtually 
every object he was presented with- both in and out of the testing room. 
His mother had been told at this stage that this was just a phase which he 
would soon grow out of. This was not unsound advice; many children, 
handicapped and non-handicapped, do develop this habit which, in 
normal development, usually disappears around 15 months. N was still 
casting 12 months later however by which stage the deleterious effects 
this 'phase' had had on his cognitive and motor development were 
becoming very apparent. He had become extremely skilled at casting itself 
and could propel objects at great speed across the room. He had, however, 
a very rudimentary understanding of the object concept. This is hardly 
surprising given that he rarely retained any object for long enough to 
learn anything about its properties. Despite his slow progress on tasks 
wi:ich tested this sort of skill, he did attain a number of social items at 
each age level which indicated that his level of functioning was not as 
low at all levels as his BSID scores suggested. 
A more qualitative analysis of N's longitudinal BSID performance 
provides a great deal in the way of explanation for this asynchronous 
pattern of cognitive and social development. When presented with the 
cube items at 9 months N was persistent in his attempts both to reach for 
and grasp the cubes. Despite clear evidence of difficulty he managed to 
secure 2 cubes and retain one in each hand for a brief period. Three 
months later, when presented with a single cube, rather than attempt to 
pick it up his response was to fling it off the table. At this point his 
mother suggested that he might take the cube if it was handed directly to 
him. Already at this stage therefore he seemed to have become reluctant 
to pick up objects by himself. In fact on this occasion he did reach for and 
pick up a second cube after E had put one in his other hand - although 
this took several attempts on his part. As N had passed item 84 (listens 
selectively to familiar words), it was necessary to present a further 6 items 
beyond this to establish his ceiling level including item 90 (puts cube in 
cup). Although he did not pass this item his mother reported that he used 
to put his toys into a box when he was younger but that he no longer 
seemed to want to do this. In this first 12 months session N failed 8 items 
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which he went on to pass in the second session administered at this age 
level. Among these was item 70: picks up cube deftly and directly. Despite 
the initial reluctance and ·apparent difficulty which he had shown with 
this task in the first session therefore, it seemed that when he was 
prepared to try, he could pass it easily. In this second session he was also 
far more cooperative on item 91 (looks for contents of box), an item in 
which he had refused to engage in session 1. 
Item 91 was among the three items dropped at 15 months. In both 15 
month sessions he cast the box across the room rather than attempting to 
look for its contents. He also on both occasions immediately swiped the 
cup off the table on presentation with item 63 (lifts inverted cup), whereas 
in sessions 1 and 2 at 12 months, although he did not secure the toy 
hidden under it, he deftly picked up the cup using the handle, thereby 
gaining credit for both items 63 and 73 (lifts cup with handle). He did 
however manage briefly to retain 2 cubes in between bouts of throwing or 
dropping them in session 1 at 15 months. In session 2 he failed both this 
and all other cube items responding by using both hands to scrabble the 
cubes over the table. 
By 18 months N had become almost untestable. In both sessions his 
response to almost every item which involved any sort of manipulation 
of an object was simply to swipe the object from the table or to pick it up 
and throw it across the room. He did, however, pass a number of social 
items at this age level including item 81 (cooperates in games) and item 
89: (responds to verbal request); he also clearly enjoyed the book (items 
93/103: looks at pictures in/turns pages of book). In session 1 the only 
object which he did retain for any length of time was the ring which he 
pulled towards him to secure (item 80) and dangled over the edge of the 
table (item 105). His mother mentioned that he had at home a similar toy 
with a string which he liked to pull. Interestingly, he seemed very unsure 
of this object when it was presented to him 3 months later, at 21 months. 
He did tentatively pull and secure it but he would not copy E's 
demonstration of dangling it over the table. This is particularly 
noteworthy given that in the first of the sessions at this age N was slightly 
more willing to manipulate other test materials. Although he did still 
cast a number of objects he also retained several which he had 
immediately rejected on presentation in earlier sessions. Two weeks later, 
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however, he returned to casting almost every object across the room -
except the ring which he immediately dangled over the table in response 
toE's demonstration - although he did eventually cast this object also. 
During the brief lapse in the casting 'phase' which occurred in 
session 1 at 21 months N provided some evidence as to the possible cause 
of this behaviour which had been so prevalent in previous sessions. N's 
fine motor coordination was very poor. His mother reported that he had 
recently become interested in putting objects into, and removing .objects 
from containers - but that his success rate on this sort of task was very 
low. This was clearly apparent from his attempt at item 100 (puts 3 or 
more cubes in cup). Despite his clear intention to execute this action, 
having picked up a cube, he had great difficulty in controlling the 
movement necessary to transfer it successfully to the cup. Rather than a 
smooth wrist movement he demonstrated more of a throwing action -
aiming the cube at the cup. When presented with item 92 (stirs with 
spoon in imitation), he again seemed to have difficulty with the 
movement necessary to place the spoon inside the cup. Several 
presentations were necessary before he succeeded with this item. His 
coordination was at first so poor that he responded by throwing the spoon 
in frustration. 
As already mentioned, this item, together with almost every other 
item which involved any manipulation of objects, was failed by default in 
session 2 at 21 months due toN's return to the casting response. It also 
disappeared completely at 24 months. In the first session at this age level 
he did not imitate E's demonstration of stirring with the spoon but 
instead seemed to be mimicking an eating action. In session 2 he handed 
both objects back to E without making any attempt to perform the 
response required to pass this item. As at 21 months, there was a marked 
difference between his behaviour in sessions 1 and 2 at this age leveL 
Whereas in the first session he was at least willing to attempt several 
items (items 83: rings bell; 91: looks for contents of box; 107: puts beads in 
box; 111: builds tower of 2 cubes) these same items were failed two weeks 
later because he immediately cast the objects on presentation or handed 
them back to E. Given that he had encountered such difficulty with these 
items in session 1, his response in session 2 is, in a sense, understandable. 
Despite his perseverance on items 92 and 111 in session 1, both of which 
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required a high degree of fine motor coordination, he met w~th little 
success. In that first 21 months session he also needed a considerable 
amount of persuasion before he would attempt item 100 (puts 3 or more 
cubes in cup) and as he was performing this task he pointed away several 
times in an attempt to divert E's attention away from the task. This item 
was in fact among the few he attempted in session 2 although in this 
session, his actions were far less controlled. After initially responding to 
the cubes by carelessly throwing them across the table he then decided to 
aim several at the cup and succeeded in placing 2. 
Summary 
A great deal of fluctuation is evident in this S's test performance, not 
only in terms of his approach to specific items but also in his general 
response to being asked to perform actions on objects. At 9 months he was 
willing to try, despite ~eing rewarded with little success. By 12 months, 
the effects of persistent failure were beginning to show: he had become 
reluctant even to atte~pt tasks which, when he did try, he could . 
occasionally perform successfully. At 15 and 18 months he seem_ed to 
have given up altogether and simply cast every object that was presented 
to him. By 21 months he had become slightly more willing to cooperate, 
but seemed to have 'off days' when he would return to casting in spite of 
his growing interest in objects and their properties. At 24 months the 
casting behaviour was gradually being replaced by a less aggressive, 
almost more resigned rejection response where he would simply return 
objects to whomever had presented them to him. 
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CASE STUDY 3 
Subject 18 (S): 36-54months 
Personal details 
Sex- F 
Karyotype- standard trisomy 21 








115 : closes round box 
117 : shows shoes 
42m 
2 
122 : attains toy with stick 
125 : imitates crayon stroke 
126 : follows doll directions 
134 : pegs placed in 30 sees 
48m 
117 : shows shoes 
120 : pink board:places 
round block 
123 : pegs placed in 42 sees 
125 : imitates crayon stroke 
129 : blue board: places 2 round 
& 2 square blocks 
132 : points to 3 pictures 
135 : differentiates scribble 
from stroke 



















builds tower of 2 cubes 
pegs placed in 42 sees 
blue board : places 2 
round & 2 square blocks 
points to 3 pictures 
pink board: completes 
broken doll : mends approx 
blue board : places 6 blocks 
pink board : places 
round block 
names 1 picture 
points to 3 pictures 
differentiates scribble 
from stroke 
142 : blue board: places 
6 blocks 
147 : imitates crayon strokes: 
vertical & horizontal 
161 : builds tower of 8 cubes 
Unstable items 
Items dropped at 42in 
117 : shows shoes + 
125 : imitates crayon stroke + 
127 : uses words to make 
wants known 
134 : pegs placed in 30 sees+ 
Items droppea at 54m 
117 : shows shoes + 
127 : uses words to make 
wants known * 
133 : broken doll : mends 
marginally * 
140 : broken doll: mends approx * 
Items dropped at 48m 
127 : uses words to make 
wants known * 
133 broken doll : 
mends marginally 
137 pink board : completes + 
140 broken doll: mends approx + 
142 blue board: places 
6 blocks+ 
+ denotes items which were also unreliable at the preceding age level 
denotes items which were first dropped at a previous age level. 
Subject 18 (S): Analysis of Performance Profiles 
It will be recalled from Chapter 5 that this subject produced very 
different test and retest protocols at both 42 and 54 months (see p ). 
Whereas the scores attained in the first sessions administered at these age 
levels suggested that no developmental progress had been made, S's 
optimal score profile revealed that she was in fact acquiring new items 
over this and indeed every 6 monthly interval. At the same time, 
however, a large number of items disappeared from her protocol over 
adjacent pairs of ages which prevented these new acquisitions from 
making much impression on her scores. 
A strong relationship was found to exist between items on which S's 
performance was found to change over closely spaced intervals and items 
which dropped out between age levels. 
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Items dropped between 36 and 42 months 
Between 36 and 42 months S dropped item 117 (shows shoes), item 
125 (imitates crayon stroke), item 127 (uses words to make wants known) 
and item 134 (places pegs in 30 seconds). Only item 127 had been reliably 
produced at 36 months: her performance had changed in a fail-to-pass 
direction on item 134 and in the opposite direction on items 117 and 125. 
Item 117: shows shoes 
It will be recalled that item 117 was among those on which many 
children's performance was found to be both unreliable and unstable. 
There also appeared to be some correspondence between the emergence of 
more difficult discrimination skills and the loss of this item. A 
particularly interesting pattern emerged from S's profile in relation to 
this specific item. 
In the first of the two sessions administered at 36 months, S clearly 
and willingly pointed to her shoes when asked. Her response in session 2, 
however, was not sufficiently clear to be credited with a pass; after some 
delay she simply moved her hand in the direction of her feet but 
continued to look at E. 
When item 117 was presented 6 months later, even this response 
seemed to have disappeared although it did reappear when the picture 
cards were presented (item 132: points to 2 pictures). When asked to point 
to the picture of the shoe S did so and then after some delay pointed 
under the table at her feet although at the time she was looking in 
another direction. A similar response was observed two weeks later 
although on this occasion she refused to point to any of the pictures (she 
had pointed to 3 in session 1). At 48 months item 117 was passed in both 
sessions but in session 1 S responded to the picture item by turning the 
card round and round on the table in an obvious attempt to avoid the 
task. Item 132 was, however, passed in session 2. 
S again rejected the picture cards in the first session administered at 
54 months - but this time also did not respond at all to E's request to point 
to her shoes. This occurred again in s.ession 2 although in this session, 
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when presented with the picture item, she actually named the shoe and 
then pointed to her own shoe. 
One explanation for the apparent disappearance of S's response to 
item 117 may be that as she became able to point to and discriminate 
pictures, she became reliant on this pictorial information as an aid in 
discriminating actual objects. It may be that as she learned to discriminate 
pictures of objects she was also taught to point to a 'real life' example of 
whatever was represented in the picture. As she became more competent 
with this method, however, she lost the ability to directly associate words 
and objects. 
Item 125: imitates crayon stroke 
This item is presented after the child has been given an opportunity 
to scribble spontaneously (item 112). On a new piece of paper E draws a 
line with the crayon and indicates to the child that he/she is to imitate. 
At 36 months S clearly passed item 112 in session 1. She also briefly 
imitated E's demonstration for item 125 before returning to scribbling. 
When this item was presented in the second 36 month session, however, 
she preferred to continue to scribble and would not repeat the crayon 
stroke produced 2 weeks earlier. 
Six months later, when presented with this item in both sessions, S 
again continued to scribble, leaving E in no doubt that she was simply 
refusing to cooperate. Her father stated several times during the first 
session that it was very difficult to know what S could and could not do as 
she so often refused to perfomt tasks when asked. 
She demonstrated a similar refusal to cooperate in a more advanced 
task with the crayon and paper at 48 months. In session 1 she was given 
credit for both items 125 and 135 (differentiates scribble from stroke). The 
more difficult item could not be presented in session 2, however, as S 
firstly grabbed the crayon from E's hand (she was already holding one 
herself) and then when she eventually did return it, refused to allow E to 
demonstrate a scribble. 
A further 6 months later S was again reluctant to cooperate on the 
crayon and paper items, preferring to continue to scribble than to attend 
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to E's demonstration. After some delay she did pass item 147 (imitates 
crayon strokes: vertical and horizontal) but this success was not repeated 
in session 2 when she would not fully attend to the demonstration and 
was intent on drawing curved lines around the page. 
Item 134.: pegs placed in 30 seconds 
In this item credit is given for the best time achieved in 3 trials at 
placing 6 pegs in their holes. In the first 2 trials presented in the first 
session at 36 months S completed the task quite skilfully but took more 
than 30 seconds to do so in each case. She caused problems for herself in 
trfal 3 by attempting to carry out the task with 2 pegs in each hand. Her 
eventual response in this case was to cast the pegs. In session 2 S 
completed the same task within 30 seconds in one of the 3 trials (a credit). 
At 42 months she would only complete one trial in each session- in 
both cases attaining considerably slower times than attained in the second 
session 6 months previously. When this task was first presented at 48 
months, after having placed several pegs, S accidentally knocked the row 
of pegs which were lying by the side of the peg board and they started to 
roll across the table. This distracted her and she insisted on putting them 
back in a neat row before she would continue. Consequently her time was 
again very slow. In the second and third trials she seemed more intent on 
removing and replacing the pegs rather than finishing the task. Two 
weeks later S seemed to have genuine difficulty with this task. After 
placing 3 pegs she seemed to be unable to aim the remaining 3 at the 
holes and she therefore pulled out the ones she had already placed. She 
had to be persuaded to attempt this task a second time compledng it in 
around 45 seconds. She would not give this task a third try. 
Items dropped between 42 and 48 months 
Between 42 and 48 months S dropped 4 items: items 133/140: mends 
broken doll marginally I approximately; item 137: pink board: completes: 
item 142: blue board: places 6 blocks. Only item 133 had been reliably 
passed at 42 months. 
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Items 133/140: broken doll: mends marginally/approximately 
Item 133 was also passed on both· occasions at 36 months. Because S 
had placed the doll's head on upside down in session 1 however, she was 
not also credited with item 140. In factS attempted to correct her error but 
encountered difficulty, possibly because the doll's head is so small. In 
session 2 she placed it on the right way up and was credited for having 
'mended' the doll approximately. 
At 42 months S passed item 140 in session 1 but in session 2 she 
could only be given credit for item 133 for her brief attempt at this task 
which she terminated by handing the doll to E. 
At 48 and 54 months she cast the doll every time it was presented to 
her. 
Item 137: pink board: completes 
In this task the form board is presented to the child with all 3 shapes 
(circle, square, triangle) in place. Each shape is then removed and placed 
opposite its own form on the table between the board and the child. 
In session 1 at 36 months S completed this task apparently by using 
the position cues: rather than matching each shape to its corresponding 
form she seemed to be using the position of the shapes along the side of 
the board to guide her. She successfully used this strategy again in session 
2 and in the first session administered at 42 months. She could not, 
however, be given credit for this item in the second 42 month session 
because, although she put the square and triangular blocks near their 
forms on the board, she did not fit them correctly. 
By 48 months S seemed to have genuine difficulty with this item. 
There was no evidence of the _position strategy used at earlier ages. After a 
few unsuccessful attempts to place the blocks she eventually lost interest 
and looked away. In session 2 she immediately cast all 3 blocks without 
even attempting the task. 
Six months later S threatened to reject this task when it was first 
presented - laughing and pointing away. She did nevertheless settle into 
an attempt which was not successful. She became very frustrated with the 
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square block which she had placed incorrectly over its form. Rather than 
adjust its position she hit and pushed at it very hard. She behaved 
similarly with the triangle which she had also incorrectly placed over its 
form, responding in the same way to this task when it was presented two 
weeks later. On this occasion she then pointed away and pushed the board 
away from her whereas in the previous session she behaved as though 
she had completed the task despite the two blocks which were not 
correctly placed. 
Item 142: blue board: places 6 blocks 
A similar sequence of unsuccessful attempts and rejections was 
observed in S's response to this second form board task which involves 
placing 5 round and 4 square blocks. Whenever she encountered 
difficulty she simply either cast the blocks or pushed the board away from 
her. Her most successful attempt at this task was seen in session 2 at 42 
months when she correctly placed 6 of the 9 blocks. On this occasion she 
initially appeared to know exactly where each block should be placed. 
Having made one mistake, however, she seemed to lose confidence in 
her ability to complete the task and after making several more 
unsuccessful attempts, rejected it. At 42 months, rather than adjusting the 
position of incorrectly placed blocks, she attempted to fit them by pushing 
them very hard against the board, as in item 137. 
Interestingly, at 54 months, S seemed to be attempting to apply to 
this task the strategy which she had used at earlier ages on the pink form 
board task. Unlike that task in which all the blocks are placed in front of 
the child, examiners are instructed in this item to hand each block to the 
child individually. Having been handed one block, S refused to continue 
with the task until the remaining 8 blocks were placed alongside the 
board (although not in line with their matching hole). This arrangement 
did not, however, seem to be for the purpose of visually matching the 
blocks and their forms - her attempts to push round blocks into square 
holes would seem to indicate that she did not understand the concept of 
shape. Instead it appeared that S was working on the same principles 
which she had earlier applied to the 3-shape form board task. 
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Summary 
From this child's longitudinal profile it is possible to see a dear link 
between unreliable and unstable performance. A large number of the 
items on which her performance was seen to change over closely-spaced 
intervals were also those which later dropped out. The repeated evidence 
of unsuccessful attempts at many of these tasks strongly suggests that the 
link between early unreliability and subsequent instability may be a causal 
one with failure to reliably produce skills when first acquired leading in 
turn to a failure to consolidate these skills adequately into the behavioral 
repertoire. 
OVERVIEW 
The aim of the analyses presented in this chapter of DS longitudinal 
performance on the BSID was to focus on the possible relationship 
between unreliable performance on specific BSID items and the apparent 
later loss of these same items from the DS child's behavioural repertoire. 
As was the case in the smaller-scale cross-sectional study reported in 
Chapter 4, DS test-rete:st reliability was found to be significantly lower 
than that reported for non-handicapped children. This variability of 
performance was found, to a large degree, to be attributable toSs' failure 
to engage in tasks in one or other of the two sessions. In fact the 
prevalence of such failures by default may have meant that even the low 
level of reliability found is an overestimate. Given that unreliability does 
seem to be characteristic of the performance of DS children, both in and 
out of the testing room, there is little reason to assume that even two 
short testing sessions will necessarily demonstrate its full extent. In this 
study failures by default were often found to have occurred on both 
occasions of testing, leading to 'reliable' performance yet clearly 
producing a measure which did not reflect the extent to which children 
were not performing to full competence. 
There is equally little reason to assume that repeated failure to 
reproduce items which had been passed at earlier age levels necessarily 
indicates that Ss have genuinely lost these skills from their behavioural 
repertoires. As suggested in the introduction item loss may simply be 
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explained in terms of failure on the part of the test materials - which. were 
selected for use ~ith much younger non-handicapped children - to 
interest the older handicapped child. Alternatively, as Bayley suggested, 
the level of the item itself may be inappropriately low for the child who 
has advanced onto more complex activities with the objects presented. 
Neither of the above explanations can, however, account for the 
finding that failure to engage was found to account for only 16% of 
instances of item loss. The result of this particular analysis contrasts 
markedly with that found for the analysis of unreliable performance over 
closely-spaced testing sessions in which failure to engage was recorded in 
64% of cases. Although, in itself this finding cannot necessarily be 
interpreted to indicate that skills were genuinely lost, evidence emerged 
from subsequent analyses to support the suggestion that they were indeed 
lost. 
More qualitative analyses of failures to engage in fact indicated that 
Ss were not avoiding specific items because the test materials themselves 
were inappropriate. Responses often seemed to vary more in relation to 
the tasks than to the objects used in certain items. Failure to engage was 
far less prevalent, for example, on item 102 (uncovers blue box) than it 
was on item 107 (puts beads in box). Almost 60% of children who were 
presented with the latter item either refused to attempt the task of placing 
6 small beads into a small hole in the lid of the box, or 'opted out' of the 
task before completing it. Far fewer children (13%) rejected this same 
object after watching E hide a small toy inside it. In fact many of the older 
children in this sample enjoyed playing with the blue box when it was 
presented for the discrimination item (144/ 152: discriminates 2/3: cup, 
plate, box). Items 144/152 were nevertheless among those most frequently 
failed by default; a common response to the objects was to play 'tea sets' 
rather than to cooperate in the discrimination task. There was a similar 
pattern with the jointed doll. Item 126 involved following E's 
instructions to place the jointed doll on a chair, give it a drink and wipe 
its nose. This item was a particular favourite and yet this same doll 
became especially unpopular when the task required pointing to parts of 
its face and body. 
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From the above examples, it would appear that something other 
than item-unsuitability was responsible for the avoidance of certain items 
by DS Ss. A more likely explanation is that by failing to engage in such 
items Ss were avoiding the possibility of failure. In doing so it is possible 
that they were depriving themselves of a vital element in the process of 
consolidation (see below). 
The absence of evidence to suggest that children had surpassed these 
items also supports the argument that they may genuinely have been lost. 
As a large number of cases of item loss involved the sorts of low-level 
cube skills which Bayley herself had identified to be those which older 
children are likely to have surpassed, these items were given particular 
attention in the analyses carried out here. In a substantial proportion of 
cases in which such items did drop out there was little evidence to suggest 
that this had occurred because children had advanced onto more complex 
activities with the same task objects. Even in cases in which a low-level 
cube item was dropped and replaced by a more complex item, almost 
without ~xception the higher level item was not produced reliably. This 
finding is very much at -variance with the implicit suggestion that by 
surpassing low-level items children are showing themselves to be 
. motivated to demonstrate their newly acquired higher level of skill. 
Failure to reproduce newly acquired skills reliably, by contrast, would 
seem to indicate that the DS child is not as motivated- which in turn may 
imply that s/he has encountered some difficulty in acquiring these 
abilities in the first instance. 
Moreover, there is reason to suggest that even in cases where lower 
level items are replaced by items of apparently higher levels of 
complexity, this does not necessarily indicate that the absent item is still 
within the child's repertoire of skills. As Garwood (1982) stresses, the 
order in which items appear in the BSID is not based on any theoretical 
developmental sequence but is instead based on relative difficulty levels. 
Items are arranged on the basis of their ability to reflect an increase in the 
percentage of passes with increasing age. This sequence, which was 
determined by the performance of the BSID standardisation sample does 
not therefore imply that the skills tested should be acquired in an 
invariant order. Bayley herself stated that the sequential order only holds 
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when the items are sufficiently far apart on the difficulty scale to 
constitute manifestations of different levels of ability. In the absence of 
any guidelines as to how to determine whether items are sufficiently far 
apart, the issue of surpassed items becomes somewhat ambiguous. 
Although, as stated above, items testing cube behaviours were specifically 
identified as the sorts of items which children are likely to surpass, no 
explanation is offered for the overlap between the range of age 
placements covered by lower and higher level cube items. Item 82 
(attempts to secure 2 of 3 cubes offered), for example, has an age 
placement range of 5 - 14 months which overlaps quite considerably with 
the age placement range of 10 -19 months provided for item 111 (builds 
tower of 2 cubes). This degree of overlap would seem to indicate that the 
two items are not sufficiently far apart on the difficulty scale to imply any 
sequential order in acquisition - which in turn implies that ability to pass 
the 'lower' item is not a necessary prerequisite for passing the 'higher' 
one. In addition the overlap between the age placement ranges indicates 
that some children in the standardisation sample may indeed have 
attained these two skills in 'reverse' order. 
There is no reason to assume, therefore, that by passing item 111 the 
child has necessarily demonstrated that the skills required to pass item 82 
are within his/her repertoire. If the 'lower' level item is not a pre-
requisite for the 'more complex' item 111, it may well be the case that a 
child has not yet acquired or may even have lost the ability to pass item 
82, but has gained the ability to build a tower of cubes. This suggests that 
the issue of surpassed items should be viewed with extreme caution by 
examiners testing groups of children suspected to have consolidation 
difficulties. Rather than having advanced onto a higher level of 
complexity of skill it may simply be the case that the DS child acquires one 
skill, only to lose another, related skill 
If it is the case that skills are dropping out and are being replaced by 
other, similar skills this could indicate that the OS child has not seen how 
the two skills interrelate. Whether or not they are acquired in any 
invariant order it is likely that two similar skills should have some carry 
over of understanding from one to the other. This point may best be 
illustrated by another example. At 15 months, H - one of the Ss followed 
as an individual case study - dropped two object concept items (item 86: 
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uncovers toy; age placement 6 - 12 months; item 88: picks up cup: secures 
cube; age placement 6 - 14 months) but gained another item testing the 
same kind of skill (item 96: unwraps cube; age placement 8 - 17 months). 
Because, as with the cube items discussed above, the age placement ranges 
overlap, there is no reason to assume that these items should be acquired 
in the order in which they appear in the test. For the same reason, 
however, simply by demonstrating herself capable of passing item 96, H 
cannot be assumed to have necessarily surpassed the two 'lower level' 
items. It might, nevertheless, be argued that the child is likely to apply 
this skill to a task which requires removing an object from inside another 
object, a tissue, for example, having initially acquired the simple skill 
involved in retrieving an object hidden under the tissue. 
This did not seem to have occurred in H's case. Instead her 
performance indicated that she had lost the 'uncovering' skills but gained 
the 'unwrapping' one- suggesting that she did not understand the way in 
which the two were related. Rather than having acquired an 
understanding of the object concept, what may instead have been 
acquired was a set of strategies for carrying out each separate task. Such an 
explanation lends support to Morss' suggestion that the DS child learns in 
an incomplete way- that success reflects more of an ability to perform the 
required actions than an understanding of the concepts underlying these 
actions. 
A similar explanation may apply to the relationship which emerged 
between unreliable and unstable performance. In a substantial proportion 
of instances of item loss it was found that the same items had been pass.ed 
on only one occasion at the preceding age level. Not every item on which 
performance was seen to change over closely-spaced intervals was 
subsequently lost and not every case of item loss was preceded by an 
unreliable performance at an earlier age but a high degree of 
correspondence between these two performance factors was identified. 
Given that unreliability does seem to be a characteristic of DS children's 
approach to many cognitive tasks both in and out of the testing room it 
may well be that by failing to regularly rehearse and explore newly 
acquired skills the DS child does not adequately complete the learning 
process necessary for the consolidation of newly acquired skills. If 
unreliability and instability are causally linked in this way, this strongly 
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implies that attention should be focussed ~n unreliability as a problem in 
itself; on its possible causes and on the ways in which it may prevent 
consolidation of new learning. 
Findings presented earlier in this thesis have indicated that the 
tendency to avoid cognitive tasks may be related to an imbalance in the 
success I failure ratio experienced during skill acquisition. Unlike the 
normally developing child who is able to maintain a sufficient level of 
success to provide the incentive to continue to learn, it has been proposed 
that the DS child, by nature of the handicapping condition, too often 
experiences failure and thereby loses the motivation to persevere. In this 
study, however there was evidence from the qualitative analyses of DS 
performance, that the origin of this problem may not always be cognitive. 
The performance of the second child followed as a case study - N - can be 
used to illustrate this point. N was often unable to perform a given task 
not, it appeared, because he did not have the cognitive skills to pass that 
task but because of his motor disabilities. He clearly demonstrated his 
intention to learn about the properties of objects as containers - his 
mother's report confirmed this intention - but. his attempts to explore this 
new interest were hindered by his inability to coordinate his actions: N's 
response to failures of this sort was to reject the task. 
Given that erring is believed to be as essential a part of the learning 
process as success, it is possible that by constantly avoiding failure N was 
depriving himself of a yital source of information about the properties of 
containers- his own errors. By attending only to his successes he was able 
to learn only what can ?e done with containers and nothing about the 
properties that they do not possess. In this way N was preventing 
completion of the accommodation - assimilation sequence which Piaget 
has proposed is necessary before a child can achieve a full understanding 
of why it is that a successful action is successful. The majority of N's 
failures could not be termed as 'errors' in the Piagetian sense - they were 
brought about by his motor difficulties. Nonetheless there seems no 
reason to assume that his response to the sorts of errors which are 
encountered in normal co.gnitive development - errors which normally 
developing children capitalise on and learn from - would be any different 
from those which were due to his inability to coordinate his actions, i.e to 
reject them. 
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Many other Ss demonstrated similar levels of difficulty with the 
motor components of specific tasks. Item 107 (puts beads in box), it will be · 
recalled, was avoided in almost 60% of cases in which it was presented. To 
be credited for passing this task the child is required to place a maximum 
of 6 (out of 8) 1 centimetre beads into a hole (approximately 2 em. in 
diameter) in the lid of a box. By comparison item 114 (puts 9 cubes in cup), 
a very similar task was only avoided in 7 out of 38 cases (13%). Although 
this particular item did present difficulties for several children (N being a 
clear example), it was rejected less often- possibly because the ohjects used 
in this task were easier to handle than those in item 107. 
This is not to imply that the cognitive deficit in DS can be solely 
attributed to difficulties encountered as a result of the motor deficit. DS is 
considered primarily to be a mentally handicapping condition with 
associated motor difficulties. The significance of the motor deficit is in its 
role in bringing about errors which have little contribution to make to 
the overall process of development. Instead of making a positive 
contribution to learning by clarifying what has still to be learnt, errors 
merely add to the child's awareness of his/her own difficulties in 
learning situations. The response to this experience would seem to be 
simply to avoid entering such situations. 
It will be recalled that Cunningham (1979) reached a similar 
conclusion from his study of early reaching in DS babies. He explained the 
frequent absence of the visually directed stage in reaching in early infancy 
in terms of a mismatch between intention and ability. Poor success rates 
experienced during attempts to execute the intended action, it was 
proposed, resulted in the eventual extinction of the reaching response. 
The results of the present study suggest that the mismatch between 
intention and ability may continue throughout early development in DS 
children - with the eventual outcome being failure to consolidate skills 
and a subsequently poor level of understanding of the interrelationships 
between differing levels of similar skills. 
If this is the case, it clearly implies that attention should be directed 
not only towards encouraging the development of new skills but also at 
ensuring that the learning process is allowed to run its full course - that 
newly acquired skills are fully learned and fully consolidated. The next 
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chapter will return to the starting point of this thesis, errorless learning, 
in an attempt to determine whether by artificially increasing the 
success/ failure ratio experienced by DS children in learning, it is possible 
to prevent the avoidance response and its subsequent adverse effects on 




It will be recalled that in the first study p~esented in this thesis (study 
1, Chapter 2) the efficacy of two differing strategies for teaching 
discrimination were compared: errorless and trial-and-error learning. In 
that study children in the DS group were observed to respond positively 
to the errorless learning strategy, attaining comparatively better scores, 
both in training and in post-tests, than in a similar trial-and-error task. 
This is perhaps unsurprising; the recent popularity of the technique can 
be taken as an indication of its effectiveness in teaching skills which 
children with mental handicap have had difficulty learning by trial-and-
error. However, it will be recalled that a more interesting pattern of 
results emerged from analysis of the effects of order of presentation of the 
two strategies: initial experience of errorless learning had an enhancing 
effect on DS performance on a subsequently presented trial-and-error task, 
with children presented with the tasks in this order producing 
consistently better scores both on the errorless and trial-and-error tasks 
than children experiencing these two tasks in reverse order. There was 
little evidence of such an effect being present in the scores of the non-
handicapped group indicating a difference between the two populations 
in the extent to which performance is affected by differential levels of 
success and failure. 
The studies to be presented in this chapter aim to extend these 
earlier findings; firstly, by investigating whether any gains demonstrated 
from the use of an errorless procedure have any real learning value in 
terms of a/ the stability of what has been learned and b/ the transferability 
of that learning to other related tasks, and secondly, by comparing the 
response to errorless learning of two mentally handicapped groups of 
differing aetiologies, aDS group, and a non-DS group. As the results from 
study 1 indicated that the errorless learning strategy had no particular 
advantages for use with the non-handicapped group there seemed little 
point in including another control group of normal children. It was 
therefore decided to use a control group of non-DS mentally handicapped 
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subjects. (The reasons for introducing this second group of mentally 
handicapped subjects will be discussed in full below). 
This thesis has placed particular emphasis on the unreliability of the 
performance of children with DS in assessment situations. In the studies 
presented in Chapters 3-6 children were frequently observed to withhold 
demonstration of optimal performance on specific test items. This, it has 
been suggested, may be due to the increased experience of failure 
encountered during the early stages of learning, with DS children 
developing a tendency to avoid situations in which they may encounter 
further experience of failure. It has also been suggested that poor 
engagement may be a characteristic of learning in general in DS, affecting 
both the acquisition and consolidation stages of learning. Teaching 
strategies such as errorless learning could therefore play an important 
role in preventing this tendency to avoid situations in which failure is 
likely thereby overcoming poor engagement both during skill acquisition 
and once specific skills have been acquired. Artificial enhancement of 
success/failure ratios could prevent avoidance becoming the routine 
response to difficult learning situations. A possible outcome of this more 
'balanced' experience of success/ failure may be that children might 
become less reluctant to reproduce the skills they have learned, thereby 
increasing the probability that these skills will be fully consolidated. 
Although results from the errorless learning study presented in 
Chapter 2 were encouraging, they were not sufficient as proof of the 
intrinsic value of a success-only strategy as a method of enhancing 
learning ability. Throughout this thesis a great deal of emphasis has been 
placed on the role played by erring in the process of learning. Support for 
this viewpoint was offered by Morss (1979) who suggested that learning in 
DS children often seemed to be incomplete and that this may be 
attributable to their tendency to avoid learning situations in which failure 
is likely to be encountered. This failure to appreciate the significance of 
errors means it may not be possible for these children to fully understand 
success when it does occur. Teaching children to learn in the absence of 
error would not therefore seem an ideal sol uti on to this particular 
problem. 
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In a similar vein, however, if, due to an exaggerated experience of 
failure, DS children are reluctant to demonstrate particular skills during 
the initial stages of their acquisition, it is equally unlikely that any 
successes achieved will be fully capitalised on. Perhaps in the case of these 
children it is more important to ensure success, whether or not it is 
initially fully understood, in an attempt to increase the reliability of 
production of specific skills. Having confidently 'mastered' these skills 
through repeated success, the child may be in a better position to deal 
with the errors necessary for the completion of the learning process. 
Indeed this was implied by the superior trial-and-error results attained by 
children who had had prior experience of errorless learning in study 1. 
Given the recent popularity of the errorless learning strategy, it 
seems surprising that so few studies have attempted to assess its long -
term or its carry over effects. Of the small number of case studies which 
have reported positive post-training results, there appears to have been 
little or no mention of the stability of achievements ~ade with this 
technique. The first of the two experiments to be presented here addresses 
this issue by investigating whether skills learned in an errorless way will 
be reliably demonstrated in re-tests up to six weeks following initial 
training. The second will investigate whether children can transfer the 
discrimination skills learned with the errorless procedure to a second, 
errorless task with any degree of saving. 
Both studies will compare the efficacy of the errorless technique in 
two distinct populations of mentally handicapped children. Until now 
this thesis has focussed on a single aetiol.ogical form of mental handicap. 
Because DS is identifiable at birth, this section of the mentally 
handicapped population is particularly suitable for a developmental 
investigation of the relationship between motivation and cognitive 
development. Although the mentally handicapped in general have 
frequently been observed to demonstrate poor motivation, further 
research would be necessary to determine whether the 
competence/performance patterns found in the studies here also exist in 
mentally handicapped groups of other aetiologies. Comparison of the 
response of DS and non-DS mentally handicapped children to a strategy 
designed to manipulate motivational variables may, however, provide 
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some indication of any similarities or differences in the extent to which 
non-cognitive factors may be affecting cognitive performance in other 
mentally handic~pped groups. If performance factors prove to be similar 
this would suggest that findings from DS research studies may well be 
generalisable to other sections of the mentally handicapped population. 
In study 1 errorless procedures were used to teach discriminations 
both of a common shape and of a previously unseen nonsense figure. For 
three reasons it was decided in the present study to use nonsense stimuli 
only. Firstly, this avoided any possible confounding effects on test 
performance of differential levels of prior learning experience (see 
Chapter 2 p.40); unlike common concepts such as shape or colour, it could 
be guaranteed that all subjects were equally unfamiliar with the nonsense 
stimuli. Secondly, it allowed investigation of the effectiveness of the 
procedure itself, in isolation from any possible effect of its interaction 
with experiential factors; no child could have had any previous learning 
history - either positive or negative - with the discrimination under 
study. The use of stimuli with which all subjects were equally unfamiliar 
had the third advantage of allowing a wide age range of subjects to be 
tested. It will be recalled that in study 1 subjects had been selected for 
inclusion in the experiment if they were able to demonstrate some 
knowledge of shapes but were unable as yet to discriminate the particular 
shape, a rectangle, used in training. Such a selection process could 
obviously not distinguish betweeR subjects who were performing to full 
competence in the selection pre-test and truly did not yet know how to 
discriminate a rectangle, and any who were in fact able to discriminate the 
shape but, for whatever reason, would not demonstrate this ability. As 
findings from study 1 had indicated that older subjects were more likely 
to underperform, the use of nonsense stimuli has the advantage that it 
places no limitations on the range of subjects' mental and chronological 
ages, thereby allowing investigation of any possible age effects. 
In summary the aims of the present study were as follows: 
1. to attempt to replicate the success of the errorless learning technique 
demonstrated in study 1 with a wider age range of subjects. 
2. to investigate any differences between DS and non-DS mentally 
handicapped children in response to errorless learning. 
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3. to investigate the long-term stability of achievements made with 
errorless learning in the two handicap groups. . 
STUDY 6a - THE STABILITY OF ERRORLESS LEARNING 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Eight DS and eight non-DS mentally handicapped children took part 
in this study. Both groups of children were selected from three Edinburgh 
special schools. The DS group consisted of 4· females and 4 males; age 
range 6 - 16 years (mean age 11.25 years). The age range of the 5 female and 
3 male subjects in the non-DS group was 6- 17 years (mean age 11.5 years). 
It will be recalled that, in study 1, direct mental age matching of 
handicapped and non-handicapped children was avoided on theoretical 
grounds and subjects matched by means of a task-related selection test. 
Because nonsense syllables were being used this was not possible in the 
present experiment. The two subject groups were matched therefore on 
the basis of teachers' ratings. Teachers were informed of the aims of the 
study and asked to select non-DS mentally handicapped children who 
were similar in general ability levels to the children with DS selected for 
study. 
It was felt prudent also to obtain a second measure of overall ability 
level in the event of two teacher-matched children performing very 
differently in the discrimination tasks. The accuracy of teacher matches 
was therefore assessed by determining the mental age levels attained by Ss 
on the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (K-ABC) and 
comparing these across matches. The mental age matching of two groups 
of mentally handicapped children, although by no means ideal, is perhap? 
less vulnerable to criticism than MA matches of mentally handicapped 
children to non-handicapped children who inevitably are very much 
younger. The differences expected between the two groups of handicapped 
children in terms of individual learning histories and motivational 
factors would be less than between a handicapped and a non-handicapped 
group. To some extent this might compensate for the fact that their 
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abilities are being measured with reference to those of a 'normal' 
population i.e. by a psychometric assessment test. 
Procedure 
Procedure was identical to that used in the errorless nonsense figure 
discrimination task presented in study 1 (seep ) except that pre-tests were 
included in the present study. This was done for two reasons: firstly, it 
enabled evaluation of within-session effects of errorless training; 
secondly, it provided a measure of the long-term stability of skills learned 
in training through comparison of pre- test scores obtained in sessions 2, 3 
and 4 with session 1 post-test scores. 
Trial sets each consisted of one target stimulus - a 'wug' - together 
with two alternative nonsense figures. In training the alternative stimuli 
were 'faded in' on the basis of size. 
The experiment took place over a 6 week period. In the first session, 
after being presented with the pre-test, all subjects were trained by 
errorless learning procedures to discriminate the 'wug' from two 
alternative nonsense stimuli. They were given the post-test immediately 
following training. Re-tests were administered a week and a fortnight 
following initial training sessions. Subjects were retrained in the 
discrimination if they did not achieve 100% on the pre-test at the 
beginning of each of these re-testing sessions. Pressures of time-tabling 
meant that DS subjects only could be presented with a further re-test three 
weeks after the third session (i.e. 6 weeks after the initial training session). 
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RESULTS 
All responses in the pre-tests, training and post-tests were used in 
the analysis. As in the earlier errorless learning study, pre- and post-test 
scores were expressed as the number of correct responses made and 
training scores were expressed as percentages (correct responses/ total 
responses) .1 
Subject matching 
Performance in the initial session was investigated for differences 
that may have indicated any inaccuracies in matching across the DS and 
non-DS groups. No significant differences were found between pre- or 
post-test raw scores attained by the two groups (t = 0.406, df 14, NS; 
t = 0.457, df 14, NS respectively- see Table 7:1). A further comparison of 
pre-/post-test differences in individual subjects did not reveal any trend 
in favour of either group (t = 0.114, NS) indicating that for the purposes of 
this study, subject matches were satisfactory. Comparison of mental age 
scores attained on the K-ABC also revealed no significant differences 
between groups, adding further support for the validity of teachers' 
original ratings. 
1Thanks to Rachelle Walker for her help in the collection of some of the da ta 
reported in this chapter (see also Walker 1989). 
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Table 7:1 
'Wug' Discrimination: Effects of Training on Subsequent Performan ce 
Pre- and Post Test Scores 
OS Subjects 
Session: 1 2 3 4 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre 
1 1 7 7 7 7 
2 0 6 4 5 2 7 7 
3 3 7 7 7 7 
4 3 6 7 7 7 
5 4 7 7 7 7 
6 1 7 7 7 7 
7 3 7 7 7 2 
8 3 2 4 5 7 7 
Non-DS Subjects 
Session 1 2 3 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
1 3 7 2 7 7 
2 1 7 7 7 
3 3 7 3 6 7 
4 2 5 2 7 7 
5 0 7 7 7 
6 6 7 7 7 
7 2 7 7 7 
8 4 6 7 7 
Session 1 
Training scores 
Table 7:2 shows the percentage of correct responses during training 
trials for both OS and non-OS groups over 3 sessions. Although both 
groups responded positively to the errorless strategy in the first session, t-
test comparison of training scores attained in this session revealed a 
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significant difference in favour of the DS group (t = 1.974, df 7, p < 0.05). It 
can also be seen from Table 7:2 that 3 subjects from each group required 
retraining in the second session and 1 DS subject had to be trained a third 
time. In all cases, however, training scores were seen to improve in these 
subsequent sessions, demonstrating at least some level of carry-over 
effect. 
Table 7:2 
Percentage of Correct Response During 'Wug' Training Trials 
Session: 1 





























Table 7:1 shows the effect of training on post-test performance and 
on pre-test performance in subsequent sessions. Improvement in 
performance in session 1 was calculated by comparing pre- and post-test 
scores. This difference was found to be highly significant both when 
scores from the two groups were combined and when treated separately 
(combined groups t = 7.456, df 15, p < 0.0005; DS group t = 4.651, df 7, 
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p < 0.005; non-DS group t=5.657, df 7, p < 0.0005). Consistent with findings 
from the errorless learning study in Chapter 2, this initial comparison 
demonstrates the immediate carry-over effects of a single errorless 
training session on post-test performance 
Pre-test scores attained in the two subsequent sessions provided a 
measure of the extent to which the discrimination had been retained over 
the weekly and fortnightly intervals. No significant differences were 
found between scores achieved on the pre-test in session 2 and those in 
the post-test in session 1 either when the two groups' scores were 
combined or were taken separately (combined groups: t = 1.3, df 15, NS; 
DS group: t = 1.7, df 7 NS; non-DS group: t = 0.3, df 7, NS), indicating that 
the discrimination had been retained between the first and second 
sessions. Comparison of the results obtained by the two groups, however, 
suggested that the DS group may have benefited to a greater extent from 
the initial errorless training session: from Table 7:1 it can be seen that 
only one DS subject actually produced a lower score in the second of the 
two sessions, two other subjects showing score improvements; scores 
from three non-DS subjects by comparison were reduced in session 2, 
with only one subject attaining a small improvement in performance. 
Evidence of retention of the discrimination was, however, clearly 
demonstrated for both groups in the third session; again, no significant 
differences were found between pre-test scores in this session and post-
test scores from session 1, either overall or for the separate groups. In this 
third session all but one DS subject attained 100% on the pre-test. After 
retraining this single subject did succeed in correctly discriminating the 
wug in all 7 post-test trials and was able to repeat- this high level of 
performance in the final pre-test administered 3 weeks later. As can be 
seen in Table 2, 7 out of the group of 8 DS subjects had fully retained the 
discrimination over this second 3 week interval. 
DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to replicate and to extend the study presented in 
Chapter 2. In that study errorless learning was shown to be an effective 
method of teaching discrimination skills to DS children. Here the 
errorless procedure was investigated for its effectiveness as a means of 
increasing the reliability of these skills once taught. As expected, in both 
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the DS and non-DS _groups there was a significant carry-over effect from 
training to post-test performance in the first session. In almost 70% of 
cases a single training session proved sufficient for subjects to select the 
correct target stimulus in all 7 post-test trials administered immediately 
following training. With one exception, the remaining subjects, whilst 
unable to demonstrate full mastery of the discrimination were able to 
show a marked improvement on pre-test scores after exposure to 
training. Findings from study 1 were therefore successfully replicated, 
with errorless learning once again shown to be an effective method for 
teaching discrimination skills within a single teaching session. 
Results also clearly showed that the majority of subjects were still 
able to discriminate the target stimulus successfully in pre-tests given 1 
week then 2 weeks later. Success in these latter two sessions is particularly 
encouraging given that pre-tests contained only 7 trials. Children in 
neither group apparently required any prompting to recognise the task 
and then go on to perform at a similarly high level to that demonstrated 
after initial training. The fact that 7 out of 8 DS children demonstrated 
retention of the discrimination when presented with a third re-test 6 
weeks after the first training session is particularly encouraging, especially 
given that in most cases only one training session had been required. 
Teachers had indicated in preliminary discussions that children in both 
groups often required repeated teaching sessions when .learning similar 
skills using conventional methods. These results suggest that for both DS 
and non-DS mentally handicapped groups, skills taught in this way can 
not only be learned comparatively quickly but are also retained. 
A clear difference did, however, emerge between the two groups in 
training. In the first session DS children required fewer trials to acquire 
the discrimination than children in the non-DS group. This result may be 
attributable to the superior visual discriminatory abilities observed in DS 
subjects in comparison to subjects with other forms of mental handicap 
(Gordon 1944; O'Connor and Hermelin 1961; Bilovsky and Share 1968; 
Snart, O'Grady and Das 1982). Given however that this difference was not 
significantly reflected in any subsequent session, nor in the amount of 
improvement made between pre- and post-test scores in the initial 
session, it would appear that these differences demonstrate a more 
positive response within the DS group to errorless training per se, rather 
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than any inherent advantage in terms of discriminatory abilities. This 
finding may reflect a stronger relationship betwee~ motivational factors 
and the demonstration of competence in performance in children with 
OS than in non-DS children. There were several clear examples of OS 
subjects at all ages 'switching on' social skills in non-training trials - in a 
way very similar to that so frequently observed in the OS children tested 
on the BSID - to avoid the task in hand. Little evidence of the use of 
similar avoidance tactics was observed in the performance of non-OS 
subjects. 
Despite OS children's use of this type of behaviour during testing, it 
proved to have little effect on the stability of their performance. Although 
there were subjects in both groups whose scores had dropped between 
sessions 1 and 2, for the OS group this was only found to occur when the 
discrimination had not be~n fully mastered in the initial session. All but 
one OS subject, having attained 100% on any pre- or post-test, were able to 
reproduce this score in subsequent tests. This was not always the case with 
children in the non-OS group where a few quite severe score losses 
indicated that the discrimination, apparently mastered in the first session, 
had not been retained. This trend in favour of greater stability of 
performance among the OS subjects occurred in spite of the tendency 
among subjects in this group to divert attention from the tasks. Although 
still in evidence within this learning situation therefore, motivational 
factors seemed to have a far weaker effect on overall performance than 
was observed in the earlier studies. 
Although encouraging, the fact that subjects responded so well to the 
errorless procedure does not in itself necessarily mean that this procedure 
is effective in terms of learning per se. In itself all-correct within-task 
performance on a discrimination task after errorless training does not 
necessarily imply that a discrimination skill as such has been acquired. 
The true value of discrimination learning lies in the ability to transfer 
that skill to other tasks .. 
It will be recalled that study 1 demonstrated that prior experience of 
errorless training in a shape discrimination task had an enhancing effect 
on OS childrens' performance on a subsequently presented trial-and-error 
task requiring use of the same discrimination skill. The major purpose of 
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that particular study was not to teach children how to discriminate 
shapes, however; children were selected for inclusion in the study on the 
basis that they were already able to identify some common shapes but not 
the shapes used in the experiment. In fact it will be recalled that the lower 
level of success attained by subjects on the shape task, when compared to 
the nonsense figure task, was interpreted as resulting from the very fact 
that children had had prior experience of shape discrimination learning. 
The major focus of that study was on the influence of non-cognitive 
factors on children's performance on discrimination tasks, rather than on 
discrimination as a cognitive ability per se. These results therefore could 
also tell very little about the efficacy of errorless learning as a device for 
teaching discrimination skills. The purpose of the next study was 
therefore to investigate what it is that is learned with the errorless 
procedure and whether that learning can be successfully transferred to a 
second errorless task - one which involves a different discrimination but 
requires the same basic discrimination skills. 
STUDY 6b: THE TRANSFERABILITY OF ERRORLESS LEARNING 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Seven of the 8 DS subjects from study 6a took part in this study. Due 
to medical appointments DS subject 8 was unable to participate. He was 
therefore replaced by a 9 year old boy with DS. This lowered the mean age 
of the group to 10.3 years. 
Procedure 
Seven sets of cards similar in format to those used in study 6a were 
used, each including one 'nim' (the target stimulus) together with two 
alternative nonsense stimuli. One trial set in each of the pre- and post-
tests included a 'wug' (the target stimulus from study 6a) as an 
alternative. 
Subjects were tested once weekly for three weeks. As in study 6a, all 
subjects were trained in the new discrimination in session 1 (after 
administration of the pre-test, and followed by the post-test). Re-training 
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was given only where necessary in the two subsequent sessions (i.e. if pre-
test scores were not 100% correct). 
RESULTS 
Training scores 
Training scores are set out in Table 7:3. It can be seen that most 
subjects responded well to the change in target stimulus and were able to 
produce training scores in session 1 of an equivalent level to those 
achieved in the first training session in study 6a. No significant 
differences were found between scores attained in the initial training 
sessions in studies 6a and 6b (t = 0.894, NS). This result suggests that there 
was little transfer of skill between the two discrimination tasks; had a skill 
been transferred some savings in the number of training trials required 
for mastery of the second discrimination would have been expected. 
Table 7:3 
Percentage of Correct Responses During 'Nim' Training Trials 
Session 1 2 3 
Subject 1 94 73 89 
2 94 Abandoned 74 
3 Abandoned 74 94 
4 100 100 100 
5 100 
6 100 
7 100 100 100 
8 100 100 
In addition, although in many cases training scores in the second 
and third sessions were consistently high, it can be seen that many 
subjects did require re-training. Six subjects received training a second 
time and five a third time whereas in experiment 1 only three children 
had required a second, and one a third training session before being able 
to achieve 100% pre-test scores in all subsequent sessions. It will also be 
noted from Table 7:3 that 2 training sessions had to be abandoned. This 
will be discussed below. 
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Pre- and post-test scores 
Table 7:4 shows the effect of training on pre-and post-test 
performance. Direct comparison of pre- and post-test scores attained in 
the first session yielded no significant differences (t = 1.843, df (7), NS). 
Whereas in study 6a performance had significantly improved after a 
single training session, this effect was not found when the target stimulus 
was changed for the present study. Pre-post test improvement in the first 
session of study 6a was significantly higher than that achieved on this 
second discrimination task (t = 3.308, df (7), p < 0.01). 
Table 7:4 
'Nim' Discrimination: Effects of Training on subsequent Performance 
Pre- and Post-Test Scores 
Session 1 2 3 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Subject 1 4 6 3 5 6 7 
2 0 1* 0 0 4 
3 2 1 3 5 6* 
4 0 3* 1 6* 4* 7 
5 4 7 6* 6* 7 
6 7 7 7 7 
7 3 5 3 5 5 6* 
8 7 7 5* 6* 7 
* Denotes sessions in which 'wug' was incorrectly selected 
Due to the absence of any immediate carry-over effect onto post-test 
performance in this initial session, it was not possible to repeat the 
investigation of longer-term effects carried out in study 6a. Instead 
statistical comparisons were restricted to those made directly between 
scores achieved in experiments 1 and 2; remaining comparisons were of a 
more qualitative nature. 
Not surprisingly, given that so few subjects had mastered the 
discrimination within the initial training session, pre-test scores achieved 
one week later were significantly lower than those achieved in the second 
pre-test in experiment 1 (t = 4.223, df 6, p < 0.005). Of the 3 subjects who 
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had attained 100% in the first post test, two were unable to reproduce this 
high level of success in this second session, both having selected the 
'wug' in the single trial in which it was presented as an alternative 
stimulus, and both repeating this selection in the subsequent post-test (see 
Table 7:4). The same two subjects did achieve 100% in the pre-test 
administered in week 3, having apparently dropped their tendency to 
select the 'wug'. With the exception of the single subject who had 
achieved 100% scores throughout trials, however, the remaining subjects 
were clearly still unable to master this second discrimination. Pre-test 
scores in this third session were again significantly lower than those 
achieved in the third pre-test in study 6a (t = 3.333, df (6), p < 0.01). Even 
after a third training session, two subjects still showed a confusion 
between the previous and the present target stimuli. 
DISCUSSION 
Study 6b aimed to investigate whether the errorless learning 
procedure has any intrinsic learning value in terms of the transferability 
of skills learned. Results from study 6a demonstrated that a 
discrimination taught using the procedure was reliably reproduced up to 
6 weeks following initial training but results from this second experiment 
were considerably less encouraging. The majority of subjects, despite 
responding equally well in initial training with the new target stimulus, 
were unable to maintain the high level of subsequent pre- and post-test 
performance demonstrated in study 6a. A small number of subjects 
moreover had severe difficulty making the transfer within training itself. 
In two cases sessions had to be abandoned, subjects having become 'stuck' 
on several trials, repeatedly selecting an incorrect figure. Unlike study 6a, 
it was not possible in these cases to rectify these errors through re-
presentation of the previous trial; often a pass on initial presentation 
would be followed by a fail when the same trial set was returned to a 
second time. In many cases these failures did not appear to be genuine but 
rather to reflect an almost defiant refusal to comply with the procedure. 
This represents a strong contrast to children's initial responsiveness to 
the first training in study 6a. The carry-over effect within training scores 
also, in some cases, disappeared, with subjects attaining lower scores in 
second and even third sessions than in the first. 
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Why should the· procedure which had proved to pe so effective in 
the first experiment produce such comparatively poor results with this 
second task? Given that in both experiments training procedures had 
been identical, with alternative stimuli 'faded in' on the basis of size, it 
seems very unlikely that the second discrimination was intrinsically any 
more difficult to master than the first. 
A particularly prevalent characteristic of performance which 
emerged in the first post-test of some subjects and was still in evidence in 
some final sessions may provide an explanation. In many cases, although 
correctly selecting the 'nim' in 6 out of 7 post-test trials, subjects showed a 
clear preference for the 'wug' in the single trial set in which it was 
presented. For some reason the original discrimination was given priority 
over the new target stimulus. Previous research with the fading 
technique has suggested that it does not provide sufficient comparative 
experience to permit transfer (Gollin and Savoy 1968) because it tends to 
confine subjects' attentional responses to specific attributes of the target 
stimulus. Similarly Bijou (1977) and Schilmoeller and Etzel (1977) 
pointed to the overuse of non-criterion related cues as an explanation for 
poor transfer (in the present study this would be the size of the target 
stimulus). The predominant focus on successful responses in errorless 
procedures is such that subjects are not required to identify the 
characteristics of any alternative stimulus in order to distinguish it from 
the target stimulus. Selection of the target stimulus is guided in initial 
trials through fading, and through recognition in later trials. It is possible 
therefore to achieve 100% success in training without necessarily having 
to attend to the alternative stimuli; the procedure can teach subjects how 
to identify which of the three figures is the correct choice, but not why the 
remaining two are incorrect. 
On this basis, it could be argued that although the second training 
task enabled identification of the 'nim' as the new target stimulus, by its 
nature the errorless procedure precluded the possibility of learning that 
the 'wug' now represented an incorrect response. The identical nature of 
the training task and the occasional appearance of the 'wug' may have 
implied that the original stimulus was still relevant in some way. If 
children were simply responding to the non-criterion size cue in training 
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in both tasks, it is not difficult to see how they could have become 
confused between the new stimulus and the original stimulus. This 
interpretation would suggest that rather than fully learning a 
discrimination skill, children were learning a task-specific strategy for 
making correct responses. 
It will be recalled from chapter 6 that this task-specific strategic 
approach had been offered as a possible explanation for Ss' apparent 
failure to consolidate newly acquired skills. DS Ss frequently seemed to 
acquire the skills required to pass certain BSID items in isolation, 
demonstrating little evidence that they understood the association 
between these and oth~r related skills. Further evidence from a study of 
object concept development in DS children would also seem to indicate 
that this tendency to adopt superficial task strategies is characteristic of the 
approach to learning in other areas of development (Wishart 1990). 
Rather than using what has been learned at one level to bridge the step to 
a more advanced level, each task is tackled anew. The inappropriate 
transfer of tactics from one task to another also seems to imply that very 
little true learning is actually taking place. Without actually having 
learned the association between the two tasks, the response is to use the 
strategy available at that particular time. 
In the present experiment, the same strategy was appropriate for both 
tasks but the response learned through use of this strategy in the first task 
was not appropriate in the second task. This use of task-specific strategies 
lends further support to Morss' suggestion that learning in DS may be 
incomplete. Given that this contention was based on childrens' apparent 
failure to appreciate the significance of error in learning situations, it 
indicates a need for extreme caution in the use of techniques such as 
errorless learning which actually preclude erring. If DS children are 
naturally devising a series of superficial tactics for minimising failure, 
overuse of techniques which operate on similar . principles may simply 
reinforce their belief in the efficacy of this approach. 
It was suggested at the very beginning of this thesis and in the 
introduction to this chapter however, that DS children, because of the 
tendency to avoid learning situations in which they could potentially fail, 
may require an initial 'boos t' before they can become sufficiently 
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confident to deal with failure. Even if the use of success-only techniques 
does encourage the adoption of task-sp~cific strategies, such techniques 
could nevertheless provide a 'baseline' of repeated success, generally not 
as readily achievable in conventional trial-and-error learning situations. 
Experience of repeated success has been demonstrated here both to 
improve children's performance on a task that did involve the possibility 
of failure, and to increase the likelihood of reliable production of correct 
responses in the long term. Although results from the present study 
imply that what is 'learned' through use of the errorless approach is of 
little value in terms of discrimination learning per se, in terms of what 
children may learn in relation to the experience of learning itself, this 
approach may yet be of considerable potential. 
On this argument the intrinsic value of errorless learning may be 
not in its use as a teaching device itself, but as a device for persuading 
children to perform to full potential. The approach of enhancing 
performance on conventional learning tasks could be incorporated into 
an ongoing learning situation in which erorrless and trial-and-error 
methods are used alternately. In discrimination learning for example, 
ha.ving learned through errorless training which is the correct response 
and to reliably and consistently select that response, the child could then 
be taught to relinquish the particular strategy used in the choice of that 
response and to learn why it is in fact correct. It may be possible in this 
way to reduce the influence of motivational deficits on the approach to 
learning in DS children and to increase the stability of that performance, 
thereby allowing what is learned to be adequately consolidated. 
By increasing reliability and stabilising performance it would seem 
that certain procedures of learning do produce performances which more 
closely match levels of performance in DS children. Although the 
errorless procedure was investigated here for use in teaching 
discrimination skills only, results imply that by increasing the experience 
of success/ failure during skill acquisition, it may be possible to encourage 
a more equal relationship between competence and performance in the 





The aims of this thesis were four-fold. The major aim was to study 
the early development of cognitive abilities in DS from a perspective 
which emphasises the contribution of non-cognitive factors - in particular 
motivation - to the process of cognitive development in this population 
of children. In doing so it was hoped to bring the study of development in 
DS more in line with current mainstream developmental theory in 
which it is now largely accepted that cognitive development cannot be 
studied in isolation but should be seen as a complex and dynamic process, 
a process which is influenced as much by what the child is motivated to 
learn as by his/her level of cognitive potential. Until recently the study of 
development in DS and in other mentally handicapped children has been 
heavily dominated by an approach which focuses primarily on the 
functional deficits and delays which distinguish the child with a mental 
handicap from the normally developing child. This thesis has aimed to 
provide a broader perspective on the learning difficulties experienced by 
the DS child by considering the way in which such functional deficits 
might have influenced his/her approach to learning. 
A second and related aim was to demonstrate that poor performance 
cannot always be taken to indicate similarly poor levels of cognitive 
competence in the DS child and that motivational deficits may impede 
the demonstration of optimal levels of competence. From this approach it 
was aimed to determine the extent to which any 
competence/performance differential might affect the performance of 
infants and young children with DS in assessment situations and in the 
light of these findings, to re-evaluate those theories of development in 
DS which have been based solely on outcome measures derived from 
psychometric assessments. 
A third aim was to explore the possibility that motivational 
problems may inhibit the developmental process itself, thereby adding to 
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the already existing cognitive deficit. The idea that poor motivation can 
adversely affect the performance of people with a mentally handicapping 
condition is not a new one. Many previous research studies have resulted 
in descriptions of this population as 'learned helpless' (Floor and Rosen 
1975; Weisz 1982) or 'failure avoiders' (Cromwell 1967). Until recently, 
however, such descriptions have been applied from a perspective which 
sees the motivational deficit to be another 'symptom', inherent in the 
condition of mental handicap. This thesis has aimed to show, by contrast, 
that the motivational deficit in DS has its own developmental history 
and that its effects on the process of cognitive development may originate 
at a very early stage in development. 
The final aim of this thesis was to explore how differential 
experience of success/failure in a learning situation might influence both 
the acquisition and consolidation stages of the learning process in DS 
children. The possibility that the true value of errorless learning teaching 
strategies may lie in their potential to increase the DS child's motivation 
to learn from more conventional teaching methods was investigated. 
These methods are widely used as teaching methods with the mentally 
handicapped, in place of traditional trial and error teaching techniques. 
Here it was aimed to demonstrate that a purely errorless learning 
approach may be inappropriate in the longer term while also showing 
that there may be considerable value in a teaching strategy which 
incorporates both errorless and trial-and-error methods. 
The relationship between competence and performance in DS children 
In the course of this thesis a great deal of evidence was gathered 
from both learning and assessment studies of DS children which lent 
support to the hypothesis that the relationship between competence and 
performance in DS is not a straightforward one. Repeatedly it was found 
that levels of performance fell short of optimal levels of ability. A 
comparison of two methods of teaching discrimination to DS and to non-
handicapped children (study 1) indicated that DS performance was 
affected to a comparatively greater extent by prior experience of success 
and failure; DS subjects' performance on a trial-and-error task was 
significantly enhanced when this task had been preceded by an errorless 
learning task, but performance on both tasks was adversely affected if the 
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two tasks were presented in the opposite order. Non-handicapped 
children showed no such order effects; analysis of their scores indicated 
that any improvements made were as much attributable to the effects of 
practice as to any possible enhancing effects of prior experience of learning 
in the absence of error. 
Findings from detailed cross-sectional studies of the performance of 
children with DS on the BSID also revealed a strong tendency to 
underperform (studies 2 and 3). Subjects frequently failed items which 
their parents reported they should have passed. As age increased so did 
the likelihood that children would 'fail to engage' in test items - either by 
attempting to divert E's attention away from the task in hand or by 
refusing to comply with E's requests to demonstrate specific skills with 
the test objects. In study 3 it was revealed that children performed to full 
competence in neither of two closely-spaced sessions with optimal scores 
(based on all passes attained in either of the two sessions) significantly 
higher than those recorded for either session alone. Such findings 
strongly suggest that motivational factors adversely affect the approach of 
DS children to cognitive tasks. 
It is well established that motivation plays an important role in 
normal cognitive development. Studies conducted by Dweck (1975, 1978, 
1982)) have shown that learning in non-handicapped children may be 
adversely affected by poor levels of motivation. It has also been proposed 
that the assessment performance of normally developing children 
necessarily includes a measure of motivational levels (Hrncir 1985; Scarr 
1981). As stated above, however, although it has been acknowledged that 
motivational factors may impede the performance of mentally 
handicapped children it is often assumed that the mentally handicapped 
child is inherently poorly motivated to learn. Theoretical approaches to 
the learning difficulties encountered by mentally handicapped children 
have therefore tended to neglect the importance of motivational factors, 
focussing instead on more cognitively-based explanations of their 
difficulties in learning situations. 
The competence/performance differential: its implications for learning 
The popularity of errorless learning teaching s trategies for use with 
mentally handicapped children demonstra tes the extent to which 
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theoretical approaches to learning in mental handicap have diverged 
from current mainstream developmental theory. Generally the use of 
errorless techniques stems from the l;>elief that mentally handicapped 
people cannot learn by trial and error - that the experience of erring in a 
learning situation will always be counterproductive. This idea has 
persisted in spite of the fact that it is incompatible with the idea, largely 
accepted in mainstream learning theory, that error has as much to 
contribute to the process of learning as success. Implicit in the proposal 
· that handicapped people cannot learn from error therefore is the 
suggestion that the way in which they learn must be inferim· in some 
way. 
Indeed a large majority of the findings presented in this thesis could 
be interpreted to lend support to this suggestion. In study 4 detailed 
examination of longitudinal BSID profiles revealed that many children 
failed on items which they had passed at earlier age levels. In the majority 
of such cases subjects did not reliably demonstrate any higher level skills 
indicating that they had 'surpassed' these items, nor was it possible to 
fully explain their disappearance in terms of the lack of suitability of the 
test items. Many subjects genuinely appeared to have lost skills which 
they had demonstrated to be within their repertoires several months 
earlier - indicating that there may be associated problems with 
consolidation in DS. ·This pattern contrasts markedly with the 
incremental process believed to characterise normal development. 
In normal development it is believed that the experience of error 
may in fact frequently provide the child with the incentive to build on 
what has already been learned.· Having acquired a particular skill which 
proves to be effective in certain situations the child then goes on to 
explore this skill and to apply it to different tasks. The discovery that this 
leads to error leaves the child with the challenge of finding a more 
effective solution - which often marks the step onto a higher level of 
development. 
Results from studies 2 and 3 indicated that the DS child, by 
comparison, does not seem to explore and experiment to the same degree. 
Observations made in study 2 suggested that rather than being motivated 
to explore their environment, young DS babies may actually lose the 
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motivation to do so. It was noted, for example, that several 6 month old 
DS children had apparently lost their interest in locating the source of a 
sound. Parents provided reports supporting this interpretation of this 
developmental 'loss'. The responses of several 3 month old DS babies to 
sound-locating tasks indicated that although apparently having the 
motivation to turn towards the source of a sound, their ability to do so 
was restricted by the tonic neck reflex. This finding suggested that there 
may have been a causal link between these two patterns of response: that 
the mismatch between the desire or intention to explore and the inability 
to do so at the earlier age level had resulted in the loss of interest seen in 
older DS children. Cunningham reported similar findings from a study of 
visually directed reaching in DS babies of 16 to 18 weeks of age. 
Results from study 2 indicated that a similar history of mismatching 
intentions and abilities might explain the frequency with which older DS 
children were avoiding BSID tasks. It was revealed that several items 
which children were avoiding were the same items which had been failed 
by large numbers of children at earlier age levels. Detailed investigation 
of the longitudinal profiles of three individual children (study 5) revealed 
that task avoidance did ·indeed seem to be related to failures encountered 
on. similar tasks during testing sessions 3 and 6 months previously. A 
link between unreliable performance on certain items and the later loss of 
the same items emerged- a link w~ich strongly suggested that there may 
have been a causal relationship between poor reliability during the 
acquisition stages of learning and subsequent failure to consolidate. 
Additional observations, moreover, lent support to the hypothesis that 
this pattern of task avoidance and subsequent consolidation difficulties 
might have compromised children's understanding of the successes they 
did achieve. Such findings lend support to Morss' (1979) suggestion that 
learning in DS may be incomplete. 
All of the above lends support to the suggestion that learning in DS 
may be adversely affected by the early experience of error encountered 
during the acquisition of certain skills. Such an explanation does not in 
itself indicate, however, that the DS child is incapable of learning from 
errors. On the contrary the findings of study 5 suggested that the 
frequency with which DS children encounter errors which cannot 
contribute to the overall developmental process may prevent the child 
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from experiencing - and identifying - the sorts of errors which present a 
challenge to the non-handicapped child. DS children often rejected tasks 
after making errors which were a__ttributable more to the motor deficit 
than to any inability to meet the cognitive demands of the task. This 
tendency to avoid error may generalise to errors which are necessary for a 
full understanding of success thereby leaving the DS child with only a 
vestigial understanding of the concepts required for development to 
progress normally. 
Encouraging learning in the absence of error may not therefore be 
the most effective means of overcoming the learning difficulties 
experienced by the DS child. Indeed such an approach may actually 
accentuate the tendency to avoid error. A more valuable approach may 
instead involve altering the DS child's success/failure experience ratio in 
a learning situation in an attempt to reduce the probability that that 
learning situation will be avoided. The results of study 1 indicated that 
errorless learning techniques may have a useful contribution to make in 
this area. It Was demonstrated that prior 'priming' with an errorless 
strategy could enhance DS children's performance on a trial-and-error 
task. Here the main purpose of the errorless task was not to teach the 
child a discrimination - rather it was being used to teach the child that 
he/she can learn- that learning need not always be such an unrewarding 
process. 
An equally encouraging set of results emerged from study 6a in 
which it was demonstrated that discrimination skills taught using the 
errorless teaching procedure were retained and reliably reproduced by DS 
children for up to 6 weeks. This result contrasts sharply with data 
obtained from the BSID studies in which DS children's performance on 
test items was seen to change both in the short term and in the long term. 
Not only does this result imply that children are less likely to avoid tasks 
taught using the errorless method, but also that skills taught using this 
method may become more stable acquisitions to the developmental 
repertoire. 
Unfortunately a subsequent experiment (study 6b) revealed that such 
'skills' may have been no more than task-specific responses. In this study 
DS Ss were found to be unable . to transfer the newly acquired 
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discrimination 'skill' to a second discrimination task. Detailed 
examination of response patterns moreover indicated that the poor levels 
of success seen may have been attributable to Ss' inability to distinguish 
between the correct responses to the two tasks. The errorless strategy had 
provided no means by which to 'unlearn' the response taught in the first 
task. 
Although this finding does have very negative implications in 
relation to the effectiveness of success-only methods for teaching specific 
skills, it does demonstrate that the experience of error in learning is as 
important for the child with DS as it is for the non-handicapped child. 
This set of results indicates the need for a more global approach to the 
learning difficulties experienced by the DS child - one which considers 
both cognitive and non-cognitive factors. Rather than simply accepting 
that the experience of error in a learning situation will always be 
counterproductive, such an approach demands an explanation of the 
developmental role of errors in DS learning. 
Implications for development: the developmental difference theory 
The pattern of early development in DS which has emerged from 
the studies presented in this thesis contrasts sharply with the incremental 
developmental pattern seen in the non-handicapped child. It has been 
proposed that development in DS is characterised by frequent failure, 
poor rehearsal of new acquisitions as a result of the tendency to avoid 
experience of failure and, in turn, poorly developed levels of 
understanding and difficulties with the consolidation of newly learned 
skills. 
There was little indication that this pattern of development was 
restricted in DS children to any particular skill areas. Results from 
chapters 3 and 4 did reveal that the tasks on which children were 
producing unreliable performances and those in which they were failing 
to engage were similar in type. Study 5 also indicated that failure to 
engage was often associated with previous experience of failure on 
similar tasks. It could therefore be stated that there are particular 
weaknesses associated with the condition of DS in relation to these 
specific skill areas. Results from chapter 6, however, revealed very little 
in the way of evidence to suggest that these specific weaknesses would 
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predictably lead to the loss of these same skills in all subjects. The 
relationship between unreliability and instability was identified across a 
wide range of. test items - often in single cases only. Therefore, although at 
some level it could be stated that development in DS is associated with 
poor reliability of performance which may lead to developmental 
instability, it is not possible to specify how this sequence may relate to the 
overall pattern of development. It is not, in other words, possible to 
determine with any confidence how this 'different' pattern of 
development will be manifested in terms of the repertoire of emerging 
abilities in the individual DS child. 
It may therefore be more useful to attempt to explain the pattern of 
development in DS which has emerged from these studies at a more 
global, theoretical level - one which focuses less on specific patterns of 
cognitive or motor skills and abilities and more on the way in which the 
development of these abilities may be affected by factors other than levels 
of cognitive or motor functioning. At this level, rather than identifying 
differences, it is possible to see how factors influencing development in 
DS are very similar to those believed to characterise normal 
development. Although this thesis has highlighted the motivational 
deficit in the DS child it has nevertheless drawn attention to the fact that 
motivational factors cannot be left out of any theory of cognitive 
development in DS. As in normal development cognition and 
motivation are closely interrelated in DS development. 
With the emphasis on such similari ties in the overall structure of 
development, rather than on the differences, delays or aberrations 
observed in very specific areas, it is possible to conceive of a single theory 
which might encompass both patterns of development. This more 
integrated theoretical approach could not only provide a means by which 
mainstream developmental ideas could be applied to mental handicap, 
but it is also likely to benefit the DS child in many positive ways. 
This thesis is not the first attempt to look at development in DS in 
this more global way. Proponents of what is termed the 'organisational' 
approach have attempted to demonstrate that the interrelationships 
between cognition and other developmental domains, for example, affect, 
are very similar in DS and normal development (see e.g Beeghly and 
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Cicchetti 1987). Unfortunately the value of much of this research has been 
diminished by its reliance on psychometric data for matching DS and 
non-handicapped children. The work reported in this thesis strongly 
suggests that psychometric instruments cannot provide accurate 
measures of the cognitive abilities of children with DS. At one level it is 
possible to see in the organisational approach a rejection of the medical 
model which concentrates solely on the 'symptoms' of mental handicap 
and the ways in which these interfere with the normal process of 
development. At another level, however, it could be argued that the 
medical model of mental handicap is being perpetuated by the use of the 
very tools which emphasise such symptoms: psychometric-based 
assessment batteries. 
A similar dichotomy can be identified in the work of Rauh et al 
(1990 in press) aimed at measuring the rate of development in DS. On one 
hand, this group of researchers have conceded from their results that 
there is no prescribed rate at which development in DS progresses and 
have concluded that it may be more productive to consider the shape of 
the developmental curves of individual children. On the other hand, 
however, by using psychometric tools to measure DS development, these 
studies could only result in a negative picture of development in DS. If 
developmental rate is measured only against the norm, the outcome will 
inevitably highlight the fact that DS children take longer to acquire 
specific cognitive skills. It cannot accurately monitor any positive progress 
which the DS child may have made over time. 
Implications for psychometric assessment 
As Cicchetti (1982) pointed out, the reliance on psychometric 
measurements may in large part be attributable to the fact that no 
alternative means of assessing development in mental handicap are as 
yet available. The only available frame of reference is that which has 
come from years of studying normal development. 
The original objective in compiling assessment batteries such as the 
BSID was to devise a means of determining the extent to which 
individual differences in intelligence remained constant from infancy to 
school age. Despite all efforts to maximise numerical precision, however, 
it failed to generate any evidence to support the predictive validity of 
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infant 'IQ'. The BSID was consequently redesigned to serve more 
diagnostic purposes. Bayley (1969) stated that the primary value of the 
revised version of the BSID is that it provides "the basis for establishing 
the child's current developmental status and thus the extent of any 
deviancy from normal expectancy" and "a basis for instituting early 
corrective measures when the child shows evidence of retarded 
mental.. ... development". Having failed in its original objective the BSID 
therefore became a 'hand-me-down' for use with populations of children 
who were not represented in the standardisation sample. No 
consideration was given to the possibility that it might not be appropriate 
for this purpose and no attempts were made to adapt the scale for use 
with handicapped children. 
There are, however, a number of reasons for questioning the 
concurrent validity of the BSID when used with OS children. The BSID 
has a system of scoring which can only accurately measure the 
'developmental status' of children who fall within the upper ranges of 
ability in mental handicap: the MDI stops at SO. In addition, the test itself 
contains a large number of items which have a heavy motor component. 
and which therefore cannot hope to assess accurately the cognitive 
abiiities of any child who has a deficit in motor ability. Items were 
originally designed for use with children whose chronological ages fell 
between 0 and 30 months and yet it was simply assumed that these same 
items would be suitable for use with handicapped children of 
considerably older ages. More importantly perhaps, the step sizes between 
differing levels of difficulty in the BSID were calculated on the basis of the 
progress made by non-handicapped children over fixed time intervals. It 
is consequently unable to monitor any smaller-scale developmental 
attainments which handicapped children may make over the same time 
periods with the BSID. Its validity for use with OS children is further 
compromised by the fact that this group of children tend to avoid many 
cognitive tasks. 
This test also cannot claim to be a reliable means of measuring the 
cognitive development in children. with OS. The performance of OS 
children on the BSID was found to be considerably more variable than 
would be expected on the basis of normative reliability studies. Study 3, 
moreover, revealed that the level of reliability quoted for the BSID may 
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. actually be artefactually low- thereby indicating an even greater difference 
between OS and non-handicapped children in the extent to which they 
can be expected to produce reliable BSIO performances. 
Studies of the predictive validity of infant tests such as the BSIO 
have resulted in the conclusion that there is very little correlation 
between individual non-handicapped children's infant and childhood 
IQs but that this correlation is higher for children with mental handicap 
(Illingworth and Birch 1959; Knobloch 1959; Knobloch and Pasamanick 
1960, 1963, 1967; Koch et al 1963). This, it has been suggested, indicates that 
such tests can indeed have some predictive function within such 
populations. Study 4 casts considerable doubt on this claim. Given the 
level of item instability between adjacent pairs of ages found in that study, 
it seems highly unlikely that this claim, made on the basis of overall 
scores, would be substantiated if the same data which led to this claim had 
been analysed on an item-item basis. 
From all of the above it is clear that the BSIO - and other 
psychometric tests of infant development- can provide only very limited 
information on the development of children with OS. What it can tell us 
in relation to this - and many other groups of handicapped children- may 
well be inaccurate and is predominantly negative in nature. Clearly there 
is a pressing need for a better and more positive means of assessing the 
abilities of the child with mental handicap. This need seems particularly 
pressing given the latest set of guiqelines produced by the government in 
relation to the assessment of mentally handicapped individuals. The 
most recent note of guidance on the implementation of the proposals laid 
down in the 1987 White Paper on community care is devoted· entirely to 
the subject of assessment. The very existence of this publication implies a 
strong commitment to formal methods of assessing the needs of the 
mentally handicapped population. Such an emphasis on assessment may 
have extremely unfavourable consequences for the mentally handicapped 
child. If there are no viable alternatives to the psychometric measures 
currently in use it is likely that such measures will be officially adopted 
for the purpose of assessing the early intervention needs of this age group 
of the mentally handicapped population. Clearly these measures are 
unlikely to provide an accurate picture of the needs of OS children or of 
their potential to benefit from appropriately tailored intervention. 
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As Garwood (1982) has pointed out, the curriculae for many 
intervex:'-tion programmes are based on the sequences of items contained 
in psychometric tests. This implies that many of the inadequacies 
discussed throughout this thesis in relation to the use of such tests in 
assessing mentally handicapped children also apply to the methods of 
intervention used with such children. The Portage intervention 
programme, widely used by home teachers in this country, uses a 
checklist of items which are matched to c4rriculum cards. Teaching is 
focussed on items on the checklist which are absent from the 
handicapped child's profile - the aim being to provide experiences 
'!esigned to facilitate the emergence of the skills required to pass such 
items. Not only does this programme implicitly assume that children 
develop behaviours in the invariant order in which they appear in the 
checklist, but also that the process of development consists only of the 
acquisition of the very specific behaviours contained on that checklist. 
The overall objective of the Portage programme is to determine what is 
'missing' from the behavioral repertoire of the handicapped child and 
then to attempt to 'patch up' these gaps by focussing on the behaviours · 
themselves. It is simply assumed that their absence is attributable solely to 
the functional deficits associated with the handicapping condition - little 
consideration is given to the influence - whether positive or negative - of 
motivational factors on development. This 'patching' may be successful 
at some level but it fails to address the basic problem that mentally 
handicapped children may not be as motivated to learn as their non-
handicapped peers. 
In view of the above, it is perhaps not a surprise that despite the 
effort and funds presently being diverted into early intervention 
programmes of this sort for DS children, the ability levels found in the 
studies in this thesis differ very little from those seen in ec:ulier studies of 
this population. Clearly, if neither intervention programmes nor 
instruments for assessment are sensitive to the needs of children with a 
mental handicap, it is likely that both the programmes and studies 
evaluating the efficacy of these programmes will continue to produce 
disappointing outcomes. Unless it is stressed, however, that this lack of 
improvement in levels of ability may simply reflect the inadequacy of 
currently available programmes for early intervention and of methods of 
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assessment of progress, such findings could well be interpreted as lending 
support to the argument that there is little potential for improvement in 
the DS child. 
Future directions 
There is a need for the application of a more integrated approach 
both to clarify the assessment and intervention needs of the DS child. By 
highlighting the influence of motivational factors in the development of 
cognition in DS it is hoped that this thesis has demonstrated the merits of 
an approach to the learning difficulties in this population which 
considers the whole child and not just his/her level cognitive 
functioning in isolation. Research should continue to look beyond the 
deficits and delays which are identified through comparison with 
normally developing children and focus instead on attempting to 
understand the complex interactions between cognitive, motivational, 
social and emotional factors which might explain why it is that the DS 
child experiences difficulties in learning. It is no longer sufficient simply 
to attribute all of the difficulties which emerge to the handicapping 
condition. 
A more accurate picture of development in DS might best be 
achieved by studying DS children in their own right. It may be of more 
value to focus simply on what DS children themselves can do rather than 
to measure their achievements from within the parameters of normal 
development. Such an approach may not only provide a more sensitive 
insight into the way in which the DS child does learn, but may also lead 
to a very much more positive outlook on the DS child than that obtained 
through constant reference to his/her more able peers. Where it is 
necessary to provide an assessment measure, rather than pointing out 
that a child has an IQ of less than 50 it may be of more value to stress 
what he or she can do - that s/he can pass the Piagetian stage 5 object 
concept tasks and can make sentences of three words, for example. In a 
related vein, in research studies where it is required to match DS subjects 
with non-handicapped subjects, a similar approach to that adopted in the 
errorless learning study presented in Chapter 2 might be taken. In that 
study, it will be recalled, subjects were matched not on the basis of 
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equivalent mental ages but on the basis of the specific discrimination 
skills required for participation in the experiment. 
A more positive approach to the motivational deficits evidenced by 
DS children would also seem to be merited. Evidence was presented in 
study 2, for example, suggesting that the auditory discriminatory abilities 
of the DS child may be affected at a very young age by poor levels of 
motivation. Success-only or fading techniques may have a useful role to 
play at this early stage in development by providing the child with a 
sufficiently high experience of success to maintain the will to explore the 
environment. It would also seem well worth exploring the efficacy of the 
errorless learning approach for teaching skills other than discrimination. 
However, it would be equally valuable to identify situations in which DS 
children are motivated to respond to their own errors i.e. to focus as 
much on their strengths as on the weaknesses associated with the 
condition. 
It is also important that while remaining aware of the differences in 
development between handicapped and non-handicapped children, we 
continue to stress the similarities between the two populations. The 
successful integration of any minority group into our society has worked 
on this principle. The mentally handicapped are not ill - even 
government policy has acknowledged this issue through moves towards 
the closure of hospitals for this population. For the Care in the 
Community initiative to succeed it is vital that we continue to point out 
the inadequacies of the medical model of handicap and to emphasise the 
rights of thE! handicapped as individuals - in terms of research attention 
and funding as well as in standards of care and educational provision. 
Research in particular must attempt to understand why it is that 
competence is not more efficiently reflected in performance in DS 
children and identify methods of ameliorating this differential. 
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A COMPARISON OF TWO PROCEDURES FOR TEACHING 
DISCRIMINATION SKILLS TO DOWN'S SYNDROME AND 
NON-HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 
Bv LOUISE DUFFY AND JENNIFER G. WISHART 
(Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh) 
SuMMARY. Two different strategies for teaching discrimination to Down 's Syndrome (OS) 
and non-handicapped children were compared for relative efficiency: trial-and-error and 
errorless learning. Two types of discrimination tasks were used, shape and nonsense 
figure tasks. A pre-test was used to match children for pre-existing ability. Errorless 
learning proved to be the superior training strategy in each group, both during training 
and in post-tests. OS children responded poorly to trial-and-error training in both 
absolute and relative terms. Although order of presentation of training conditions had 
little effect on performance in the non-handicapped group, an interesting differential 
effect emerged in the OS group: initial trial-and-error training adversely affected 
subsequent performance in the errorless task while initial errorless experience enhanced 
subsequent trial-and-error performance. It would appear from these results that errorless 
learning may be useful as a "primer", increasing motivation to learn in more conven-
tional learning situations. 
INTRODUCTION 
DowN'S Syndrome (DS) is the single greatest cause of mental retardation in the UK, 
accounting for nearly one third of children with severe mental handicap. Huge 
advances in our understanding of the metabolic and biochemical abnormalities 
associated with DS have been made recently (see Smith, 1985) but these are unlikely 
to benefit those children already born with DS. Prenatal screening has made some 
inroads into incidence rates but medical and economic factors at present limit the 
use of screening to women already known to be at risk, that is, women over 35 or 
women who have already given birth to a child with DS; even within this high risk 
group, it would appear that a significant proportion are either not offered screening 
or do not take up that offer (Walker and Howard, 1986). This at-risk group 
accounts in any case for only one third of all OS births. Prevention of DS by use of 
pre-natal screening techniques is still, therefore, a distant prospect. Recent studies, 
in fact, show little decline in overall incidence rates, with figures suggesting an 
increase in infants born to mothers in younger age groups (Abroms and Bennett, 
1983; Stratford and Steele, 1985). Prevalence, additionally, has increased four-fold 
within the last generation as a result of advances in medical technology, particularly 
in paediatric cardiology (Kirman, 1983). 
As long as prevalence and incidence figures remain high, it would be unwise to 
abandon psychological approaches to the study of DS on the grounds that future 
discoveries in the medical field may ameliorate- or even eliminate- the condition. 
The anomalies associated with DS are expressed behaviourally. Psychology can, 
therefore, contribute much to attempts at facilitative intervention. It seems essential 
that we continue to try to learn more about the exact nature of the mental handicap 
found in children with DS. It seems particularly important that we attempt to find 
some way to counteract the progressive decline in rate of mental development 
generally found with increasing age (Gibson, 1978). 
Recent years have seen a significant impact on development as a result of DS 
children being brought up in the parental home rather than in an institutional setting 
(Centerwall and Centerwall, 1960; Carr, 1975, 1985). In normal children, variations 
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in ability, particularly in IQ, are often associated with factors such as parental IQ 
and social class. This relationship does not generally hold true in OS (Gibson, 1978; 
Carr, 1985), although, interestingly, exceptions to this trend have recently been 
reported (Sharev et a/., 1985; Cunningham, 1986). Given the wide variation in 
learning ability found in children with OS and this absence of any clear, straight-
forward relationship with environmental factors usually closely associated with 
developmental outcome, it would seem that other, less obvious factors must be 
influencing development in OS. If these could be identified, appropriate fine-
tailoring of the environment to the particular needs and skills of the OS child might 
well improve on presently achieved levels of development. It is important, however, 
to be realistic about what may be achieved: the genetic component in OS must 
inevitably set some upper limit on improvement in developmental outcome. 
Nonetheless, there seems reason to believe that with appropriately sensitive teaching 
methods, more children with OS could be encouraged to develop to their full 
potential. 
Two distinct psychological approaches to research into learning difficulties in 
mentally handicapped children dominate the literature, one based in cognitive 
theories of mental handicap, the other emphasising motivational deficits. The 
cognitive approach emphasises deficits in cognitive functioning as the source of 
learning difficulties: development in the mentally handicapped is generally 
characterised as identical in nature to cognitive development in normal children, 
with only rate and end-point of development differentiating the two populations 
(Illingworth, 1980). In contrast, motivational theorists emphasise the role of 
motivational deficiencies, often classifying the mentally handicapped as "failure 
avoiders" (Cromwell, 1967): more motivated to avoid failure than to achieve 
success, the mentally handicapped are characterised as avoiding learning situations 
and responding poorly to traditional trial-and-error teaching methods (for reviews, 
see Zigler and Balla, 1982). The motivational and cognitive approaches outlined 
rarely overlap in any investigation of learning processes in mentally handicapped 
children. It is possible, however, that the cognitive deficits seen in the OS child may 
to some extent result from motivational problems: frequent early experience of 
failure may erode motivation to learn, thereby contributing directly to subsequent 
deficits in functioning. 
It is, of course, impossible to examine motivation or cognition in isolation from 
each other. Terms such as "cognitive style" acknowledge this. However, different 
teaching strategies place differing emphases on these two performance factors . The 
study reported here sought to compare two different methods for teaching 
discrimination to young children with OS: trial-and-error learning and errorless 
learning. 
Errorless learning is the most widely-used strategy for teaching new skills to the 
mentally handicapped. It has proved highly effective in teaching adolescents 
practical discrimination skills, skills previously unlearned when conventional 
methods were used (Cullen, 1976; Mcivor and McGinley, 1983; Adams, 1984). To 
some degree, its adoption implies recognition of the possibility that motivational 
factors may influence cognitive outcome, but generally its use stems from the more 
pessimistic belief that the experience of erring in a learning situation will always be 
counter-productive in the mentally handicapped, adding to already existing 
cognitive problems. 
Despite the widespread use of errorless teaching strategies with all ages of 
handicapped children, few published studies have directly compared its efficiency 
with more traditional teaching methods. The most interesting papers generally 
report single, older case studies aud often only anecdotal evidence of failure of other 
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teaching methods is given . Many learning theorists - in particular, Piaget (1936, 
1937, 1950)- would argue that erring is an essential element in the learning process 
and that error has as much to contribute to processes of cognitive development as 
success. Evidence of poor learning ability using traditional trial-and-error methods 
is not in itself evidence of inability to profit cognitively from mistakes: there has 
been little direct evidence to support the view that the mentally handicapped cannot 
also learn from their own mistakes. It is possible, then, that adoption of an 
exclusively errorless approach throughout development may in some way be 
perverting or undermining the normal course of early learning. 
In the study presented here, the relative effici ency of errorless and trial-and-
error methods in training discrimination skills in both DS and non-handicapped 
children was investigated. Two sets of tasks were used: shape discrimination and 
nonsense figure discrimination tasks. The use of nonsense figure tasks served as a 
control for any positive or negative effects that differential prior learning experience 
with the target concept might have on rest performance; balancing of order of 
presentation of the two training conditions allowed examination of any within-
session effects of exposure to the two kinds of learning situation. 
Three main hypotheses were tested: 
(1) That errorless learning would have a greater enhancing effect on 
performance than trial-and-error learning and that that effect would be 
greater in OS than in non-handicapped children. 
(2) That initial experience of errorless learning would enhance performance on 
a subsequently presented trial-and-error task and that this enhancement 
would be greater in DS children . 
(3) That initial experience of trial-and-error learning would adversely affect 
performance on a subsequently presented errorless task and that this effect 
would be present in OS children only. 
MET HOD 
Sample matching 
Direct mental age (MA) matching of handicapped and non-handicapped 
children was avoided for a number of reasons, both practical and theoretical. The 
validity of MA matching in handicap studies has frequently been questioned (Clarke 
and Clarke, 1975; Woodward, 1979; Wishart, 1986a). The MA composite is arrived 
at by simple addition of scores on a number of test items. This means that two 
children with widely differing ability profiles can achieve identical MAs. Even in the 
normal population, some "matches" must for some purposes be inaccurate. Even 
more vulnerable to criticism are MA matches of mentally-handicapped children to 
much younger non-handicapped children; the greater the chronological age gap, the 
more widely-differing the individual learning histories of the MA-matched children 
and the more inexact - and less meaningful - any such "match" is likely to be 
(Hogg and Moss, 1983). 
More importantly, perhaps, acceptance of psychometrically-based matching 
procedures implies acceptance of one particular theory of mental development in the 
handicapped , the "slow development" theory. This theory maintains that processes 
of cognitive development in the handicapped and non-handicapped are identical in 
nature, with only rate and end-point of development differing (see above). Recent 
research suggests, however, that learning in OS children may be radically different 
from that seen in normal children, with important qualitative as well as quantitative 
differences in learning processes existing in the two populations (Morss, 1983, 1985; 
Wishart, 1986b). Use of MA-matching involves accepting, moreover, that 
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motivational factors do not differentially influence performance in the two groups, 
that performance and competence are similarly linked in both populations. Again, 
there is evidence to suggest that this may not be the case (Byck, 1969; Balla and 
Zigler, 1979; Shaw, 1986; Wishart, 1987). 
Given the particular nature and aims of the study to be reported here, it seemed 
important to include neither of these theoretical assumptions in the experimental 
design. Children were therefore matched, not on MA, but on the basis of ability to 
pass a pre-test based on the discrimination tasks to be used in the experiment itself 
(see below). 
Down's Syndrome group. Thirteen children were selected from two Edinburgh 
special schools. Three were excluded on the basis of the pre-test (see below) and two 
had to be dropped because of inability to concentrate for long enough to take part 
effectively in the experiment. This left eight OS children, five males and three 
females, who completed the experiment (mean age: 7 years 9 months; SO: 14.6 
months). 
Non-handicapped group. Thirteen children were selected from two Edinburgh 
nursery schools. Four were already able to pass the pre-test and one further child 
had to be excluded later in the experiment becau.se of attention difficulties. Mean 
age of the remaining eight non-handicapped children was 2 years 6 months (SO: 4 
months). There were four males and four females. 
Procedure 
Testing of all children took place in a small room, as free from distractions as 
could be arranged within the school settings. Child and experimenter sat opposite 
each other at a small table. 
Selection pre-test. One of the two target stimuli (a rectangle or oval) was 
presented together with two alternative stimuli: one "orthodox" shape (circle, 
square, triangle or parallelogram) and one "unorthodox" shape, introduced to limit 
the possibility that the oval or rectangle would be "correctly" identified by a process 
of elimination of more familiar, known shapes (see Figure 1). 
FIGURE I 
TEsT CARDS U SED IN SUBJECT SELECTION PRE-TEST 
0 
0 
All shapes were of different colours and approximately 7 ems on their longest 
dimension. Each was centred on a white card, 12 em x 8 em. Position of shape to be 
identified was randomised over trials. Children were told: ''I am going to show you 
three cards with shapes on them. When I say the name of a shape, I want you to 
point to the card with that shape on it." 
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A minimum of 28 trials were given, a minimum of six of each target stimulus 
and four of each orthodox shape. Further trials were given as necessary until it could 
be established whether correct responses were due to random guessing or true ability 
to discriminate the shape in question. Responses were not differentially reinforced in 
this pre-test. Children were selected on the basis that they showed an ability to 
discriminate some shapes but were not yet able to discriminate rectangles and ovals. 
All children chosen on the basis of the selection pre-test went on to be presented 
with the pre-tests, training and post-tests of the shape discrimination tasks, followed 
by the training and post-tests of the nonsense figure discrimination tasks. (No pre-
test was required for either of the nonsense figure tasks since no prior knowledge 
could safely be assumed). Both groups of children were divided into two subgroups 
and order of presentation of errorless and trial-and-error training within each 
discrimination task balanced over subgroups and for each child. 
(A) Shape discrimination tasks 
Trial-and-error training used an oval as the target stimulus, errorless training a 
rectangle. 
Pre- and post-tests. Seven sets of cards, identical in format to those used in the 
selection pre-test, were used. (Initial use of 10 trials in both the pre- and post-test 
resulted in an unacceptably long procedure.) The target stimulus varied in size, 
colour and proportion over trials in order to represent the concept of rectangle or 
oval in its most general form. Position of target stimulus was randomised over trials. 
Instructions to children were as in the selection pre-test. 
(i) Trial-and-error training (oval). As in the pre-test, an oval was presented 
together with a common and an unorthodox shape. 15 trial sets of three cards were 
used. Colour but not size was varied over trials. Order of presentation of the 15 
cards was randomised. 
Children were told: "I am going to show you three cards with shapes on them 
just as I did the last time and I want you to point to the card with the shape I ask for. 
This time I will tell you if you are right." Correct responses were verbally praised. 
Incorrect responses were negatively reinforced; children were told: "No, that is not 
right. Try again the next time." 
(ii) Errorless training (rectangle) 15 trial sets of three cards were used. The trials 
were presented in an order by which two alternative stimuli to the rectangle were 
gradually "faded in", increasing in size while varying in shape over trials (see 
Figure 2). 
FIGURE 2 
ExAMPLES OF ERRORLESS lEARNING TEST CARDS 
(SHAPE DISCRIM INAT ION - RECTANGLE) 
D 0 D 0 
D D 0 D 
0 D D D 
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In the first two sets, the target stimulus was presented with two blank cards. In 
these and all subsequent trials, position of the target stimulus was randomised over 
trials, as was colour, the latter a precaution against misidentification of this as a 
relevant attribute of the target stimulus. Trials 3 and 4 consisted of a rectangle with 
two similarly coloured but much smaller (0.5 em) alternative shapes. The dimensions 
of the alternative shapes were gradually increased over trials 5-13. The final two 
trials consisted of three red shapes, a rectangle and two alternatives of equivalent 
dimensions. 
Verbal instructions to the children were identical to those given in the trial-and-
error training. Verbal praise was given each time the ch ild made a correct response. 
Errors were not commented on but, rather than proceeding with the next trial, the 
previous trial was re-presented, this procedure being repeated as necessary, until the 
child had shown mastery of that particular step in the training sequence. 
(B) Nonsense figure discrimination tasks 
Trial-and-error training used "nims" as the target stimulus, errorless training 
used "wugs" (see below) . 
Pre-tests. No pre-tests were presented since no prior knowledge of the concept 
of "nims" or "wugs" could be assumed. 
(i) Trial-and-error training ("nims"): 15 trial sets of three cards were presented, 
each showing a "nim" and two other nonsense figures of equivalent size and colour 
(see Figure 3). 
FIGURE 3 
ExAMPLES OF TRIAL-AND-ERROR lEARNING TEST CARDS 




Children were shown a drawing of a Mr Plimp- a "nim"-like figure - and 
told that he had some friends called "nims" in the pack of cards on the table. The 
aim of the game was to help Mr Plimp to find all the "nims". They were then told: 
"I am going to show you three cards with little men on them. I want you to point to 
the card you think has Mr Nim on it. Correct responses were verbally praised on 
behalf of Mr Plimp and when an incorrect response was made, children were told to 
try again next time. 
(ii) Errorless training ("wugs"): 15 trial sets of three cards were used. 
Alternative stimuli to the "wug" were faded in over trials in exactly the same way as 
in the errorless rectangle training. 
Post-tests. Post-test trials consisted of seven test card sets, each with either a 
"nim" or a "wug" and two othc:r similarly sized nonsense figures. 
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All responses in the pre-tests, training and post-tests were used in the analysis. 
Scores in the pre- and post-tests were expressed in terms of the number of correct 
responses made. Since the number of trials presented in the errorless procedure was 
child-determined, scores in the errorless and trial-and-error training periods were 
expressed as percentages (correct responses/total responses). 
Shape discrimination 
Pre-test trials. Pre-test scores on both shape tasks were compared in the DS and 
non-handicapped groups. No significant differences were found, thereby validating 
the procedure adopted for sample selection and matching (oval (trial-and-error): 
t = 1.078, df (14), NS; rectangle (errorless): t = 1.56, df (14), NS) . There were also 
no differences within groups in pre-test performance on the two discrimination tasks 
(DS: t = 0.74, df (7), NS; non-handicapped: t = 0.42, df (7), NS). 
Training trials. Table I shows the percentage of correct responses during trial-
and-error and errorless shape training trials for both the OS and the non-
handicapped children . Performance in the two training conditions differed 
significantly in the combined groups (t = 3.7, df (15), P < 0.005) and also in both 
groups taken separately (DS: t = 11.4, df (7), P < 0 · 0005); non-handicapped: 
t = 4.8, df (7), P < 0.005), with errorless training scores exceeding trial-and-error 
training scores in all three cases. 
T-tests comparing the trial-and-error training scores-of children initially trained 
with errorless learning and children with no prior training revealed a significant 
TABLE I 

















5) 80 40 
6) 85 46 
7) 100 33 
~100 ~ 
Non·llandicapped subjects 
I) 82 60 
2) 94 60 
3) 89 46 
4) 100 100 
~100 ~ 
6) 94 33 
n1oo M 
8) 94 46 
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difference in favour of those who had experienced the errorless training prior to 
presentation of the trial-and-error training (t = 2.15, df (14), P < 0.025). A similar, 
if weaker, effect existed in both groups when analysed separately (DS: t = 1.47, 
df (6), P < 0.10; non-handicapped: t = 1.63, df (6), P < 0.10). No effect of order of 
presentation of training conditions on errorless scores was found although there 
seemed to be a trend, in the DS group only, in favour of better performance in 
errorless training in children with no prior experience of trial-and-error shape 
learning (t = l. 70, df (6), P < 0 .10). 
Post-test trials. Table 2 shows the differential effects of the two training 
procedures on subsequent performance. Improvement in performance was 
calculated by comparing pre- and post-test scores. For the combined groups, 
performance improved more following errorless training (t = 1.78, (df 15), 
P < 0.05). This effect did not reach significance in either group, however, 
although it came closest to doing so in the non-handicapped group (t = 1.76, 
df (7), p < 0.10). 
There was no overall effect of order of training procedures on post-test 
improvement. Only the trial-and-error scores in the DS group varied significantly 
with order of presentation, with prior errorless experience enhancing subsequent 
trial-and-error performance (t = 1.96, df (6), P < 0.05). Improvement in perform-
ance in the two non-handicapped sub-groups was roughly equivalent in both 
training conditions, irrespective of their order of presentation . 
TABLE 2 
SHAPE DISCRIMINAT ION - EFFECTS OF ERRORLESS AND TRIAL-AND-ERROR TRAINING ON SuBSEQUENT 
PERFORMANCE : PRE-/ POST-TEST ScORE DIFFERENCES 
Errorless Training Trial-and-Error Training 
Scores (rectangle) Scores (oval) 
Pre- Post- Diff. Pre- Post- Diff. 
Initial training DS subjects 
I) 0 5 5 2 5 3 
Errorless 2) 0 7 7 5 7 2 
3) 4 7 3 2 7 5 
4) 2 4 2 6 5 
5) I 2 I I 2 I 
Trial-and-error 6) 0 5 5 2 5 3 
7) I 5 4 2 - I 
8) 3 6 3 4 3 
Non-handicapped subjects 
I) I 5 4 4 7 3 
Errorless 2) 3 6 3 2 6 4 
3) 2 6 4 2 3 I 
4) 6 7 I 7 7 0 
5) 4 7 3 2 7 5 
Trial-and-error 6) 2 6 4 I 5 4 
7) 2 7 5 2 2 0 
8) I 6 5 3 6 3 
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Nonsense figure discrimination 
Training trials. Errorless and trial-and-error training scores are set out in Table 
3. Errorless training scores reliably exceeded trial-and-error training scores, both 
overall and in each group, although this difference in scores was less pronounced in 
the non-handicapped group (overall: t = 6.15, df (15), P < 0.0005; DS: t = 5.96, 
df (7), P < 0.0005; non-handicapped: t = 3.31, df (7), P < 0.01). 
TABLE 3 




Initial training DS subJects 
I) 94 40 
Trial-and-error 2) 100 26 
3) 82 13 
4) 94 80 
5) 100 33 
Errorless 6) 94 46 
7) 100 40 
8) 100 86 
Non-handicapped subJects 
I) 100 33 
Trial-and-error 2) 100 100 
3) 94 66 
4) 100 73 
5) 100 33 
Errorless 6) 94 80 
7) 94 53 
8) 100 73 
Comparison of trial-and-error training scores of children initially given the 
errorless task and children with no prior training showed no significant differences, 
either for the combined groups or for either group taken separately. Nor was there 
any effect of training order on errorless training scores, although, as in the shape 
task, a trend in favour of the DS subgroup given this training condition first, i.e. 
with no prior trial-and-error experience, was present (t = -1.48, df (6), P < 0.10). 
Post-test trials. Since there were no pre-test scores, the differential effect of the 
two training strategies on nonsense figure discrimination was evaluated by 
comparison of post-test scores in the two training groups (see Table 4). Errorless 
learning proved superior in all comparisons, with the effect again more pronounced 
in the DS group than in the non-handicapped group (overall results: t = 3.6, df(15), 
P < 0.005; DS group: t = 3 .2, df (7), P < 0.01; non-handicapped group: t = 2.18, 
df (7), P < 0.05). Although a trend in favour of initial errorless learning was evident 
in the post-test scores of both the non-handicapped and DS groups, the differences 
failed to reach significance, either overall or for either group. 
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TABLE 4 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NONSENSE FIGURE POST-TEST ScORES AFTER ERRORLESS AND TRIAL-AND-ERROR 
TRAINING 
Errorless Trial-and-error 
training training Diff. 
Initio/ training DS subjects 
I ) 5 3 2 
Trial-and-error 2) 7 0 7 
3) 7 5 2 
4) 6 3 
5) 7 0 7 
Errorless 6) 6 0 6 
7) 7 7 0 
8) 7 7 0 
Non-hondicopped subjects 
I) 7 7 0 
Trial-and-error 2)7 7 0 
3) 6 3 3 
4) 7 7 0 
5) 6 
Errorless 6) 6 I 
7) 6 4 2 
8) 7 7 0 
DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to investigate and compare the efficiency of errorless and 
trial-and-error methods in teaching discrimination skills to normal and mentally 
handicapped children . As would have been expected, the non-handicapped group 
performed better than the handicapped group under trial-and-error training 
conditions. This kind of training most closely approximates the conditions 
encountered in everyday, natural learning situations, situations in which the non-
handicapped children, by definition, show superior learning skills. It was hoped, 
however, that the DS children might benefit more than the non-handicapped 
children from errorless training, in relative if not in absolute terms. Surprisingly 
perhaps, both groups of children appeared to benefit equally from errorless 
training, both during training and in the subsequently administered post-tests . While 
better training scores would have been expected almost by definition with errorless 
training, its enhancing effect on DS post-test scores is encouraging, particularly 
given that only one short training session was used. With larger groups and repeated 
training sessions, it wou ld seem reasonable to hope for even stronger carry-over 
effects. 
From the above, it is clear that the two groups responded very similarly to 
errorless training but very differently to trial-and-error training. While the 
differential effect in favour of errorless training existed in both groups, it was more 
pronounced in the DS group, in both training and post-test score comparisons. 
Again, to some degee, this was to be expected. For whatever reasons - ability or 
motivational differences - the trial-and-error training scores of the non-
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handicapped children would be predicted to be- and were- greater than those of 
the handicapped children, thereby narrowing the difference between training scores 
achieved under the two conditions. No such simple explanation can account for the 
differential effect on post-test scores. After trial-and-error training, post-test scores 
of the DS children were markedly inferior to those achieved by the non-handicapped 
children; after errorless training, however, post-test scores on both discrimination 
tasks matched those achieved by the non-handicapped children. The enhancement 
effect was particularly noticeable in the nonsense figure results, where errorless 
training doubled the post-test success rate of the OS children. 
Why should the differential effect of the two training conditions be so marked 
in the handicapped group? It was suggested in the introduction that motivational 
factors may adversely affect the expression of competence in performance in OS. If 
motivational factors do influence performance in handicapped children over and 
above cognitive limitations on their performance, it might be expected that initial 
successful experience with errorless learning, by increasing motivation to learn, 
might have a priming effect on subsequent performance; initial trial-and-error 
learning experience might perhaps have the opposite effect, adversely affecting 
performance and reducing motivation to perform to full potential on the second 
discrimination task, even with errorless training. No such within-session effect 
would be predicted in the non-handicapped scores. Given the superior ability and 
better balanced history of failure and success in this group, there is no reason to 
expect that their motivation to learn would be either reduced by trial-and-error 
experience or increased to any significant degree by errorless experience. If 
anything, experience of either form . of training, it might be predicted, would 
beneficially affect subsequent performance, simply by increasing familiarity with 
the type of task, a straightforward practice effect. 
Some limited support for the motivational hypothesis can be found by 
comparing training and post-test results in the two training subgroups of each group 
of children. Order of presentation of the two training conditions did appear to 
influence scores although the effect was not a strong one and, when present, was 
sometimes to be found in both groups of children . In both shape and nonsense 
figure discrimination tasks, for example, training scores favoured both of the 
subgroups given errorless training first, i.e ., the children with no prior trial-and-
error experience of the target concept; these trends in favour of errorless training 
were not, however, statistically significant in either group of children on either task. 
For OS children only, a statistically significant effect of training order was present in 
scores on the shape task; on the nonsense figure task again only a trend in favour of 
prior errorless training was evident. While these results are not very strong, they are 
consistent: in all cases where a trend was evident that trend was, without exception, 
in favour of children given errorless training first; in all cases, the effect was either 
greater or present only in the OS children . 
Some further support for the suggestion that prior, unsuccessful trial-and-error 
experience of a learning task can negatively affect training outcomes can be found 
by examining the differential enhancement effects of errorless training in the two 
discrimination tasks. In the nonsense figure tasks, tasks on which neither group 
could have had any prior learning experience, the enhancement effect of prior 
errorless training was clearly demonstrated, with the OS group benefiting most from 
prior error-free experience. A far weaker enhancement effect of errorless training 
procedures was found in the shape discrimination task results, both in the training 
and post-test scores. All children were likely to have had some prior experience of 
shape teaching, either formal or informal. Given that neither group of children were 
proficient yet in shape discrimination, any such prior learning experience must, of 
necessity, have been of a trial-and-error nature. 
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Although showing similar levels of pre-test ability, learning histories prior to 
training must, however, inevitably have differed in the two groups of children, even 
if only in terms of length . Given the difference in general ability levels of the two 
groups, it seems reasonable to assume that in their lengthier pre-history, DS children 
would also have been exposed to a higher absolute and relative rate of failure than 
the non-handicapped children. This prior negative experience could perhaps account 
for the poorer training outcome with these discrimination tasks; prior experience of 
failure was actually being added to in the testing situation, further lowering 
expectation of success, even on the errorless learning task. 
Overall, then, the results suggest that errorless learning techniques may be of 
value both in themselves and by virtue of the priming effect they appear to have on 
subsequently presented trial-and-error learning tasks. The fact that trial-and-error 
training appeared to depress DS performance, even on an errorless task, underlines 
the importance of ensuring that expectations in the handicapped do not lie in the 
direction of failure. It is easy to see how constant failure due to intrinsic deficits in 
functioning could negatively influence general expectations of success in any 
learning situation, resulting ultimately in a form of learned helplessness (Seligman, 
1975). 
Previous research suggests caution, however, in the use of errorless training. 
Dweck (1975), for instance, has questioned whether the most effective way of 
dealing with the poor response of mentally-handicapped children to failure is to 
eliminate the possibility of failure: teaching the child to respond positively to failure 
would seem in the long run to be more productive. Errorless learning is, after all, a 
very artificial teaching strategy, bearing little relation to real-life learning situations. 
Over-use could lead to an unhealthy and counterproductive dependence on this sort 
of learning support. Research also suggests that, while effective in teaching specific 
discriminations, errorless learning does not generalise readily to other tasks or even 
to post-tests of the same task (Gollin and Savoy, 1968; Etzel et at., 1981). The 
principles of errorless learning are, moreover, difficult to apply to higher level, more 
abstract learning tasks. Errorless learning may, however, play a useful role in the 
progression towards these more advanced forms of learning. Instead of imposing a 
difficult learning task on an apprehensive learner, errorless learning, by changing 
the success/failure rate that would normally be experienced, can perhaps be used to 
teach the child that he/she can learn and that learning can be easy, hopefully thereby 
raising motivation to put this newly realised skill to further use. 
Some anecdotal evidence from the study reported here can be offered in 
support of the contention that it is important to avoid the establishment of a 
"failure set" being generalised to areas of comparative or untested strength (see also 
Duffy, 1986). Patterns of performance in at least two of the DS children - children 
2 and 3, both 10-year-olds- suggested that the low scores achieved in the selection 
pre-test did not accurately reflect these children's current level of shape 
discrimination ability. When questioned at the end of the experiment, child 2 in fact 
readily admitted that he had deliberately underperformed in the earlier parts of the 
experiment (although this had not been obvious in any way to the experimenter at 
the time) . 
Similarly, two other DS children (also 10-year-olds) who were eventually 
excluded from the experiment, produced overly consistent incorrect responses in the 
selection pre-test; when offered tangible reinforcement for correct responses both 
changed to near perfect ability to discriminate the shapes in question (see also Byck, 
1969; Shaw, 1986). According to the teacher, in one case at least, this behaviour was 
likely to have been a deliberate tactic produced to avert the possibility of being 
presented with a more difficult task; this particular child was always reluctant to 
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admit to being able to perform certain tasks even when well within his abilities, 
apparently suspicious that good performance on an "easy" task would lead to being 
tested on more difficult tasks, where he was likely to experience failure. 
This reluctance to perform to full potential seemed to be a characteristic of only 
the older DS children tested. A 6-year-old DS boy who had to be excluded from the 
study made no attempt to hide his capabilities in the selection pre-test. The older DS 
children, by contrast, rather than allowing themselves to be placed in a situation 
over which they might have little control, seemed to be imposing their own control 
over the situation from the start, their poor performance very much a case of 
"won't do" rather than "can't do" (Koegel and Mentis, 1985) . . Whether this 
behaviour is characteristic only of DS or is a product of age in combination with 
mental retardation remains to be investigated . Two further mentally-handicapped 
but non-DS 10-year-olds were run through the experimental procedures; although 
differing widely in levels of discrimination ability, neither showed any tendency to 
underperform. A further larger-scale investigation of these aspects of DS 
performance would seem therefore to be worthwhile. 
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INSTABll.JTY OF PERFORMANCE ON COGNITIVE TESTS IN 
INFANTS AND YOUNG CHILDREN WITH DOWN'S SYNDROME 
BY JENNIFER G. WISHART AND LOUISE DUFFY 
(Edinburgh Centre for Research in Child Development) 
SUMMARY. Stability of cognitive performance in assessment situations was investigated in a group 
of 18 children with Down's Syndrome (DS) aged 6 months to 4 years. Two widely used tests of 
early cognitive development were presented: the Mental Scale of the Bayley Scales of Infant 
Development and a series of Piagetian object concept tasks. Both sets of tasks were presented in 
the same testing session, with testing repeated one to two weeks later. Both qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of performance were recorded. Even when overall scores were similar, 
patterns of pass/fails were very different in the two testing sessions. Successes showed poor 
stability over sessions with fails often occurring by default, the result of a refusal to engage fully 
in a particular task. This pattern of results suggests: (1) that single-session testing may not 
adequately assess cognitive status in DS children; (2) that the relationship between performance 
and competence may be unstable in such children, and (3) that "slow development" theories may 
not adequately describe cognitive development in young children with DS. 
INTRODUCTION 
WHILE considerable number of children with Down's Syndrome (DS) may also have motor 
or sensory handicaps, the major handicap is clearly cognitive. DS is the most common form 
of mental handicap in the UK and world-wide, accounting for approximately one-third of all 
children with severe mental handicap. DS provides researchers with a unique opportunity to 
investigate developmental processes in handicap: unlike most other forms of mental 
handicap, it occurs in large numbers, it is of known genetic origin and, most importantly, it 
can be confidently identified at birth. Careful, detailed study of early learning ability in 
children with DS may thus present us with unique insights inLo developmental processes in 
handicap. 
One of the major debates in research on development in mentally handicapped children 
is whether developmental processes are broadly equivalent to those seen in normal develop-
ment (only taking longer to unfold and progressing to a lower ceiling) or whether there are 
significant differences in both structure and organisation - the "difference versus delay" 
debate (Zigler and Balla, 1982). Recently, a growing body of evidence has suggested that 
learning in children with mental handicap may indeed differ in very fundamental ways from 
that seen in non-handicapped children, with important qualitative as well as quantitative 
differences existing between the two populations (Rogers, 1977; Morss, 1983, 1985; 
Macpherson, 1984; Rondal, 1984, 1988; Cherkes-Julkowski et al., 1986; Wishart, 1986, 
1987; Duffy and Wishart, 1987; Moss and Hogg, 1987; Dyer eta/., 1988). If this is the case, 
both developmental theory and educational practice will require substantial revision. 
Despite the increasing evidence that a delay theory may not adequately describe 
developmental processes in handicap, a surprisingly large number of studies have prejudged 
the issue in their experimental design, either explicitly or implicitly. This is particularly 
obvious in studies in which tasks designed for and standardised on young, non-handicapped 
children are presented to older, handicapped children. Failure is typically interpreted as 
evidence that a skill has yet to be acquired, that there is still a basic lack of competence in the 
area under study. Without evidence of the suitability of such tasks for children of that age, 
whether handicapped ornon-handicapped and in the absence of developmental data on young 
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handicapped children on these same tasks, such conclusions cannot be justified. The tasks 
may simply have failed to engage the older child, a case of"won 't do" rather than "can 't do" 
(Koegel and Mentis, 1985; Wishart, 1987). 
The assumption of slow development may be less obvious but is equally prevalent in 
other types of study. The widespread practice of matching handicapped and non-handicapped 
children on the basis of mental age (MA), for example, also assumes that developmental 
processes are identical in both sets of children and that both have reached the same stage in 
development by the same developmental pathways. This assumption seems unwise. It is well 
known that two children with identical MAs may nonetheless have very different develop-
mental profiles. The validity of MA scores as a measure of cognitive ability, moreover, 
depends on competence being accurately reflected in performance. Given the substantial and 
inevitable differences in learning histories, both in terms oflength and experience of success/ 
failure, it seems unlikely that performance and competence will be similarly linked in 
handicapped and non-handicapped children. This suggestion is backed up by findings from 
a number of studies which indicate that differences in performance between MA-matched 
handicapped and non-handicapped children are often due LO differences in motivation, the 
handicapped child frequen tly underperforming in many situations (Snyder, 1977; Siegel, 
1979). 
Trying to decide between the relative merits of the delay and difference arguments may 
in fact tum out to be a fruitless pursuit, as impossible a task as trying to portion out the exact 
and relative contributions of genes and environment to development To some extent, much 
of the argument depends on the level of analysis employed: studies in which the evidence 
appears to support a slow development theory may, on more detailed analysis, reveal the 
existence of importance differences (Kiernan, 1984). What it does draw our attention to, 
however, is the need for more detailed information on development in children with 
handicap, and especially for a beuer description of the earliest stages in that development. 
Until recently, surprisingly few data were available in sufficient detail to allow insightful 
comparison of developmental processes in handicapped and non-handicapped children. The 
majority of studies simply told us what we already know - that children with mental 
handicap do less well on almost any psychological test than do their non-handicapped peers. 
A growing number of studies are now directed at filling in these gaps in our 
understanding. The authors are presently conducting a series of interlinked cross-sectional 
and longitudinal studies of early learning and development in infants and young children with 
DS. These in-depth studies a im not only to assess the deficits in learning but also to identify 
the processes which impede that learning. The longer term aim is to identify the learning 
"style" of the child with OS and from that, to generate effective teaching procedures (for an 
overview, see Wishart, 1989). In the particular study to be described here, two tests of 
cognitive ability in infancy were presented on two occasions to a group of 18 infants and 
young children with OS. The two tests used were the Mental Scale of the Bayley Scales of 
Infant Development (BSID) and a set of Piagetian object concept tasks (covering Piaget's 
Stages III-V I). These tests were chosen firstly, because a substantial data-base, including 
detailed norms and reliability measures, was already available for non-handicapped children 
(Werner and Bayley, 1966; Bayley, 1969; Uzgiris and Hunt, 1975; Wishart and Bower, 1984, 
1985) and secondly, because both tests have been widely used in studies of mental 
development in handicapped children (for reviews see Gibson, 1978; Carr, 1985; Morss, 
1985). 
The study had three main aims: 
(1) to investigate the stability of performance of infants and young children with OS 
on standardised tests of cognitive development, 
(2) to investigate the relationship between performance and competence in children 
with OS, and 
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(3) to investigate the adequacy of describing early cognitive development in DS in 
terms of normal developmental processes. 
These aims seemed important for practical and theoretical reasons. The theoretical issues 
have already been discussed above. On the more practical level, assessment of cognitive 
ability plays a far greater role in the life of young children with mental handicap than in that 
of ordinary children (Morss, 1988): Many decisions, most obviously those concerning 
educational placement, are based on outcome measures from cognitive tests such as the ones 
used here. More often than not, the test is given only once and generally by an adult who is 
unfamiliar with the child; frequently the mother is not present. If such tests do not accurately 
measure mental ability in handicapped children or do not do so reliably, re-evaluation of the 
value of such testing would be indicated. If, moreover, the inadequacy of these tests results 
from basic differences in the ways that children with handicap approach learning, a re-
assessment of teaching methods would also be required: traditional teaching methods which 
are highly effective with ordinary children may be ineffective - or even counter-productive 
- when applied to mentally-handicapped children. 
METHOD 
Sample 
The Mental Scale of the BSID is designed to test for abilities which normally emerge 
between birth and 30 months; object concept tasks cover a similar age range, birth to 24 
months. Cognitive development in children with DS is generally described as progressing at 
a pproxi matel y half the normal rate (see, e.g., Berry e 1 a/., 1984). In order therefore to examine 
the validity and reliability of the two chosen tests over their whole range, 18 DS children in 
the age range 6 months to 4 years were recruited to the study, three at each of the following 
ages: 6, 12, 18, 24, 36 and 48 months. 
All children were confirmed by karyotyping as having Down's Syndrome (DS): all 
were standard Trisomy 21, with one also showing a small percentage of XXX cells. There 
were 13 females and 5 males. Nine children had congenital heart disease of varying degrees 
of severity (the majority minor), three had diagnosed hearing loss, four had minor visual 
impairments and one suffered from arthritis; none, however, had been hospitalised for any 
lengthy period during their development. All children had been volunteered by their parents 
and came from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds. Seven were first boms. Number 
of siblings at time of testing ranged between none and four. 
None of the children was naive to assessment situations. All were being regularly 
visited at home by the local authority's home teaching service and all but the three youngest 
and one 2-year-old had a lready participated in s tudies carried out by the present investigators. 
This is clearly a possible source of confounding variance but is an unavoidable feature of 
carrying out a research programme with any clinical population of restricted size and with 
this population in particular. As the average interval since last being seen by the authors was 
three months, it was considered unlikely that this factor would seriously affect the validity 
of this study. 
Each child in the presem study served as his or her own control. Since both tests had 
a lready been standardised on large groups of non-handicapped children and since the specific 
purpose of the study was to investigate the validity and reliability of the two chosen tests 
within this particular population, no direct control group of non-DS children was cons idered 
necessary. As indicated in the introduction, the present authors have in any case severe 
reservations, both practical and theoretical, about the value of using control groups matched 
on the basis of mental age. It was hoped that the present study would provide additional 
empirical support for this viewpoint. Controls matched for chronological age also seemed to 
have little to recommend them, being likely only to confirm what is already known- that 
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a child with DS will perform less well on cognitive tests than a child of the same age who has 
no handicap (Duffy and Wishart. 1987; Wishart. 1987). 
Procedure 
All testing took place in the Department of Psychology in a small, quiet room with 
minimal distracting features. Testing was scheduled for a time of day when the mother 
thought her child was most likely to be alert and co-operative. The mother was present 
throughout and the child sat on her knee for testing; mothers were asked to encourage their 
children if necessary but not to direct their responses in any way. 
Two sets of tasks, widely used to assess early cognitive ability, were presented: a series 
of Piagetian object concept tasks (presented by the first author), followed by items from the 
Mental Scale of the BSID. Testing was repeated one to two weeks later, with procedure 
identical in both sessions. All testing sessions were videorecorded for subsequent analysis. 
Object concept tasks: Object concept development is indexed by performance on a 
series of search tasks in which the hiding sequence increases in complexity according to the 
stage being tested (Piaget, 1937). In all but the simplest task, the infantmust choose between 
one of two identical occluders in order to retrieve a hidden toy; unless he or she fu lly 
comprehends the particular hiding sequence, performance can only be at chance level. 
Four levels of task, covering Stages Ill-VI of object concept development, were 
presented in ascending order of difficulty: Task 1, a simple 1-occluder hiding task; Task 2, 
a task involving retrieving an object from inside one of two possible occluders, the object 
having been visibly displaced from one to the other (widely known as the "AAB "task); Task 
3, an inference task, a task in which, on discovering the absence of the object from an expected 
location, the child must infer its true location; and Task 4, a 2-occluder "switching" task in 
which, following the hiding of the object, the positions of the two occluders are transposed 
before the child is allowed to search. White cardboard cups served as occluders and a varie ty 
of small toys as objects. Four trials of each task were given, with side of hiding randomised 
over trials. Success on all four trials was required foraccreditationofapasson any given level 
of task. 
Exact details of task procedure and a fuJI justification of scoring criteria adopted can 
be found in Wishart and Bower (1984). In that study, the ages by which 75 per cent of infants 
could pass Tasks 1 to 4 were 5, 10, 15 and 22+ months respectively. 
Mental Scale of Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID): Items from the BSID 
Mental Scale were presented in accordance with the procedural instructions given in the test 
manual (Bayley, 1969). A basal level was established and higher level test items then 
presented until a minimum of six consecutive fai lures had been recorded. From the raw score 
thus obtained, children were given an age equivalent (AE) level and, where possible, an MDI 
(Mental Development Index) score from the BSID normative tables. 
RESULTS 
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses of performance on the two task sets were 
carried out. 
Object concept tasks 
Success rates: Scores from the two testing sessions for each of the four levels of object 
concept task are shown in Table l . 
Success rates were not impressive at any age in either session. If total scores are con-
sidered, there was some evidence of scores increasing with increasing age (Jonckheere S = 
59; P<0.05); this increase was very modest, however, given the norms for these tasks and the 
large difference in age between youngest and oldest children (31 /2 years). With the exception 
of Task 1, success rates were generally poor on all levels of task. The results from Task 2 were 
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s urprising. The age by which most non-handicapped children can pass this task is 10 months. 
As might have been expected, the majority of 6-12 month-old handicapped children failed 
in both sessions; all butoneofthe 18-24 month-olds passed both times. This relatively easy 
task appeared to present difficulties to the 3-4 year-olds, however, with four fail ing in at least 
one session. Task 3 showed a more usual developmental pattern, with young childre n failing 
and only the very oldest children succeeding. Task 4 seemed d ifficolt at all ages, although 
there was some improvement in older children by the second testing session. 
TABLE I 
PA SS RATES ON EAcu OF ThE FouR UVELS OF OBJECT CoNCEPT TASKS IN THE Two ThsnNo SESSIONS 
Task 
2 3 4 
Testing 
Session I n I n I n I n 
Pass rate N Child 
Age (aU tasks varying over 
(months) combined) sessions 
6 I 2 (I/O) 0 0 (0/0) 0 0 (0/0) 0 0 (0/0) 3 
12 3 3 (0/0) 2 I (1/2) 0 0 (0/0) 0 ( I/O) 10 4 
18 3 3 (0/0) 3 3 (0/0) 0 0 (0/0) 0 I (1/0) 13 
24 3 3 (0/0) 3 2 (0/1) 0 0 (0/0) 0 0 (0/0) II I 
36 3 3 (0/0) 2 (1/0) 3 3 (0/0) 0 I (I/O) 16 2 
48 3 3 (0/0) I (0/0) 3 2 (0/1) 0 2 (2/0) 15 3 
Totals: 16 17 (I/O) 10 9 (2!3) 6 5 (0/1) 0 5 (5/0) 68 (8/4) 12 
Note: Numbers in parentheses: N children whose performance improved over sessions/ N children whose 
performance deteriorated. 
Stability of pass/fails: Although the grouped data indicated that success rates varied 
very little between sessions, this was not the case when individual records were examined. 
The performance of 12/18 children differed on at least one task in the two testing sessions (see 
Table 1 ). In eight cases, performance improved while four children failed to repeat an earlier 
success on re-testing (one 12-month-old improved performance on Task 4 but failed at a 
previously-passed level, on Task 2). 
Order of difficulty of tasks: Normative studies have established that these tasks form 
a developmental hierarchy, ascending in order of difficulty from Task 1 through to Task 4: 
a child who can pass Task 3, for example, can reliably be expected to pass Tasks 1 and 2 but 
not Task 4. Group scores for each of the four levels of task appeared to confirm this as the 
order of difficulty pertaining in the DS c hildren tested here (see Table 1). Closer examination 
of individual patterns of pass/fails did not support this conclusion, however. 
Differences in difficulty level between any two tasks on either testing session were 
computed for each child and the derived d ifficulty order compared with the normatively-
derived sequence. As in any task order analysis of cross-sectional data, each child provided 
data on the relative difficulty of only a subset of the tasks presented, those tasks falling to 
either side of his or her current developmental stage; any child who e ither failed or passed 
all tasks (two in this study) provided no relevant data. (For example: a child who passed Tasks 
1, 2 and 4 but failed Task 3, provided no data on the relative diffic ulty of Tasks 1, 2 and 4 to 
each other but did provide data on the difficulty of Task 3 in relation to each of these tasks; 
since, moreover, Task 3 was found to be more difficult than Task 4, the derived d ifficulty 
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order in this case could be classed as deviating from the normatively-derived hierarchy for 
these tasks.) 
In six out of the 16 cases where comparative information on task difficulty existed, 
order of difficulty did not match the norm for at least one task pairing (xl = 6.58 {dfl): 
P<O.Ol ). In two younger children, this was due to a reversal in difficulty level between Tasks 
3 and 4; in four older children, it was due to Task 2 proving more difficult than Task 3. 
Failures to engage: Over the two testing sessions, there were 76 instances where a 
child's performance did not meet the stringent statistical criteria necessary to score a pass. 
Inspection of performance protocols, however, suggested that many of these failures could 
not confidently be attributed to a straightforward absence of the required level of cognitive 
ability. In 55 cases, there was evidence that the child had not fully engaged in all of the four 
trials presented {Table 2), a frequency which would suggest extreme caution in using such 
data as a basis for assessing cognitive status in these children. 
TABLE2 
FREQUENCIES OP FAILURES To ENGAGE ON EAcH OF THE FouR OBJECT CoNCEPT TASKS IN 
EAcH AGE GROUP 
Age Session Totals 
(months) No. I 2 3 4 
tip 1/p 1/p 1/p 1/p 
6 I 1/0 2/0 2/0 2/0 7/0 
D 0!0 2/0 1/1 2/0 S/1 
12 I 0!0 1/0 1/2 2/0 4/2 
D 0!0 0/1 0/3 0/1 0/S 
18 0!0 0/1 1/1 0!0 1/2 
D 0!0 0!0 1/2 0/1 1/3 
24 I 0!0 0/0 1/1 1/0 2/1 
D 0!0 1/0 1/1 1/0 3/1 
36 I 0!0 1/2 0/0 3/0 4/2 
n 0!0 0/2 0!0 1/2 1/4 
48 0!0 1/1 0/0 0/1 1/2 
ll 0/0 1/1 1/0 1/0 3/1 
Totals: 1/0 9/8 9/11 13/S 32/24 
Note: t = total failure to engage; p = panial failure to engage 
(see text for definitions) 
Failure to engage occurred with near equal frequency in both sessions. It was defined 
as any instance where a child refused to attend to the hiding sequence or failed to search 
quickly and clearly for the hidden object (the success or failure of any search being 
immaterial). Failure to engage was classified as being either total or partial. It was classified 
as total if on any trial, the subject either (a) refused to attend to the full hiding sequence or 
(b) made no auempt at search. Since the criterion for a pass on all tasks was 4/4, this level of 
"switching out" meant that some children failed by default, rather than by making errors. 
Interestingly, many such children would happily re-engage, albeit it often only temporarily, 
in subsequent trials of another task, even although that task involved exactly the same test 
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materials and was of a higher level of difficulty than that just refused. Also noteworthy was 
that all but the very youngest children were as likely to opt out after a trial in which they had 
successfully re trieved the object as after one in which initial search had been unsuccessful. 
Failures to engage were often only partial. Although prepared to watch the hiding 
sequence and to search, it was clear that that search did not represent the child's best attempt 
at the problem being presented. As trials progressed, children would delay search, often 
attempting to divert the tester into some sort of social game by producing some sort of party-
trick (such as clapping hands) or response which was quite unrelated to the task in hand. This 
sort of behaviour can only make a difficult task more difficult, adding a memory component 
where none previously existed. Some children simply opted out of a particular task by 
refusing to commit themselves to either cup, sweeping both from the table, an inefficient, 
low-level strategy which led to recovery of the object but did not meet the criteria for a pass. 
Sided strategies: Less readily classifiable as refusals to engage (and not included in 
Table 2) were instances where children adopted a sided strategy, automatically choosing the 
cup on one side on every trial of a given taSk, irrespective of whether that cup had actually 
been involved in the relevant hiding sequence or not. There were 14 instances of a sided 
strategy being used, all but one occurring in relation to the two higher level taSks, Tasks 
3 and 4. 
These rates do not differ significantly from the frequencies of usage that would be 
expected on the basis of normative studies of these tasks. However, the quality of the 
behaviour and the response to its outcome were noticeably different to the first author, a 
highly experienced tester both of these tasks and of this population. A sided strategy is 
"correct" as often as it is "wrong" in the design adopted here. 
Typically, however, on trials where the strategy in fact failed , children showed no 
surprise or concern, simply going on quickly to search at the remaining cup. The side 
repeatedly chosen, moreover, corresponded to the child's demonstrated hand preference in 
all but two instances. This is not unusual for Task 4 but is highly unusual for Task 3, where 
a sided strategy is generally the result of a tendency to repeat search to the side which flfSt 
produced success. This suggests that while on the surface these children appeared to be co-
operating, there was little true task engagement, the strategy adopted being one of conven-
ience rather than one evolved from cognitive considerations. 
A number of other indications of falling levels of task engagement were repeatedly 
observed within trial sets of a given taSk. Auention became increasingly difficult to capture 
and often drifted during hiding sequences, and search was clearly less motivated. In Task 3, 
for example, exhaustive search of all possible locations in early trials fell to 1-stage search 
in later trials: both qualify as "fails" on statistical criteria but the number oflocations searched 
in this task has been shown in normative research to be a good indicator of developmental 
status. Similar evidence of reduced effort was found for Task 4; errors- quickly corrected 
in initial trials-were simply accepted in later trials, the child sitting, as if helpless, waiting 
to be shown where the toy was. Since introduction of a new level of taSk led to a revival of 
effort and attention, this lower-level responding could not be attributed to simple fatigue 
effects, to basic attentional deficits or to an overall low level of motivation. 
Mental Scale of Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID) 
Raw scores: In over half the testing sessions, raw scores on the BSID Mental Scale were 
too low to be converted into Mental Development Indices (MDis). BSID data were therefore 
treated in terms of raw scores and their age-equivalent (AE) levels. 
Table 3 shows the mean raw scores in the two testing sessions for the six age groups 
tested. Raw scores increased significantly with increasing age (Jonckheere S = 127; P<O.Ol 
for both sessions). Even the six-month-olds, however, scored Ito 2 months below the norm 
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for their age, a deficit in performance which widened with increasing age, the oldest children 
scoring at levels between 18 and 28 months behind expected levels for non-handicapped 
children of similar age. 
TABLE3 
RAw ScoRES AND VARIABILITY ON THE BSID MENTAL ScALE IN THE Soc 
AGE GROUPS 
Age Testing Session 
(months) I n Total N iLcms varying 
over sessions 
Mean score (AE) Fail-LO-pass Pass-Lo-fail 
6 SS.3 ( 4 .S) S3.3 ( 4.S) 12 19 
12 77.3 ( 7.0) 75.6 ( 7.0) 10 IS 
18 100.0 (11.0) 99.7 (11.0) 11 13 
24 109.0 (13.0) 108.7 (13.0) 16 16 
36 131.3 (I 9.0) 130.3 (19.0) 12 IS 
48 142.3 (22.0) 142.3 (22.0) 13 13 
Totals: 74 91 
Nole: AE =age cquiva1enLlevel (in months) 
Stability of pass/fails: In order to examine the stability of pass/fails, two measures of 
reliability were taken: a comparison of the raw scores achieved by each child in the two testing 
sessions (the most direct measure of the reliability of an "intelligence" test) and a more 
detailed analysis of the item-item consistency for each child over the two testing sessions. 
Quite different pictures emerged from these two analyses. Comparison of raw scores 
indicated that there was no significant difference in performance over the two sessions (t = 
0.76, (df 17); NS). Examination of individual performance profiles, however, showed that 
even where raw scores were very similar (or even identical), performance had in fact changed 
on a substantial number of items (see Table 3). 
Item-item agreement over sessions in individual children would be the most obvious 
and sensitive measure of a test's reliability. No such normative data are provided by Bayley, 
however. Re-test data from a very small sample of children (28) at only one age level (8 
months) are presented and no indication of the reliability of test items for individual children 
is given, only the relative reliability of individual test items. Procedure, moreover, varied 
from the standard testing procedure in that all re-test children were given the same number 
of items, irrespective of their individual ability levels. In order, therefore, to investigate 
whether variability in performance was greater in the sample ofDS children tested here than 
in the normative sample, the variability in each individual child's scores over the two testing 
sessions was compared to the variability which would be predicted on the basis of the 
standard errors of measurement (SEm) provided in the BSID manual for the range of mental 
ages covered by the test. As a measure of reliability, this is likely to be an over- rather than 
under-estimate of the variability in scores to be expected in individual children. 
In most cases, scores were too low to be converted into MDis. Comparisons were 
therefore carried out against the variability predicted in raw scores on the basis of the SEm 
and AE level for each child (for a child of 24 months with an age equivalent level of 12 
months, for example, raw scores would be expected to vary by a maximum of 6 points on re-
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testing). A t-test indicated that there was a significant difference between observed and 
expected variability over the two sessions (t = 2.78, df (17), P<0.01). Overall, there were 165 
cases of item instability: in 74 cases, items which had been failed in the first session were 
passed in the second session; in 91 cases, the change was in the opposite direction, a 
previously passed item being failed on re-testing <.f= 0.96 (df 1): NS). Degree of variability 
and ratio of pass-to-fail to fail-to-pass changes were similar at all ages (t= -0.82, (df17); NS). 
Pauemsoffails-to-passes andofpasses-to-failsareequallyinteresting butfordifferent 
reasons. A fail-to-pass could result from a genuine developmental advance having been made 
between sessions. However, given the short interval between testing sessions, this was 
unlilcely to be the case when performance improved on a substantial number of items in the 
second session. It was also unlikely that any such improvement could have resulted merely 
from increased fami liarity with the tester on the second session, since she was already 
familiar to most of the children on the first testing session. More likely is that fluctuating 
levels of task engagement were responsible for the instability shown. In this respect, a pass-
to-fail pattern is far less ambiguous. Clearly the required behaviour was in the child's 
repertoire but was not for some reason being reproduced on the second testing. This 
instability must inevitably lead to underestimation of the child's true competence. Unlike 
fails, any pass, whether produced in the first or the second session, is likely to be genuine; 
few of the BSID items permit chance success. When the children tested here were credited 
with all items on which they had scored a pass, regardless of its stability, this "optimal" score 
proved - not surprisingly- to be consistently higher than the score actually achieved in 
e ither of the two testing sessions (lsi/2nd session: t = 2.60/3.24 (dfl7); P<O.Ol/0.005). 
A further analysis of the difficulty level ofthose items which proved to be unstable was 
carried out in which each item which varied was related to the developmental level of each 
child. The midpoint between lowest basal and highest ceiling levels attained over the two 
sessions was determined for each child and the numbers of pass-to-fail and fail-to-pass items 
which fell below and above this midpoint were calculated. Numbers of fail -to-pass items fell 
equally on e ither side of this midpoint. There was, however, a trend for more pass-to-fail 
items to occur above than below this midline and for these to exceed the number of fail-to-
pass items above this point (t = 1.40/1.24 (dfl7); P<O.l O/NS respectively). 
Failures to engage: Given how unstable performance was, it seemed worth investigat-
ing the possible source of this instability. Failures to engage were more difficult to define in 
relation to the BSID items. Unlike the object concept tasks, BSID items vary greatly, both 
in content and in terms of task demands. It is particularly difficult to identify with any 
confidence any failure to engage in relation to items at the bottom end of the scale, where to 
be credited with a pass the child has simply to respond to a stimulus (e.g., regards cube,tums 
head to rattle). In these cases, it is impossible to distinguish between a criterion fa il , indicating 
absence of the required level of cognitive ability, and a fail by default, where failure is due 
to the child having refused to engage. At all levels, the BSID also includes a number of 
" incidental" items, items in which there is no particular task to be engaged in (e.g., vocalises 
once or twice, repeats performance laughed at); by definition, these too cannot be incorpo-
rated into any failure-to-engage analysis. Forty-seven out of the 165 cases of item instability 
were omitted from the analys is below on these grounds, although it is perhaps worth noting 
that as performance did differ on these items (and not in all cases in the fail -to-pass direction), 
it seems highly probable that something other than lack of the required cognitive ability was 
determining poor performance in one or other session. 
In the 118 remainingeligiblecases,subjectrecords were re-examined for any evidence 
of fai lure to engage on the failed item. Failure to engage was defined as any instance where 
the child's response fell into one of the following three categories: (1) refusal to attend to the 
task, (2) rejection of the task object by casting, swiping or dropping it on the floor, or (3) 
repeated production o( an inappropriate, off-task behaviour in response to the task materials. 
In over half of the cases where performance on items differed over sessions, failure was 
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clearly due to the child refusing to engage in the task: in 40/64 cases in the pass-to-fail 
direction, and in 26/54 in the fail-to-pass direction. 
DISCUSSION 
The low levels of ability demonstrated were somewhat discouraging, given the effort 
and funds presently being diverted into early intervention programmes for DS children. 
Unlike DS children in the 1960s, all of the children in this study had home teachers, all were 
being brought up in their own homes and all had highly motivated parents, all of whom 
believed in actively encouraging their child's development in all areas. Ability levels differed 
very little, however, from those seen in earlier studies of this population (for overview, see 
Gibson, 1978). On average, performance was at approximately half the level that would have 
been expected given their chronological ages, a finding consistent with recent results from 
studies in the USA, Australia, Canada and Germany (Pueschel, 1984 ; Rauh et al., 1987). 
Although at one level the results lend support to a "slow development" theory, there 
did seem to be important differences in the way in which the children with DS responded tO 
both sets of tasks. These particular tasks were selected for study because although neither test 
was specifically designed for or standardised on handicapped children, both have been used 
widely to assess early cognitive development in handicapped children. Object concept 
development was considered by Piagetto be prototypical of all cognitive development, and 
fifty years on object concept studies still dominate much of the literature on learning in 
handicapped and non-handicapped children (for reviews, see Schuberth, 1982; Harris, 1988). 
In a review of psychological tests of early cognitive ability, Francis et al. (1987) described 
the Bayley Scales as "unrivalled at determining a child' s developmental status in relation to 
its age-mates". Only a few studies suggest that either test has any great predictive validity 
(e.g., Wachs, 1975; Siegel, 1981), but it is generally accepted that each has both concurrent 
and construct validity - that is, that they reliably measure in a single testing session whether 
a child has or has not reached important stages in early cognitive development. 
The present results would suggest that neither test does this in the case of mentally 
handicapped children. On both sets of tasks, the variability in performance was far greater 
than would have been expected on the basis of large-scale normative studies (Bayley, 1969; 
Homer, 1980; Morss, 1985; Wishart and Bower, 1985). In the object concept tasks, there was 
no simple pattern to the variability demonstrated, either in terms of age or task level. The 
performance of 12 children varied over sessions and all levels of tasks showed some 
instability (although it was most frequently seen in Tasks 2 and 4). "Switching out", however, 
was consistently associated with all of these apparent reversals in ability, children failing tO 
complete a ll four trials or responding in an inappropriate or stereotyped fashion in either the 
first or second testing session. Failures to engage were equally prevalent in response to the 
Bayley items and it was c lear from the analysis of"optimal" versus typical performance that 
in these tasks too, virtua lly all the children were underperforming to some degree in both 
sessions. 
The many failures to engage suggest that motivational factors play an important role 
in the expression of competence in performance in young children with DS. In the object 
concept tasks, this "switching out" may have been responsible for the disruption found to the 
order of difficulty these tasks normally hold to each other. Longitudinal research with 3-5 
year-olds and with infants with OS has indicated that failure on object concept tasks at later 
ages may not, as is commonly concluded, represent a failure to have acquired the requis ite 
cognitive skills but may result, rather, from a failure to consolidate these skiUs when they 
were firstacquired, in early infancy (Wishart, 1987; 1988a).In these studies, failure to engage 
appeared to result from the operation of two distinct processes, both of them linked tO the 
relationship between the difficulty level of the task being presented and the child's stage in 
development at time of testing. Infants in these longitudinal studies went tO considerable 
lengths tO avoid tasks of a level of difficulty one step or more above their current 
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developmental status. This was perhaps not surprising but unfortunately tasks previously 
mastered also fell out with the range of engagement, performance typically falling away in 
the months following initial acquisition. Only tasks falling within a narrowly defined range 
of difficulty were fully engaged in and reliably passed, suggesting that this form of cognitive 
avoidance adversely affects both the acquisition and consolidation stages of learning. The 
analysis of the Bayley data lends some support to this interpretation, with "switching out" and 
instability occurring in relation to items at both the easy and difficult ends of the child's 
developmental range. 
In both these previous Wishart studies and in the study reported here many task failures 
were by default, the result of the child refusing to participate in all trials of the task being 
presented. Often the child used- or more accurately, mis-used- social skills to get out of 
the task in hand (Wishart, 1988b ). Toclassif y such responses as "fails" or to describe the child 
as "umestable" is not particularly helpful, either to the child or to our understanding of that 
child. It is clear, however, that any attempt to modify performance in such situations will 
require a better understanding of developmental processes in children with handicap than that 
presently held. We shall also need deeper insight into the interrelationship of motivational 
factors, competence and performance in such children. In the case of some fai lures, it may 
be possible to modify testing procedures to suit the child's cognitive "style" be tter; it may be 
that the number of trials dictated by statistical considerations exceeds that considered to be 
cognitively or motivationally relevant to the post-acquisition child with DS. Overcoming 
poor engagement in the acquisition stage may be more difficult but it is perhaps possible that 
artificial enhancement of success/failure ratios could prevent avoidance behaviour becoming 
the routine response to difficult learning situations (Seligman, 1975). 
Obviously, a cross-sectional study such as this cannot provide any direct evidence on 
development or developmental processes and cannot therefore explain the mismatch be-
tween performance and competence found in so many of the children here. The instability 
shown could result from poor motivation, could reflect a basic instability in the learning 
process itself or could be due to a complex developmental interaction between inadequate 
motivation and inefficient learning processes, with poor motivation contributing directly to 
the growth of deficits in cognitive functioning. What can safely be concluded is that, if the 
instability demonstrated in assessment situations is characteristic of the DS child 's response 
to his or her everyday learning environment, quite clearly inefficient use is being made of 
whatever level of ability is present, a factor which can only add to the child's already existing 
handicap. 
Unstable performance may underlie a feature frequently commented on in relation to 
development in DS. Parents of DS children often comment that their child's development 
seems to be very uneven, several advances being made in a comparatively short period of 
time, only to be followed by a lengthy period in which development seems to have come to 
a virtual standstill. A number of researchers have found evidence supporting the suggestion 
that development in DS shows such "plateaux", periods which they have interpreted as 
periods of consolidation of recently acquired skills (e.g., Carr, 1975; Cunningham, 1988). 
Others are less optimistic, seeing these plateaux as evidence of the child meeting a 
"developmental wall", a period during which no development takes place at all (Gibson, 
1978). Neither may in fact bean accuratedescriptionofwhat is going on. If individual profiles 
are monitored, we may find that these apparent lulls in development are as much due to the 
dropping out of previously passed items as to any failure to make progress on new, higher 
level tasks. 
A longitudinal study presently in progress aims to test out this alternate hypothesis. If 
this docs show poor stability of new acquisitions, clearly teaching effort will have to be 
directed not on! y at encouraging development of new skills but also at ensuring that recently 
acquired skills are adequately consolidated. How easy it will be to bypass the DS child's 
apparent inclination to avoid this remains to be seen. Some evidence does exist that tailoring 
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of teaching methods to the particular needs and skills of the handicapped child can improve 
performance and can lead to positive carry over effects in less structured learning situations 
(see, e.g., Duffy and Wishart, 1987); it is not yet clear, however, whether any long-term 
benefits accrue from this type of approach (Wishart, 1986). Amplified developmental 
instability may, as Shapiro (1983) suggests, be built into the learning system, an inevitable 
effect of the trisomy on development, affecting all but the most buffered areas of develop-
ment; the degree to which this instability may be compensated for through environmentally-
based intervention remains an open question. 
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